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FOREWORD
The American way of war in the twentieth century required the ability to project
combat power effectively onto foreign shores from a homeland reasonably secure
from adversarial threats. Using the current doctrinal terminology, the homeland was
the core strategic support area from which US forces could mobilize, deploy, employ,
and sustain combat power against enemies abroad.
Expectations surrounding future warfare with a near-peer adversary leave little
hope for such unfettered power projection. The current strategic environment suggests
US forces will face contested deployment from enemies possessing the capabilities
to obstruct and disrupt kinetically and virtually.
Infrastructure critical to ensuring power projection is aging and easily susceptible
to attack. Processes and procedures critical for these functions are only partially
under the control of the military. Civil-military coordination requirements will span
federal, state, and local government, transforming the extant paradigm from Defense
Support of Civil Authorities to Civil Support of Military Activities.
This study, undertaken in 2018 for an integrated research project headed by the
Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group of the Army War College Center for
Strategic Leadership, contributes to the thinking that will be required to prepare
US forces—and, especially, the US Army—for “contested deployment.” While
acknowledging a broad swath of issue areas, the study focuses predominantly
on physical infrastructure issues that will impact the ability of the United States to
mobilize, deploy, employ, and sustain its forces. While the study’s findings and
recommendations are not always intuitive when compared to effective business
practices, they promote a necessary redundancy made urgent by the threat of
determined nation-state opponents or their proxies.

COLONEL JAKE LARKOWICH
Director
Center for Strategic Leadership
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SUMMARY
Early in academic year 2018, a group of US Army War College faculty
and students came together in pursuit of an integrated research project
devoted to an examination of contested deployment and the growing
realization the US homeland can no longer be considered an inviolable zone in
preparing for war. Expecting free movement of forces in mobilization, movement to
ports of embarkation, and deployment against the nation’s adversaries is beneath reason.
Two oceans and benevolent neighbors to the north and south can no longer be
considered a significant buffer against internal and external enemies. Adversaries of
the United States will seek to disrupt or disable the movement of its forces long
before they can be placed in combat against foes overseas, and the nation must be
prepared for this opposition.
Gray zone activities, hybrid warfare, and the obfuscation of the boundaries between
competition and conflict signal a new urgency for examinations such as this one.
This study is not exhaustive; the participants made a conscious decision to limit their
examination to a few—albeit immediate—physical considerations among the challenges
US forces would most likely face when moving “from fort-to-port.”
The study begins with a discussion of the fundamentals of contested deployment.
Current doctrine and recent events, from the COVID-19 pandemic to social unrest,
focus attention on Department of Defense support to civil authorities. In a contested
deployment scenario, planners and policymakers need to consider the ways in which
the coordination process would work when the military needs the support of state,
local, tribal, and territorial resources to overcome adversaries’ obstacles to
deployment. Next, the study continues with an examination of the 22 US strategic
seaports, identifying issues ranging from throughput to security and the structural
integrity of port infrastructure.
Infrastructure readiness is not limited to seaports. Thus, an examination of the
current state of the Interstate Highway System, its criticality to successful deployment,
and the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries follows. Then, a review of
munition production and distribution and the vulnerabilities of the business model
that sustains the employment of US forces is provided.
Many other issues require the military’s attention in general and the US Army’s
attention in particular. One set of issues, for instance, is addressed by Professor Ben
Leitzel of the Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership in an integrated
research project recommending ways in which Department of Defense cyber units
might respond to a cyberattack on critical infrastructure supporting the deployment
of forces. Similarly, a paper written by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Ladd (US
Army Reserve), while a member of the US Army War College class of 2018,
addresses the critical issue of mobilizing the reserve component. Ladd introduces
difficulties that could be encountered if the complex issues surrounding mobilization
are exacerbated by deliberate obstructions that are predictable in a contested
deployment environment. Both of these studies are included as appendices to this
study.
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The realization the homeland can no longer guarantee a secure space for
mobilization and deployment is recognized in current defense strategy and evolving
Army doctrine. The observations, issues, and recommendations in this study are this
US Army War College team’s contribution to the next step—realistically preparing
for and addressing the disruption or disabling of US forces during mobilization.

xii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Future deployment activities within the homeland during large-scale multi-domain
operations (MDO) will require close civil support to military activities to ensure the
generating force can sustain and project forces to various operational theaters. Evolving
MDO doctrine identifies the homeland as the core strategic support area (SSA)—
“the area of cross-combatant command coordination, strategic sea and air lines
of communications, and the homeland.”1 Future adversaries will seek to disrupt
and degrade the United States’ ability to move personnel and materiel through the
battlefield framework from homeland basing to the forward fight. This chapter
expands the discussion of contested deployment operations within the SSA.
We define contested deployment as deployment operations faced with incidental,
inadvertent, or deliberate obstruction, resulting in a prohibition of, or significant delay
in, the relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Adversaries’
capabilities have expanded the battlefield geographically to the homeland, limiting
its status as a sanctuary and impeding freedom of maneuver.2 Thus, beginning
planning for readiness and deployment operations within the homeland as if it were a
contested environment is critical. The contested spaces discussion will cover both areas
where US or coalition forces can challenge adversaries and areas where adversaries
can challenge US or coalition forces to deny freedom of action.3 Only through deep
engagement and dialogue about the challenges associated with this emerging
operational environment can we successfully address the risks.
The emerging security environment, “more complex and volatile than any we have
experienced in recent memory,” leaves little doubt the next conventional conflict we face
will occur within the territorial confines of the United States.4 The US Army Training
and Doctrine Command pamphlet, US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, outlines a
future operational environment in which state and nonstate actors will expand operations
into the US homeland to disrupt US advantages.5 Power projection supporting combatant
commands originates in the continental United States as the core SSA for the Joint Force.6
Therefore, in future large-scale combat operations, the United States must expect nearpeer adversaries to take measures to delay, disrupt, or obstruct force-projection efforts
within the homeland. Accounting for contested deployment operations in the homeland
is an obligation the United States cannot ignore.
1. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations
2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 6, 2018), GL-9.
2. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the
Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2018), 3.
3.

TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, GL-2.

4.

Mattis, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy, 1.

5.

TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, iii, vi, 13.

6. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025–2040 (Fort
Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 2017).
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Expecting near-peer foes to allow the United States freedom of movement when
mobilizing its forces is no longer reasonable. Adversaries’ multi-domain capabilities
across an expanded battlefield, including the homeland, must be taken into account. The
chapters in this integrated research project focus on challenges to the movement of US
forces, from unit installations to ports of embarkation. The chapter authors investigate
key contested deployment operational topics dealing with force protection, strategic
seaports, the Interstate Highway System, and the risks of translating business model
efficiencies to military operations. The resulting recommendations for doctrine and
policy seek to stimulate professional discussion regarding the challenges of conducting
operations in the stateside SSA.
Evolving adversary capabilities mandate deployment operations within the
territorial confines of the United States be a part of military planning and an evolving
MDO doctrine. Future force projection operations to support combatant commands
must include operational considerations for generating homeland forces within
the MDO framework.7 The chapters of this study focus on critical components
that enable fort-to-port deployment operations.8 Anticipating and preparing for
contested operations within US borders is essential. We cannot win “over there” if we
lose “over here.”9
Charles Brady begins the second chapter by asserting the homeland has, indeed,
been a virtual sanctuary during relatively recent conflicts. Persistent fear of disruption
or sabotage at installations, transportation, and logistics nodes has not been felt since
World War II. This fear will most likely return in the future. He suggests a contested
deployment scenario would require adjustments to military and civilian coordination
and cooperation mechanisms to ensure the United States’ ability to deploy forces.
Current regulations and doctrine provide an initial framework, but force projection
operations in the homeland require more robust codified solutions to address civil
support to the Department of Defense.
Brady shows civil support of military movement is a critical component during a
contested scenario. In such a scenario, the Department of Defense would seek support
from civil authorities, reversing conventional thinking about DoD’s Defense Support
of Civil Authorities mission set. He suggests revising doctrine within the Army
may be a good start, but interagency and civil-military integration will be crucial
for success. A mechanism for this integration may be the National Preparedness
System, which Brady recommends expanding to include support to the Department of
Defense in protecting installations, lines of communication, and ports of embarkation
during conflict. Core documents should be revised to account for and further
develop the concepts of planning, prevention, and protection encompassing critical
7.

TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 13.

8. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Deployment and Redeployment, Army Techniques
Publication (ATP) 3-35 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 2015).
9. Bert Tussing and Barrett Parker, “The Multi-Domain Battle: What’s in It for the Homeland?,”
War Room (blog), November 10, 2017, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/multi-domain
-battle-whats-homeland/.

2

interagency and civilian support for force projection operations.10 In closing, Brady
reiterates his less-than-intuitive position that “the Army would be the supported unit
instead of the supporting unit” in a contested deployment scenario.
In the third chapter, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur C. Roscoe examines America’s
strategic seaports within the context of a contested deployment. His research addresses
approaches for mitigating deployment delays and disruptions engineered by adversaries
in addition to shortcomings caused by the posture and condition of existing seaport
infrastructure. Strategic seaports are a critical force projection enabler because 90 percent
of military cargo is transported by sea.11 The United States currently has 22 strategic
seaports, 17 of which are commercial ports the military may use to deploy resources
in the event of conflict overseas.12 While these strategic seaports have served their
purpose during the past two decades of operations, they may not be satisfactory in
the next war.
Citing several reports, Roscoe uncovers issues at multiple strategic seaports
with throughput, structural integrity, security, operational readiness, funding, and
authorities.13 Regarding port security, he points to substantive progress since the
9/11 attacks thanks to initiatives like the Security and Accountability for Every Port
Act of 2006 and the Port Security Grant Program.14 Beyond physical concerns, he
explores emerging cyber threats within the operational environment and cites the
transworld malware cyberattack on the Maersk seaport terminals in June 2017, which
for a time shut down operations in the Port of Los Angeles.15
In addition to the threat of cyberattacks against US seaports, Roscoe highlights
the danger electromagnetic pulse weapons pose as a military option for adversaries.16
He suggests an “e-bomb,” reportedly possessed by both Russia and China, could be a

10. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 4th ed. (Washington, DC:
Department of Homeland Security, October 28, 2019).
11. Zina D. Merritt, Defense Logistics: The Department of Defense’s Report on Strategic Seaports
Addressed All Congressionally Directed Elements, GAO-13-511R (Washington, DC: Government
Accountability Office, May 13, 2013), 1.
12.

Merritt, Defense Logistics, 1.

13. Donna J. Simkins et al., Port Look 2008: Strategic Seaports, Report SDD80T1 (Tysons, VA: LMI,
October 2008); and Merritt, Defense Logistics, 15.
14. Henry H. Willis, “Ten Years after the Safe Port Act, Are America’s Ports Secure?,” RAND Blog,
April 6, 2016, https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/attractive-targets.html; and John D. Donahue
and Mark H. Moore, eds., Ports in a Storm: Public Management in a Turbulent World (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 30.
15. Strengthening Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Coordination in Our Ports Act of 2017,
H.R. 3101, 115th Cong. (2017).
16. Terrorism and the EMP Threat to Homeland Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of
tLowell Wood, commissioner, Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse Commission).
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feasible means to disrupt port operations and could cause a cascading failure throughout
an entire power grid.17
In concluding the chapter, Roscoe makes several recommendations for mitigating
a contested deployment scenario involving our strategic seaports. First, he calls for
revising the outdated evaluation criteria used to select and designate seaports as
strategic ports. Developed by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command, the Army’s component of US Transportation Command, Roscoe holds the
current criteria is ill-suited for the emerging operational environment.18 Second, he
recommends incentivizing commercial port owners to seek necessary improvements
to the structural integrity of ports through grants and other programs. Finally, he
suggests a joint, civil-military approach to more significant cybersecurity measures.19
Ultimately, Roscoe contends, these joint assessments of the threats, devoted to
identifying clear points of failure in military deployment operations, would permit
appropriate prioritization and mitigation.
In the fourth chapter, Lieutenant Colonel John Bretthorst examines points of
failure related to the application of civilian business models to military operations.
He maintains the military’s current business-systems approach is detrimental
and essentially creates vulnerabilities that manifest as single failure points.
Business -model approaches that deliberately seek to eliminate redundancies may
degrade the military’s ability to operate effectively.20 He examines this apparent
dichotomy through its implications for munitions logistics and cites examples from
the two main military munitions terminals—Military Ocean Terminal Concord and
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point—to demonstrate the disadvantages associated
with a pure business-model perspective.21
Bretthorst notes most US munitions are now stored within the homeland because
of the drawdown of the US military presence in Europe and elsewhere following the

17. Jenna Baker McNeill and Richard Weitz, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack:
A Preventable Homeland Security Catastrophe (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation,
October 20, 2008); and Aylin Woodward, “Weak Links in US Power Grid Vulnerable in Event
of Catastrophe,” New Scientist (website), November 16, 2017, https://www.newscientist.com
/article/2153472-weak-links-in-us-power-grid-vulnerable-in-event-of-catastrophe/.
18.

Merritt, Defense Logistics, 1.

19. Department of Transportation, “US Department of Transportation Launches BUILD
Transportation Program, Announces $1.5 Billion Notice of Funding Opportunity,”Department
of Transportation, April 25, 2018, https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot3218; and
Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2017 Port Security Grant Program Fact Sheet,” Maritime
Security Outlook, n.d., https://www.maritimesecurityoutlook.com/images/2017_PSGP/FY_2017_PSGP
_Fact_Sheet_FINAL_508.pdf.
20. Everett C. Dolman, “On the Business Models of War,” Strategy Bridge (blog), November 22, 2017,
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/?author=56fdec1037013b09a736eeda.
21. Kimberly Hanson, “Military Ocean Terminals Play Strategic Role in Defense,” US Army, October 17,
2013, https://www.army.mil/article/113348/military_ocean_terminals_play_strategic_role_in_defense.
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collapse of the Soviet Union.22 This shift in storage sites necessitates bulk movement
to theaters of operation from the SSA, primarily through strategic seaports. He points
out seaports, by their very nature, are vulnerable to threats from land, sea, and air. 23
In addition, Military Ocean Terminal Concord and Military Ocean Terminal Sunny
Point are the only ports in the United States today capable of safely handling military
munitions, thus exacerbating the vulnerability. Though the consolidation of military
munitions ports advances a certain level of efficiency, this consolidation also creates a
positive targeting opportunity for enemies of the United States.
Asserting munitions nodes are exceptionally susceptible assets, Bretthorst stresses the
need to evaluate prevention, protection, mitigation, and recovery measures. He contends
protecting the munitions infrastructure is a shared responsibility among federal, state,
local, and territorial entities that requires vigilance among private- and public-sector
stakeholders as a critical prevention measure.24 While reducing munitions infrastructure
may appear logical in the business-efficiency model, he concludes this reduction would
leave the military far more susceptible to the disruption of its vital assets.
The ability of adversaries to interfere with the flow of munitions or disrupt or
destroy them in place is a matter of compelling urgency. Other factors of concern are
the decline in the munitions infrastructure industrial base, a reduced munitions-capable
labor force, the slow mobilization process of the force, and the designation of Military
Ocean Terminal Sunny Point and Military Ocean Terminal Concord as the only two vital
strategic munitions ports as single points of failure.
In the fifth chapter, Lieutenant Colonel Edmund “Beau” Riely investigates risks
to mobilization and deployment across the Interstate Highway System, officially
designated the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense
Highways. President Eisenhower envisioned the system as a network of major
highways designed to provide ease and safety in transportation, enhance the US economy,
and offer a means for the military to transport equipment and personnel to ports of
embarkation.25 The importance of these functions has been clear since the network’s
inception, leading Presidential Policy Directive 21 to designate the Transportation
Systems Sector as one of the country’s 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors.26
22. Stacie L. Pettyjohn, US Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2012), 83–89.
23. Keith Laing, “Lawmakers Fret about Potential Terrorist Attacks at US Ports,”
The Hill, October 27, 2015, https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/258290-lawmakers-fret
-about-potential-terrorist-attacks-at-us-ports.
24. Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2001), 70–71.
25. Elisheva Blas, “The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense
Highways: The Road to Success?,” History Teacher 44, no. 1 (November 2010): 1; Tim Minahan, “Interstate
Highways Pay Off,” Purchasing 121, no. 3 (September 5, 1996): 45; and Doug Briggs, “USTRANSCOM
JDPAC/SDDC TEA” (PowerPoint presentation, 2018 Committee on Transportation System Operations
Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, August 27–29), 11.
26. Barack Obama, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, Presidential Policy Directive 21
(Washington, DC: White House, February 12, 2013).
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Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations mandates the Department of Defense
integrate national defense requirements into the development, construction, and use of
the public Interstate Highway System.27 Riely posits the system, as one of the 16 Critical
Infrastructure Sectors, must be integrated into national readiness efforts for large-scale
mobilization. He identifies several vulnerabilities and concerns regarding the Interstate
Highway System and expresses a common US concern: The Interstate Highway System
is deteriorating. The problem is exacerbated by “increasing congestion, unprecedented
levels of travel—particularly by large trucks—and insufficient funding to make needed
repairs.”28 If left unfixed, these deficiencies will undermine the ability of US forces to
deploy. Riely notes the physical and structural trends the deficiencies represent create
vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited by multi-domain-capable adversaries.
Disruption across the Interstate Highway System could seriously interrupt
deployment operations, whether as a function of physical or cyberactivities. Riely
warns against the potential impact of US adversaries’ information operations designed
to foment disorder in the guise of transportation-related labor strikes and protests.29
Another set of exploitable vulnerabilities he explores is the transportation of hazardous
materials along the highway system. Chemical and petroleum shipments are the most
concerning because they are the most prevalent hazardous materials transported
on US roadways.30 The absence of a uniform regulatory authority that deals with the
transportation of chemicals and petroleum among states is disconcerting in the best of
times. Adding this daily misfunction to the potential for a deliberate attack should move
US discomfort past dangerous to ominous.
Riely offers straightforward measures to mitigate the threats to the Interstate
Highway System. For example, he recommends immediate attention be paid to repairing
and revitalizing the system, a challenge he acknowledges can only be met by Congress.
Next, realizing the challenge requires greater civilian-military coordination, Riely
proposes the National Guard Bureau and the Department of Homeland Security create
a team to explore preparation for and countering of contested deployment threats. For
the hazardous materials issue, he recommends the Department of Homeland Security
establish and enforce a hazardous materials quality-control standard akin to the one
provided by the National Association of Chemical Distributors.31 Finally, in a measure
incorporating public response and government initiative, he calls for the development of
27. Transportation Engineering Agency, “Highways for National Defense (HND),”
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, n.d., https://www.sddc.army
.mil/sites/TEA/FunctionsSpecialAssistant/Pages/HighwaysNationalDefense.aspx.
28.

Mark S. Kuhar, “Interstate Highway System Turns 60,” Rock Products 119, no. 7 (July 2016): 88.

29. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for US Military
Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2016), 41; and
Charles R. Burnett et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2016), 29.
30.

Mary A. Field, “Highway Security and Terrorism,” Review of Policy Research 21, no. 3 (May 2004).

31. “Responsible Distribution,” National Association of Chemical Distributors, n.d., https://www
.nacd.com/rd/about/.
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a national-level hotline, accompanied by interstate digital signage and other advertising
means, to increase awareness and provide for prevention simultaneously.
Ultimately, this integrated research project is designed to contribute to the discussion
of homeland contested deployment operations within the MDO framework. The project
does not serve as a comprehensive listing of all issues or challenges the United States may
face and is not prescriptive in addressing them. The goal of the project was to highlight
the issues and collectively assess the threats and the ability of the United States to meet
them. Ultimately, the United States must take a proactive, rather than reactive, approach
to addressing the threat of contested deployment.
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2. ARMY DEPLOYMENTS IN A CONTESTED HOMELAND:
A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTION
Even in a permissive environment, military deployments are contested by the sheer
difficulty of getting people, equipment, and supplies moving in unison and on time.
During marshaling and movement to ports of embarkation, fog and friction provide
plenty of resistance and set the stage for even more to come once operations begin at a
deployed location. Traditionally, unit movements from the United States occur, if not
in a stress-free environment, then at least in a relatively threat-free environment. What
happens when we add an adversary who is contesting our deployment to the workload?
Does the US Army have a plan for contested deployment?
This chapter examines the necessary military and civil-military procedures,
processes, policies, and relationships for ensuring the United States’ ability to deploy
forces within the homeland while the deployment is being contested by an active
threat. It also identifies the challenges and obstacles of contested deployment and
recommends planning and preparation actions for the Army to succeed with a primary
focus on a planning framework for protection, which is an essential joint function
critical for deploying in a contested environment. Specifically, the chapter examines
how the Army must provide for its security and plan for additional protection
support from civil authorities.
The definition of “protection” is the “[p]reservation of the effectiveness and
survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities,
information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries
of a given operational area.”1 The plan for protecting a deploying force and providing
the critical support it needs calls for a change in mindset by both the Army and the
nation. War is changing, the threat is changing, and the United States and its Army need
to adapt to these changes. The 2018 National Defense Strategy and many other current
strategic documents identify this fact. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
of the United States states, “It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.
America is a target. . . . During conflict, attacks against our critical defense, government,
and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.”2 The United States must plan and
prepare to mobilize and operate in this environment. Policymakers can use existing
Army and Department of Homeland Security doctrine and procedures to inform much
of this planning and preparation. With a basic framework for protection, the military can
adapt and focus more on the execution of deployment operations.
Current Army doctrine for protection and security covers deployed (that is,
in-theater) operations (Army Doctrine Publication 3-37, Protection) and the garrison
environment (Army Regulation 525-2, The Army Protection Program).3 In a contested
1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Washington, DC: Chairman of the JCS, 2021), 174.
2. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the
American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, January 2018), 3.
3. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Protection, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)
3-37 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2019); and HQDA, The Army Protection Program, Army Regulation
525-2 (Washington, DC: HQDA, December 8, 2014).
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deployment, these protection activities are vital to the survival of the force. These two
Army force protection and continuity-of-operations activities must overlap and become
operational (that is, tactically focused, as in a warfighting mode) to protect the force
and ensure mission-essential functions occur. Beyond organic Army capabilities for
protection, external support will also be required in a contested, fort-to-port scenario.
Given the increased threat, local, state, and federal authorities, as well as Joint Force
organizations, will be needed to a greater extent than is currently the case.
The protection framework discussed in this chapter applies to more than just
protection for the deploying force. The findings and recommendations apply to
protecting computers and networks, essential operations, infrastructure, emergency
management and response, health support, policing, security of information, and
installation property. The protection framework and the Army Protection Program (APP)
concept extend to other support and response functions required in the deployment
process, such as transportation, staging, and convoy control. The larger issue is how the
Army and the nation must adapt the current operational paradigm and doctrine to meet
the requirements of a contested deployment.
At this stage in our nation’s war on violent extremism, or violent extremism’s war
on our nation, the idea the Army could be attacked inside US borders should not be a
surprise.4 Events since the 9/11 attacks, such as the Boston Marathon bombers in April
2013 or the truck driver who mowed down cyclists and pedestrians in New York City in
October 2017 after being inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, are reminders
our homeland is contested. These incidents are not random. The mayhem has a purpose.
The enemy is no longer at the gates—it is within them. Servicemembers in the heartland
are targets, whether they are gunned down by a homegrown violent extremist at
recruiting stations in Chattanooga, Tennessee, or hunted on the Internet by the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria.5 The US Army Operating Concept describes a war in which
“enemy organizations expand operations to the US homeland. Enemies and adversaries
will operate beyond physical battlegrounds, and enemies will subvert efforts through
infiltration of US and partner forces (e.g., insider threat) while using propaganda and
disinformation to effect public perception.”6
Targeted and purposeful attacks will continue. The Army has adapted in the past
and must continue to adjust to these changing conditions to ensure deploying soldiers
and the enablers they require are protected. Realistically, a whole-of-government
response is required, and civil authorities and other governmental organizations
with homeland security responsibilities will be needed. Domestic agencies and
government organizations that traditionally call on the military for support for
4.

Mattis, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy, 3.

5. Kristina Sgueglia, “Chattanooga Shootings ‘Inspired’ by Terrorists, FBI Chief Says,” CNN,
December 16, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/16/us/chattanooga-shooting-terrorist-inspiration
/index.html; and Dugald McConnell and Brian Todd, “Purported ISIS Militants Post List of 1,400
US ‘Targets,’” CNN, August 13, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/13/world/isis-militants-american
-targets/index.html.
6. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The US Army Operating Concept:
Win in a Complex World 2020–2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC,
October 7, 2014), 10.
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domestic emergencies may take on tasks to support the military, whose focus will
be on national security missions overseas.7 The US military has entered a new era, and
this fact cannot be emphasized enough. To quote the director of the Homeland Defense
and Security Issues Group at the US Army War College, “Preparations for battle
must begin in the homeland. The home front will probably be part of the next major
battlefield, and the price of poor preparation will be paid by soldiers and civilians alike.
To ensure US forces are organized, trained, equipped, and postured, we must develop
battle concepts that consider the domestic battlefield. We cannot win ‘over there’ if we
lose ‘over here.’ ”8
The threat to a deployment could range from irregular attacks by small units or
single individuals intending to disrupt and terrorize servicemembers to even more
sophisticated attacks against critical infrastructure. Enemy forces in the homeland
contesting a deployment may attack port facilities, bridges, or highways used to
transport troops and equipment.9 Our adversaries could launch cyber or electromagnetic
attacks to “disrupt military command and control, banking and financial operations,
the electrical grid, and means of communication.”10 These threats will be persistent,
coordinated, diffused, and focused on the military and its deployment effort. The
Army recognizes this new challenge, and through decisive action and adapting
its protection and civil-military doctrine, it can meet and defeat the threats which
attempt to “counter US power projection . . . limit US freedom of action . . . overwhelm
defense systems, and impose a high cost on the United States to intervene in a
contingency or crisis.”11
The framework for protecting the Army in a contested homeland is Army Regulation
525-2, The Army Protection Program.12 This regulation establishes the protection
architecture and processes Army-wide for installation security, safety, emergency
response, and for maintaining mission-essential functions under duress from natural
or man-made causes.13 The Army Protection Program, the Army’s initial layer in the
homeland for the protection of forces, families, critical infrastructure, and functions
in a challenged environment, provides the starting point for securing Army activities,
including deployment. The challenge to operationalizing this doctrine will be doing so
under potential combat conditions inside the borders of the United States.
7. Department of the Army, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, ADP 3-28 (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, July 26, 2012), 3.
8. Bert Tussing and Barrett Parker, “The Multi-Domain Battle: What’s in It for the
Homeland?,” War Room (blog), November 10, 2017, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles
/multi-domain-battle-whats-homeland/.
9.

Mattis, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy, 3.

10. Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, December 2017), 12.
11.

TRADOC, US Army Operating Concept, 10.

12.

HQDA, Army Protection Program.

13.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, 7.
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Typically, Army installations and outlying sites containing reserve or National
Guard units execute APP procedures and protective measures in a steady-state
mode, free of adversarial threats. Drills confirm emergency response procedures,
and real-world emergencies are thankfully few and relatively short in duration.
The APP processes are born from experiences and lessons learned at installations
worldwide in different scenarios. The processes evolve over time, keep pace with
changes in threats, and safeguard the force and the fort. The program, founded on the
core Army values of leadership, protection, and mission accomplishment, exists so
Army communities and theiroperations can withstand the shock of a real-world hazard.
The Army’s response to the 2009 active-shooter incident at Fort Hood, Texas, illustrates
these principles in the face of a deadly attack and confirmed the importance of the
Army’s installation protection procedures and responses that saved lives, now detailed
in the Army Protection Program.14 Painful lessons learned from this incident were
incorporated into Army Regulation 525-2, which was published in 2014.
The Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team: Final Report identified key actions that were
essential to the fort’s resilience in the face of a lethal assault.15 The processes used by the
post, along with others developed over time, have been captured in the regulation. Fort
Hood continued operations, provided safety and security to its tenants, and effectively
coordinated with civil authorities to respond and care for soldiers in the midst of an
emergency.16 The Army’s first layer of security exists by virtue of the Army Protection
Program. With planning and preparation, this framework is a good starting point for
protecting a deploying force facing resistance.
The features of the Army Protection Program, for which the assistant
secretary of the Army (manpower and reserve affairs) and the deputy chief of
staff, G-3/5/7, have the lead, include 12 functional and three enabling areas.
Figure 2-1 shows how the execution of Army missions are supported by the Army
Protection Program.17 The program is a starting point for the daunting task of
protecting the Army in the homeland and enabling the force to deploy. Headquarters,
Department of the Army, directs the program, which manages “risks relative to
the safety and security of our Soldiers, civilians, family members, contractors,
facilities, infrastructure, and information.”18 The purpose of the program is to protect
against threats to a domestic Army and to enable mission-essential functions in an
environment in which an adversary has the “intent, capability, and opportunity to
cause loss or damage.”19

14. Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team, Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team: Final Report
(Washington, DC: US Army, August 4, 2010).
15.

Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team, Final Report.

16.

Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team, Final Report.

17.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, 8.

18.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, i.

19.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, 7, 37.
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Figure 2-1. Army Protection Program functional elements and enabling functions
In theory, the program is prepared to deal with all hazards, assuming it is applied,
sufficiently manned, and adequately resourced to meet its requirements. To achieve
these tasks, the APP doctrine or its implementing regulation must incorporate other
scenarios, such as future threats that may be envisioned. The program must recognize
the changing character of war and how it will affect base protection functions. This new
environment will most likely present an evolving range of threats of increasingly greater
magnitude and persistence of which will gradually increase. Heightened kinetic activity
with a longer duration and greater lethality will require scaling up the Army Protection
Program to meet the demand of such a scenario.
The 12 functional and three enabling areas cover the spectrum of vulnerability for
a contested deployment scenario.20 For protection from likely deployment threats,
the antiterrorism functions in the program direct “a collective, proactive effort
focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against Department of
Defense personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to
mission accomplishment.”21 Enabling the 12 functional elements are intelligence and
counter-intelligence, criminal intelligence, and security engineering. These functions
are familiar in a warfighting scenario, which a contested deployment would most
likely resemble. The entire construct of protection, as outlined in Army Regulation 525-2,
can be adapted to the future threats the United States is likely to face at home stations.
The Army Protection Program must be adapted, and then operationalized, to face this
environment and protect the Army’s maneuvers to ports of embarkation.
20.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, 21–25.

21.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, 21.
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The challenge for a garrison commander and staff will be to execute and sustain the
program in a contested scenario. Achieving adequate levels of resources and expertise
will probably be a challenge. The APP framework must evolve to provide for protection
and continuity of operations during a contested deployment and exercises involving
a contested deployment scenario. As the regulation states, to be effective, the garrison
must conduct an “exercise that simulates a real event as closely as possible . . . to
evaluate integrated capabilities in a highly stressful environment that simulates actual
conditions . . . [and] tests capabilities, exercises most functions, . . . coordinate[s] the
efforts of several organizations, and [stands up] the Emergency Operations Center.”22
Although the Army Protection Program is robust in scope and intent and has been
proven to protect soldiers, installations, and essential services and functions under
adverse conditions, garrison forces will likely need more resources and manning in a
contested homeland scenario.23 Funding to provide for additional security supplies
and services, overtime for civilians, and additional soldiers to man potentially aroundthe-clock operations must be produced. As will be discussed later, soldiers from the
deploying force can be incorporated into the protection functions to augment APP
requirements. For sustained and adequate support, however, the garrison commander
has the responsibility per the program to coordinate with Headquarters, Department
of the Army, which can contact the Department of Defense, Joint activities, and
federal agencies for additional support.24 The requirements for providing this kind
of security and ongoing support will be extensive. Envisioning this scenario and
testing garrison capabilities will clarify the way ahead for providing the resources
required for garrison forces supporting a deploying force attempting to maneuver to
ports of embarkation.
The counterpart guidance to the Army Protection Program is Army Doctrine
Publication 3-37, Protection, which addresses a deployed, tactical environment.25 In
a contested deployment in an insecure homeland, deploying forces must activate this
function sooner than they may expect. Linking these two protection activities with the
available forces from both garrison and deploying units will facilitate an integrated
shield of protection.
This Army doctrine publication is capable guidance for protecting forces in
contact while conducting an operational deployment. Like the Army Protection
Progarm, it focuses on Army leadership, protection responsibilities, and mission
accomplishment. Deploying commanders in a contested environment have
the added task of safeguarding their forces. They must think and act as if in an
operational environment, outside the United States, facing the enemy in an
unfamiliar domain. The concepts universally apply, whether in a threatened
homeland or in Iraq or Afghanistan. Army Doctrine Publication 3-37 states, “The

22.

HQDA, Army Protection Program, 35.

23.

Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team, Final Report, 3, 13, 19–20.

24.
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25.
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commander’s inherent responsibility to protect and preserve the force and secure the
area of operations (AO) is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.”26
The wars and operating environments of the future will require a change in mindset.
The assumption the area from which a deployment inititates is a safe zone must change.
The area must be regarded as an operational area with an active threat to the deploying
force’s operation. Applying Army Doctrine Publication 3-37 to this scenario, “Protection
must be considered continuously throughout the operations process to identify threats
and hazards; implement control measures to prevent or mitigate enemy or adversary
actions; and manage capabilities to mitigate the effects and preserve time to react or
maneuver against the enemy to gain superiority and retain the initiative.”27
The bottom line—deployments from home will have to be executed under new
rules in future war scenarios, and the Army must provide actively for its protection
or be wiped out before ever getting “over there.”28 These protection functions entail
“[a]ctive defensive measures to protect friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure”
from an enemy or adversary.29 Besides the deployment effort, the deploying force’s
workload will include the protection tasks in the doctire that are of particular
importance to a deployment. These tasks are operations security, intelligence
and antiterrorism operations, survivability operations, force health protection, and
personnel recovery operations.30
The physical merger between deploying and garrison forces should coincide at the
Protection Executive Committee. The committee “is the APP management structure at
commands, installations, and stand-alone facilities that leverages APP principles and
best practices to coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and prioritize resources with a unity
of effort across the APP functional elements of protection.”31 The deploying commander
should therefore establish a protection cell and protection working group per the
doctrine and colocate them with the installation Protection Executive Committee.32 These
planning and execution cells serve similar functions and can jointly address issues.
The Protection Executive Committee, in conjunction with the working groups,
develops integrated protection plans that detail critical base and continuity operations
that must be protected.33
The installation’s emergency operations center provides “information management,
resource management, coordination, and emergency communications” during
emergencies or events that could “impact the installation’s mission, personnel, and/or
26.

HQDA, Protection, 1-3.

27.

HQDA, Protection, 1-3.

28.
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HQDA, Protection.
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infrastructure.”34 In a contested deployment, the emergency operations center would
serve as the focal point for activities between deploying forces and the garrison.
Manned with garrison staff and the deploying unit’s protection cell and protection
working group representatives, the center could oversee and coordinate activities
throughout the deployment. As the installation command, deploying unit, and local
authorities establish a movement corridor for the deploying elements—that is, a
“designated area established to protect and enable ground movement along a route”—
the center would monitor movement and security.35 Its activities among the garrison,
deploying units, local civil authorities, and higher and adjacent elements would provide
a coordinated approach to protection.
Ultimately, the Army relies on critical, external enablers to deploy. Agencies and
commands within the Department of Defense (most notably, US Transportation
Command) and federal, state, and local authorities whose domains the Army must
move on and through are essential partners. Along with roads, rail lines, embarkation
ports, and airfields located in the civil sector, the Army uses contracted commercial
sources. Coordination between the Army and civil entities is largely logistical. In a
contested environment, this coordination must also focus on protection. Services and
support for movement must be safeguarded, and, sometimes, one of these services must
be protection itself.
A changing operational mindset can leverage the strong ties the Army enjoys with
American society to support the Army in a contested homeland. An Army post and the
families it houses are part of the fabric of the communities in which they are located.
As an enterprise, the Army is financially important to its off-post neighbors. The
relationship goes beyond routine, mutual cooperation and economic benefits; it extends
to emergency response, support during crises, and the shared experience of pulling
together during tough times. The Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team: Final Report
highlights and reinforces these relationships serve both the Army’s and the community’s
interests.36 The Army Protection Program stresses Army installations must establish
agreements with civil officials for critical response and support to benefit both the Army
and the community.37 For example, in December 2017, the Madigan Army Medical
Center at Joint Base Lewis-McChord received and treated injured passengers from an
Amtrak derailment in nearby Tacoma, Washington.38 This incident is one of many that
demonstrate how military communities interact with civil components in a beneficial

34. HQDA, Army Emergency Management Program, Army Regulation 525-27 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
March 29, 2019).
35.
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and synergistic way to provide critical services and resiliencey. “The strength of our
nation is our Army,” and the strength of our Army is our nation.39
The strong, supportive relationship between military and civil elements must
be harnessed if the United States is to survive future war in the homeland, and these
bonds must be leveraged in a contested deployment. Civilian law enforcement and
Army protection officials must coordinate in detail—and in advance—to ensure soldiers
can operate and deploy in a contested environment. Proactive information sharing is
vital to both the Army and civil elements. During this cooperation, the Army may be
able to offer safety and security support to the local population.
Local authorities who agree to provide support to the Army may need to reach up
their chains of command and out to their support networks for backup in contested
deployment scenarios. Likewise, the Army must share information on civil-military
support agreements up the APP chain of command for awareness and integration at the
national response level. The APP provisions and structure are the chain of command for
this type of coordination. Per the Army Protection Program, the Department of the Army
maintains management and oversight boards and planning and assessment documents
and communicates throughout the service and outward to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, other services, and federal agencies.40 The purpose of these activities is to
coordinate and integrate the protection of the Army with the Joint Force and interagency
and intergovernmental organizations.41 Local coordination for protection is a necessary
and logical first step between bases and local officials. Ultimately, the communication of
protection needs in a contested environment must be formalized at the national level.
The US Army Operating Concept indicates the Army must be “ready to protect
the American people and respond to crises in the homeland.”42 One of the Army’s
missions is to support civil authorities in securing the homeland, also known as
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).43 In a contested deployment,
however, the traditional defense support of civil authorities paradigm would likely
change radically. If a military deployment becomes one of the nation’s main efforts,
then support tasks arising from the Department of Homeland Security National
Preparedness Goal would likely take a back seat.44 The foundation and principles of
the National Preparedness Goal, as laid out in Presidential Policy Directive 8 and its

39. Ash Carter, “Army Chief of Staff Change of Responsibility” (speech, Fort Myer, VA,
August 14, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/613676/army
-chief-of-staff-change-of-responsibility/.
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supporting National Preparedness System (NPS), provide the fundamental way ahead
for exploring a framework for support and response to the military as a priority.45
Although the NPS doctrine and related processes typically operate in a permissive
environment in which defense supports civil authorities, the doctrine does not preclude
civil authorities from supporting defense in a contested deployment. The National
Preparedness System envisions a wide range of scenarios, and the process that facilitates
the planning and execution of this mission is the National Response Framework (NRF),
which is “built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National
Incident Management System.”46 The framework “is a guide to how the Nation responds
to all types of disasters and emergencies,” and the National Incident Management
System, which supports the National Response Framework, “provides a common,
interoperable approach to sharing resources, coordinating and managing incidents, and
communicating information.”47 Together, they “provide a single, comprehensive, nationwide approach to incident management.”48
The National Response Framework is the recognized structure and process used
by the United States to plan national responses to natural or man-made challenges,
emergencies, and crises. It provides a flexible and capable framework for facilitating
planning, determining requirements, and assigning response forces for scenarios in
which the Army might be designated the national priority.49 Such scenarios would
require a change in mindset to the ways the framework has operated in past. In this
scenario, the Army would be the supported unit rather than the supporting unit.
The framework is a good starting point for planning support to a contested
deployment of Army forces. If the top emergent priority for the United States is
deploying the Army in a contested homeland, then the requirements for mobilization,
movement, protection, and embarkation would be the focus of the framework.
The Department of Homeland Security would oversee “preparedness activities
within the United States to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies.”50 The department has the authorities, structure,
processes, and oversight of the National Resposne Framework. The Army’s and
the nation’s first option in dealing with a contested homeland, notwithstanding
the need for adaptation, should be tried-and-true concepts and doctrine for
homeland security. Understanding this new and different battlespace and the rules
governing it is essential for the military to ensure its requirements are identified.
45. Barack Obama, National Preparedness, Presidential Policy Directive 8 (Washington, DC: White
House, March 30, 2011).
46.

DHS, National Response Framework, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: DHS, October 28, 2019), i.

47. US Army War College (USAWC), How the Army Runs 2019–2020: A Senior Leader Reference
Handbook (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020), 20-4; and Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), “NIMS Components—Guidance and Tools,” FEMA, updated February 18, 2021, https://
www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nims/components.
48.

USAWC, How the Army Runs.

49.

DHS, National Response Framework.

50.

DHS, National Response Framework, 34.

18

Both civil and military authorities, led by the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense, would need to converge on this problem set with the National
Response Framework as the focal point, share situational awareness, and envision how
they will work together in an operating environment in which the military may be at
war in the homeland as it deploys.
Although the Department of Homeland Security oversees the security of the
United States and its citizens in this complex endeavoer, it relies on, and must be
supported by, numerous partners and stakeholders.51 The concepts of resilience and
coordinated response to hazards and emergencies represent a whole-of-government and
whole-of-nation approach. The basic precept of the National Preparedness System is
a tiered, bottom-up approach to supporting and responding.52 The Army’s role in this
process is to provide for its internal protection as much as possible and to identify its
requirements in detail to the Department of Homeland Security. To be most effective,
the National Preparedness System recognizes communities should conduct their own
risk- and capability-based planning that will help them identify capability gaps—
planning that should also be done at the unit level.53
One of the five mission preparedness areas is protection “to achieve the goal of a
‘secure and resilient nation.’ ”54 The result of local or unit-level assessment of capabilities
is the determination of the support and response that can be provided.55 The Army
must determine its requirements, the areas it can support for itself, and its shortfalls
in protecting its deployment operation. The coordination of this information and the
entities that provide it are placed within the “unity of effort through unified command”
principle in the response mission area.56 In addition, 15 response or core capabilities (also
referred to as emergency support functions) address protection and other requirements
of a deploying force.57 Functions of particular importance are information and planning,
transportation, cross-sector business and infrastructure, public safety and security, and
public health and medical services.58
The formulation process for mapping out support and response capabilities is
adaptable to the protection required for a deploying Army. The process, supported by a
coordination system known as the National Incident Management System, includes the
institutionalized and accepted framework for planning and executing domestic security
and hazard response.59 This system provides “for standardized but flexible incident
management and support practices that emphasize common principles, a consistent
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approach for operational structures and supporting mechanisms, and an integrated
approach to resource management.”60
Given this construct, the Army and the Department of Defense writ large must
evaluate the scenarios within a contested homeland where they will require support and
response for their deployment and the security of their bases. The Army is operating
on the Department of Homeland Security’s turf and must confirm how its protection
needs will be met. The military must identify its requirements and determine how it will
receive support. The tiered, bottom-up approach to planning in the National Response
Framework normally focuses on the capabilities providers possess in anticipation of the
responses that will likely be required. The Army must predetermine its requirements
and set conditions within the framework for the support it will need from civil elements.
Identification and visibility of Army requirements will allow for planning and matching
up of national capabilities for support. The Army can and should initiate the coordination
for this support with local and state officials while adhering to the bottom-up construct.
Agreements established between base commanders and local police, sheriffs, and state
law enforcement organizations using the APP process for dialogue and coordination are
an effective means of coordinating support. Final adjudication and approval of these
arrangements must be done by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
Oversight of this plan will be done by the Department of Homeland Security, since it is
responsible for the National Response Framework.
Once solutions to Army protection shortfalls and other deployment requirements
have been determined, they should be codified in the National Response Framework.
This type of agreed-upon support, whether determined locally or at higher levels within
the National Preparedness System, could be further classified as prescripted mission
assignments at the federal level among government partners.61 At the local or state level,
agreed-upon support would be predetermined similarly using memoranda of agreement.
An example of such an agreement for support is local law enforcement reinforcing the
base perimeter or providing additional gate security. The base’s requirements and local
law enforcement’s capabilities, once negotiated and agreed upon, would be formalized
like prescripted mission assignments for ease and speed of execution. Ultimately, the
National Resposne Framework would become the final repository for requirements and
for the identification of the entities providing response to the Army.
Many other options for support to Army deployment requirements could develop
within this construct. For example, Army or DoD assets could be resourced for critical
protection functions as part of this deliberation. Active units not in deployment mode
could backfill shortfalls or reinforce installation functions within the Army Protection
Program. These units could be tasked by the Army to alleviate burdens on deploying
units for route security when transporting sensitive or high-value items in convoys or
at assembly areas awaiting movement. This task could even involve other services or
force providers. The bigger picture, however, is the NPS methodology is the recognized
process for planning for solutions in a contested deployment environment. Bottom-up
60.
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planning conducted within Army and DoD prerogatives and authorities is the first
step, but plugging into the National Response Framework with clear requirements and
prescripted support will be essential to ensure civil assistance.
Civil and military relations in a contested homeland is a new chapter in warfare
for the United States and its armed forces. Contested deployment embodies a hybrid
state of warfare the United States has not encountered before. Active-duty Army
operations in the homeland and aggression by an enemy in which facilities, families,
and units are engaged constitute an unfamiliar scenario for the United States, at least in
modern times. As a nation and Army, we must assess this new threat and formulate a
response to it in advance. Dealing with the next generation of enemy tactics or weapons,
especially if they will be used within US borders, will be a huge challenge. What
we must not do is make this challenge harder than necessary. The United States has
the doctrine to provide for the Army’s protection in a contested homeland. Adapting
the United States’ mindset to a new form of conflict and harnessing the collective
strength of the nation will place the country ahead of the next incident or attack and
allow the Army to continue its mission.
The Army’s ability to defend the nation beyond its borders is enabled by the country’s
capabilities “to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover
from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.”62 The novel
situation of contested deployment will require the Army and homeland security agencies
to develop a different warfare perspective. Adaptation, planning, and exercising this
concept will provide resilience and response for protecting the Army and its ways and
means when it is deploying in a high-threat environment.
The way forward is to begin soon to identify national priorities within the National
Response Framework related to Army deploying forces—protection of the forces
being a chief priority—and ensuring Army requests for assistance are addressed in
advance. The framework is specifically designed for this preplanning, and its response
areas should deliver the support required. The appropriate solution, provider, or partner
must be identified at the local, county, state, or federal level to meet the protection
requirements for the Army. Safe access to roads, bridges, marshaling areas, refueling
and rest stops, ports, and airfields and the ability to access common-use architecture
(such as cell-phone towers and the Internet) must be provided through the
National Response Framework.
The doctrine for military and civil cooperation in national emergencies must
evolve to identify a contested homeland where the military needs civil support
operations. With this scenario written into the doctrine for greater clarity, and with
coordination between DoD and DHS partners, the challenge of projecting forces under
duress can be successfully met. Building national resilience to support the Army’s
deployment requirements within a contested homeland is a compelling readiness
issue. The United States must be ready now (the threat is real and on US soil), and
the nation must be ready for what is next (anticipating new threats and continuing to
evolve Army, DoD, and DHS doctrine). New solutions with a whole-of-nation
approach to war will ensure the homeland is secure so it can be defended.
62.
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3. STRATEGIC SEAPORTS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
The United States is dependent upon its seaports to project military power around the
world. In a major conflict, 90 percent of US military cargo would ship by sea.1 Today’s
military port infrastructure is concentrated in 22 strategic seaports.2 Seventeen of the
strategic seaports are commercial ports where the Department of Defense (DoD) ships
its equipment, in the event of military conflicts overseas, alongside civilian commercial
shipments.3 These strategic seaports have effectively supported the Afghanistan War,
the Iraq War, and US involvement in the Syrian Civil War over the last 20 years, but the
ports may be insufficient to support the next war.
In his Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States, Secretary
of Defense James Mattis made clear his concerns about US infrastructure in the
next conflict.
It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. America is a target,
whether from terrorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious cyber activity against
personal, commercial, or government infrastructure; or political and information
subversion. New threats to commercial and military uses of space are emerging,
while increasing digital connectivity of all aspects of life, business, government, and
military creates significant vulnerabilities. During conflict, attacks against our critical
defense, government, and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.4

Clearly, the American security environment has changed. The United States’
dependence on its strategic seaports to project power makes these seaports a likely
target in a future conflict.
In World War II, the American military mobilized and deployed its forces from
the uncontested and relatively safe continental United States (CONUS). The United
States had a strong industrial base supported by a robust and modern transportation
infrastructure. The US economy was totally mobilized and coordinated by government
for war.5 The American people were united after 1941 to work and sacrifice to support
the war effort against the Axis powers, and 97 percent of Americans supported going to
war with Japan after the Pearl Harbor attack.6
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Today, much of the US transportation infrastructure is so old and in need of repair the
American Society of Civil Engineers published Failure to Act in 2013 to show investment
shortfalls in US infrastructure.7 The Department of Defense must consider the current
state of US port infrastructure when planning for future wars. This chapter explores
the current state of US strategic seaports by focusing on the condition of the ports, the
criteria used to select strategic seaports, and federal government efforts to maintain
port readiness. Further, the chapter will review the emerging threats to mobilization at
strategic seaports and offer recommendations to improve the system.
Strategic seaports are designated by the commanding general of Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), which is the US Army
component of United States Transportation Command.8 Today, 22 ports are included
in the Strategic Seaport Program.9 The Department of Transportation Maritime
Administration, in partnership with Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command, manages the Strategic Seaport Program for the Department of Defense.10
The Maritime Administration chairs the National Port Readiness Network.11 Nine
federal agencies are members of the network: the Maritime Administration, the
US Army Corps of Engineers, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command, the US Coast Guard, Military Sealift Command, US Army
Forces Command, the Transportation Security Administration, US Northern
Command, and US Transportation Command.12
Civilian ports work with Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
to become strategic seaports. This relationship brings revenue to the port and the
communities in which they are located; business at the port means work for equipment
operators, truck drivers, and stevedores.13 These facilities are selected to be strategic
seaports based on criteria such as proximity to highways, rail access, and the number
and length of ship berthing spaces.14
A study conducted for Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in
2008 assessed the viability of strategic seaports in a future conflict and serves as a basis
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8. “Strategic Seaport Program,” US Army, February 28, 2017, https://www.army.mil/standto
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of a way forward for the command in the selection of ports, the number of ports required
for the Department of Defense, and the manning of the ports by DoD personnel.15 The
study, entitled Port Look 2008, examined three scenarios using a force-sizing construct
from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.16 The study focused on a homeland defense
surge, a war on terror/irregular warfare surge, and a conventional campaign.17 Further,
the study predicted a maximum daily cumulative throughput for ports on the East Coast,
Gulf Coast, West Coast, and the Alaskan coast for the year 2015.18 The study concluded
the strategic seaports on the Alaskan coast and the Gulf Coast had minor shortfalls in
throughput capacity, but they could be compensated for easily with the addition of
alternate ports.19
The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed another study of strategic
seaports to be performed; this report served as a follow-up to Port Look 2008.20 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the findings of the report in 2013.
The GAO report centered on four areas: the structural integrity of strategic seaports,
the impact on operational readiness if recommended improvements were not made,
potential funding sources if improvements were not made, and whether the Department
of Defense had sufficient authority to direct the improvements.21
The 22 strategic seaports had some structural deficiencies. Fifteen ports had minor
deficiencies with negligible impact. Four ports had deficiencies with minor impact. One
port had significant deficiencies that impaired its ability to support its mission. Two ports
had major deficiencies that resulted in major obstacles to deployment.22 The deficiencies
ranged from poor facilities maintenance to the need for entire wharves to be replaced.23
In its report, the Government Accountability Office concluded the listed deficiencies
had been addressed; however, the exact nature of the deficiencies and the solutions to
them were not listed in the unclassified version of the report. In addition, the criteria
used to assess the seaports were not specified.
An example of a port in need of structural improvement is the Port of Alaska, the
closest strategic seaport to Fort Wainwright.24 News reports from late 2017 revealed the
port had serious structural problems. Many of the pier pilings were made from pipe
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left over from the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.25 The saltwater had taken
its toll, and many of the pilings had corroded.26 In June 2017, some of the pilings gave way
while a large Holland America cruise ship was docking, and a portion of the pier broke
away and sank into the water. The ship was not damaged, but the incident illustrates the
potential consequences of structural deficiencies.27
The Port of Alaska has other structural problems as well. A 2003 expansion project
was halted in 2010 when damage was discovered in the support structures designed to
support the new dock. This halting of operations cost state, local, and federal taxpayers
$300 million.28
The Port of Alaska is a critical port for the state—90 percent of the freight traffic in
Alaska comes in by sea, and half of this traffic stops at the port.29 The port is critical
to the deployment and sustainment of Alaska’s military bases and is the key port for
disaster relief.30 Alaska experiences frequent earthquakes, and, in the event of a severe
earthquake, such as the one that occurred in 1964, the Port of Alaska would be critical to
recovery efforts and defense support of civil authorities.31
To gain a clear understanding of the findings of the two reports and determine
whether their findings hold true, one must look at the criteria used. The 2008 report
was working under the assumptions of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Written under the tenure of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a member of
the George W. Bush administration, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report paints a
picture of a different world than the one we live in today.32 The report talks about the
military moving “[f]rom major conventional combat operations—to multiple irregular,
asymmetric operations.”33 The document only mentions Korea four times in 113 pages.34
Russia is described as a “country in transition” that is “unlikely to pose a military threat
to the United States or its allies.”35 China, the report says, has the potential to compete
militarily with the United States because China had been investing in its military since
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the 1990s; however, the US policy was to encourage China to be “an economic partner
and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world.”36
In his 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary, Secretary Mattis states threats to the
United States have changed: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the
primary concern in US national security.”37 China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran posed
significant threats to the United States in a way they were not thought to in the past, and
terrorists and transnational criminal organizations were still a threat.38
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US government has placed significant emphasis
on security at US ports.39 In 2006, Congress passed the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act to address port security.40 The act addressed the threat of a terrorist
attack on a seaport, and great strides were made in strengthening the physical security
of seaports.41 Following this legislation, “[t]he Port Security Grant Program has helped
develop and sustain prevention, preparedness, and response capabilities around ports.”42
When Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command surveys strategic
seaports, the criteria it uses to determine their viability for military use does not take the
current operating environment into account. Port Look 2008 used the following criteria
to evaluate strategic seaports: facilities (access and capabilities), attitude (stakeholder
perspective), availability, price (cost for terminal operation and workforce), background
(history of use by the military), location (proximity to DoD shippers), and resources
(personnel).43 This criteria does not take into account the multi-domain threats the US
military would face in the event of mobilization in a contested environment.
How does the new operational environment impact US strategic seaports? The old
criteria addressed physical security, but did not take into account the kind of threats
former Secretary Mattis referred to in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Cyberwarfare
is an easy-entry, low-cost way to disrupt the US military’s movement through its
strategic seaports.
In a 2013 Brookings Institution policy paper, US Coast Guard Commander Joseph
Kramek raised concern about the threat of cyberattacks on some of the largest ports in
the United States. According to Kramek, “unlike other sectors of critical infrastructure,
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little attention has been paid to the networked systems that undergird port operations.”44
This vulnerability is a consequence of the linked systems that make the ports efficient
and profitable.
A network of complex systems manages large, modern ports today. Cranes and
container-handling equipment use optical technology to read barcodes and radio
frequency identification interrogators to locate freight. Computer systems provide
instructions to automated equipment to move and organize containers around the port.
For example, the Port of Long Beach, which is a strategic seaport, uses “robots, artificial
intelligence, and other digital tools to choreograph the complicated dance that keeps
goods flowing.”45
Linked automation systems are vulnerable, and adversaries are aware of the
vulnerability. The cybersecurity company TrapX discovered the “Zombie Zero” attack
method in 2014. TrapX states in a white paper it “believe[s] that the Zombie Zero
malware was preloaded into newly manufactured scanners by a manufacturer in
China.”46 The targeted company had 16 infected scanners, which allowed the malware to
probe the network and identify specific servers, granting the hackers complete access to
the company’s data.47 Both the manufacturer and the hackers are believed to be linked to
the Chinese government.48
A more recent example of a cyberattack on a US port occurred in June 2017 at the
Port of Los Angeles. The attack came in the form of the malware “NotPetya,” which
ravaged Ukraine’s power system and government computer systems the same year. The
malware spread to millions of computers in several countries in a matter of hours. When
NotPetya hit the Maersk terminal in the Port of Los Angeles, it shut down operations
and affected 17 other Maersk terminals around the world.49 Congresswoman Norma
Torres of California, who proposed a bill in Congress to address port cybersecurity, said,
“The most recent cyber-attack revealed serious vulnerabilities in our nation’s maritime
security.”50 Clearly, this cyberattack was very destructive; it spread very quickly and
affected systems all over the world.
Another way ports could be affected by a cyberattack is through the Global Positioning
System (GPS) signals container-moving equipment uses to locate containers and move
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them around ports.51 In a report by the cybersecurity company CyberKeel of Denmark,
maritime cyber expert Lars Jensen states, “Powerful GPS jammers are readily available
on the commercial market—whilst this is not legal everywhere, the fact remains that
they are easy to obtain.”52 In a 2014 incident at a US port, a seven-hour GPS disruption
brought the port to a standstill.53 Although these incidents would not cripple a military
deployment by themselves, US ports are clearly not safe from cyberattacks.
The use of GPS by much of the transportation industry also makes the technology a
major vulnerability. Cranes use GPS to locate containers and move them around ports.
Ships use GPS for navigation. A maritime navigation expert said in a recent article
GPS is “a free, highly precise signal that engineers have incorporated into virtually
every technology. But because of that, it’s become a single point of failure for much
of America.”54
The Coast Guard is the lead agency for port security. But the Government
Accountability Office found in 2014 the actions taken by the service to assess
cyber risk in US ports were insufficient. The Coast Guard’s legally mandated
maritime security plans did not identify or address cybersecurity threats, and
the mechanisms used to coordinate with other maritime stakeholders were not
sufficient.55 The office recommended the Department of Homeland Security “direct
the Coast Guard to (1) assess cyber-related risks, (2) use this assessment to inform
maritime security guidance, and (3) determine whether the sector coordinating
council should be reestablished.”56
In June 2015, the Coast Guard released the United States Coast Guard Cyber
Strategy, in which the service articulated its vision to “ensure the security of our
cyberspace, maintain superiority over our adversaries, and safeguard our Nation’s
critical maritime infrastructure.” The service also states the “maritime critical
infrastructure and the [Maritime Transportation System] are vital to our economy,
national security, and national defense.”57 Further, to achieve its mission of protecting
maritime infrastructure, the Coast Guard will focus on working with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and coordinating with the owner-operators of the Maritime
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Transportation System to “improve cybersecurity information sharing and develop and
implement risk-based standards.”58
Whether the Coast Guard’s efforts to emphasize cybersecurity at US ports are
improving their cyber defense posture is unclear, but some improvements have been
made. The service’s Port Operations Handbook 2015 Edition includes a portion on cyber
risk management for port operators and provides tips for safeguarding the Maritime
Transportation System from cyberattack. The handbook offers links to four websites
port operators can visit for further information from the Coast Guard and other US
government agencies.59 The handbook and the strategy have progressed, but still do not
go far enough.
In 2016, the Government Accountability Office again examined critical
transportation infrastructure in two reports. The first report called for the Department
of Homeland Security to develop metrics for assessing the effectiveness of voluntary
cybersecurity standards, and the second report noted the DHS cyber risk mitigation
efforts were still deficient in some areas.60 In addition, the office found some issues were
still unresolved in a February 2018 report.61 The department noted in an addendum to the
report the voluntary nature of the programs “hamper efforts to adopt the framework,”
and the Department of Homeland Security would continue to work with its partners to
support the adoption of the program.62 This information indicates the US government
is focused on protecting US critical infrastructure from cyberattack. Improvements,
however, should still be made. Perhaps more incentives for owner-operators of
US ports to shore up their cyber defenses would help to realize these improvements.
To illustrate the military’s degree of dependence on strategic seaports, a cyberattack
on the Port of Beaumont “would impact almost 50 percent of all military cargo bound
for overseas contingency operations.”63 Further, an adversary gaining access to the
Army logistics management system network would impact the transportation of
military cargo worldwide.64
Though the Army uses robust cybersecurity measures in its terminal operations,
commercial systems are still vulnerable. In 2012, a foreign military infiltrated multiple
systems aboard a commercial ship contracted by US Transportation Command.65 The
58.

USCG, Coast Guard Cyber Strategy, 31.

59.

USCG, Port Operators Handbook 2015 Edition (Washington, DC: USCG, 2015), 154.

60. Gregory C. Wilshusen, Measures Needed to Assess Agencies’ Promotion of the Cybersecurity
Framework, GAO-16-152 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, December 2015); and
Gregory C. Wilshusen, Sector-Specific Agencies Need to Better Measure Cybersecurity Progress, GAO-16-79
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, November 2015).
61. Nick Marinos, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Are Essential for Assessing
Cybersecurity Framework Adoption, Government Accountability Office-18-211 (Washington, DC:
Government Accountability Office, February 2018).
62.

Marinos, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 38.

63.

Kramek, Critical Infrastructure Gap.

64.

Kramek, Critical Infrastructure Gap, 23.

65.

USCG, Coast Guard Cyber Strategy, 12.

30

weakness was not in the military systems, but in the commercial system that carried
information about military shipments on commercial vessels. Clearly, progress still
needs to be made to secure US ports and shipping companies from cyber threats.
Other types of threats to strategic ports exist as well. The proliferation of weapons
capable of creating an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) places both US ports and the US way
of life in jeopardy. Congress created a commission in October 2000 to assess the threat of
an EMP attack and propose ways to defend against it.66 In 2004 and 2008, the commission
stated, “99% of the US Military is dependent on the civilian electric grid.”67 In 2004, in
a congressional hearing on the threat of EMP weapons, the EMP Commission reported,
“[T]he knowledge and technology to develop super-EMP weapons had been transformed
to North Korea and that North Korea could probably develop these weapons in the near
future.”68 If an EMP weapon were detonated 250 miles (400 kilometers) over the United
States, the detonation would affect the entire coutry; at a lower altitude, it would affect a
smaller portion of the country.69 The commission was disbanded on September 30, 2017,
and no significant action has been taken to mitigate the threat.70
In a speech to the Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference in National
Harbor, Maryland, on September 20, 2017, Air Force General John E. Hyten was asked
about the threat of EMP attack on the United States. He told conference attendees US
Strategic Command would be able to respond because its systems and facilities are
hardened against EMPs, but every cell phone, computer, automobile, or anything else
with a computer chip in it would be rendered useless. He went on to say, “[W]e have not
looked at the critical infrastructure that could be damaged by EMP, and we need to kind
of take a step back and look at that entire threat because it is a realistic threat.”71
An adversary could produce an EMP using two different methods. The first and most
catastrophic method is by detonating a nuclear device in the atmosphere. The severity of
the EMP’s effect is determined by the height of the blast. The higher the blast, the larger
the affected area.72 According to estimates, a nuclear airburst EMP could cause trillions
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of dollars in damages to the power grid.73 The detonation could also kill 90 percent
of the US population.74 Should the United States be attacked in this way, any forces
left in the CONUS would be required to assist in recovery and would not be in a
position to deploy.
The second way an adversary could use an EMP to attack the United States is with
an “e-bomb” or nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) device. These weapons
use bursts of energy to disrupt or destroy electronic devices. An example of this
device is the Counter-electronics High-powered Microwave Advanced Missile Project
Boeing developed for the Air Force. These devices use a microwave pulse to destroy
electronics.75 An adversary intent on disrupting a strategic port during mobilization
would not necessarily need to match the US Air Force in sophistication. Group Captain
Atul Pant of the Indian Air Force claims a small-scale NNEMP device could easily be
made using commonly available materials.76 In a 2017 blog post, he stated, “[T]he biggest
issue with non-nuclear EMP weapons is that the complexity and threshold required to
produce them is minimal.”77
A 2008 Heritage Foundation report paints a picture of the threat EMPs pose to the
United States. The authors assert Russia has developed an EMP-emitting device that fits
on a dining room table, and China has discussed the possibility of using EMP weapons in
future conflicts.78 Apparently, an EMP attack on US ports would be a distinct possibility
in a major conflict with either of these two countries.
The United States’ vulnerability to EMP attack, whether localized or as part of a
much larger attack, is based on the nature of the US power grid. A 2021 Department
of Energy report stated, “The US electric power grid is one of the Nation’s critical
life-line infrastructure on which many other critical infrastructure depend, and the
destruction of this infrastructure can cause a significant impact to national security and
the US economy.”79 The United States needs to invest more in its power grid. Many US
industrial control systems run on software that is a generation behind and not designed
with cybersecurity in mind.80 A cyberattack or EMP attack on one part of the power grid
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could have a cascading effect, turning a localized blackout into a widespread outage
affecting millions.81
Given US adversaries have the ability to reach the continental United States with
an EMP weapon or cyberattack on US infrastructure, the US government continues to
work with private owner-operators of strategic ports and the rest of the nation’s critical
infrastructure. The Maritime Administration and Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command designate certain seaports as strategic seaports because of their
proximity to infrastructure such as roads, rail lines, and utilities; thus, a port’s ability to
support military shipments can be greatly reduced if the power for a rail line or road
network is cut.
Given the challenges strategic ports face today, this chapter proposes steps that should
be taken to increase the likelihood of the successful use of strategic ports for mobilization
in a contested environment. The structural integrity of strategic seaports, physical
security, cybersecurity (including GPS), and protection from EMPs are addressed.
Port operators or state and local authorities are usually responsible for the
structural integrity of US ports. In the past, port owners and operators have had
the opportunity to apply for Transportation Investment Generating Economic
Recovery grants from the Department of Transportation. These grants, ranging
from $5 million to $25 million, were used for the improvement or repair of port
facilities.82 In 2021, the Department of Transportation transitioned to the Rebuilding
American Infrastructure with Sustainability and Equity grant program, the maximum
dollar amount of which is $25 million. The grant is available to regional and local
governments for transportation projects, providing a funding vehicle for needed
infrastructure improvements.83
Physical security has seen greater advancements than any other type of port
security since the 9/11 attacks. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006 was enacted to address port security concerns. Focusing primarily on the threat
of terrorist attacks, the legislation has been most effective in addressing the physical
security of ports.84 Moreover, the US Coast Guard does a good job of overseeing the
physical security of ports, as described in the 2014 testimony of Department of Homeland
Security and US Coast Guard officials before the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.85 Congress continues to do its part by funding the
Port Security Grant Program, which “provides funds for transportation infrastructure
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security activities to implement Area Maritime Security Plans and facility security plans”
and covers cybersecurity and other physical security measures at ports.86
Grants alone are not enough to protect US strategic ports from cyberattacks. One
might assume the Coast Guard is not staffed or funded to handle the job of adding
cyber to its physical security assessments of seaports. The Coast Guard works under
the Department of Homeland Security during peacetime. As evidenced in the GAO
reports previously cited, the Coast Guard is not performing its assessments of
strategic seaports quickly enough. The Department of Homeland Security should
provide the Coast Guard with additional resources to assist in completing the currently
outstanding assessments. Perhaps the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
National Cybersecurity Protection System could be tasked with assisting or augmenting
US Coast Guard cyber personnel in the completion of the task. Companies need to know
their systems are secure, and the Department of Defense needs to know its shipping
data is not falling into the wrong hands. Further, Congress needs to know the extent of
vulnerabilities to provide funding to correct them.
The Department of Defense could also help with the assessments. The mission of
the National Guard Cyber Protection Teams is to coordinate, train, advise, and assist;
thus, they could assist the Coast Guard in addressing seaport cybersecurity.87 As a
long-term
solution,
Military
Surface
Deployment
and
Distribution
Command’s five transportation brigades could each be allocated one cyber
protection team from US Army Cyber Command.88 Each brigade would
then have the ability to assist the commercial companies working with
US Transportation Command. Developing the working relationships between port and
shipping company cybersecurity personnel and the Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command transportation brigades they collaborate with would be valuable.
This route may be difficult since it would require the Department of the Army to make a
force management decision. This option, however, should be explored.
Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, mandated the
creation of the DHS Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program and
a risk-based Cybersecurity Framework, a set of industry standards and best practices
to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks.89 The department and industry
should select and implement a single cybersecurity standard. In addition,
the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program should
be mandatory and a prerequisite for ports hoping to participate in the
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Strategic Seaport Program. Furthermore, Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command should use the standards of the framework to evaluate
prospective Ports for National Defense when each port study is conducted by the
their Transportation Engineering Agency.90 Also, the Maritime Administration should
reinforce to private port operators the urgency of protecting the networks at strategic
seaports through the National Port Readiness Network.
An EMP created by a nuclear detonation over the United States would be
catastrophic and make deployment nearly impossible in the immediate aftermath,
although this type of attack is not as likely to occur. As previously discussed, a more
localized NNEMP attack could be used to impede mobilization to a strategic port.
To mitigate this risk, an evaluation must be added to the Transportation Engineering
Agency port survey that addresses the vulnerability of ports to a localized EMP
device. Ports should then develop plans for hardening or shielding their systems
from the effects of such an attack and develop a recovery plan in the event
they are attacked before completing this hardening plan. These criteria should be
required if the port is to be considered as a potential Port for National Defense.
Large power transformers are the single most critical link in the power grids
that supply US ports. A recent Department of Energy study identifies the need
for spare large power transformers and notes the relatively small number of
manufacturers in the United States that can make these devices. Further, the study
mentions the United States is too dependent on foreign suppliers for the devices.91
The Department of Energy must continue to work with the industry to ensure spare
large power transformers are available in the event of an emergency.
A 2008 Heritage Foundation report examined the threat posed by EMPs to the US
power grid. The report also discusses NNEMPs and their largely localized effects.
Further, the foundation believes, “If properly shielded, electrical devices and systems
can generally survive even the strongest EMPs.”92 Congress should ensure current grant
programs for port security allow for EMP-shielding costs.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed threats that could seriously impede the Department of
Defense’s mobilization and deployment of the US military through its designated
strategic seaports. The evaluation criteria, the structural integrity of ports, and security
at port facilities require additional consideration by the US government.
The evaluation criteria used by Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command to select strategic seaports are based on scenarios that are no longer
relevant. Military leadership can no longer assume the armed forces can
mobilize from the continental United States uncontested. The new strategic
environment, as described by former Secretary of Defense Mattis, is one in which
the United States may enter into conflict with near-peer powers, and the efforts
90.
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of the Department of Defense to mobilize will be contested.93 Thus, the evaluation
criteria for the selection of strategic seaports need to change to reflect the new threat.
The structural integrity of US ports must be sufficient to support mobilization in all
areas of the country. Previous assessments assumed outdated criteria and deployment
rates that did not account for the current strategic environment as outlined in the
current National Defense Strategy. As evidenced by the degraded conditions of the
Port of Alaska, more work is needed to fix US ports. Both the military and commercial
shipping companies would benefit from these improvements.
The security at US ports is perhaps the gravest shortfall. This topic is divided into
two parts, and cybersecurity is the first part. Despite progress in physical security
(fencing, security cameras, and guards), the Coast Guard has been unable to assess
the civilian cybersecurity posture of the strategic seaports.94 The threat to civilian
systems is also a threat to the Department of Defense because civilian companies ship
a large amount of DoD cargo. Information on these shipments is vulnerable because
port networks are underprotected. In addition to computer systems, cameras, barcode
readers, and other peripheral devices linked to port networks are vulnerable to
intrusion, and GPS used by automation systems in ports, such as crane automation
systems, are vulnerable to jamming. A whole-of-government approach must be taken
to address the cyber issues—one that includes the Department of Defense, the
Department of Homeland Security, and Congress.
The second part of port security is vulnerability to EMPs. Both nuclear weapons and
NNEMPs pose a threat to the systems required to move military formations through the
ports and onto ships. The technology to shield key devices exists and must be explored
to protect against disruption during mobilization.
The recommendations proposed to address the structural and security issues
are rudimentary and achievable. The criteria used to evaluate potential strategic
seaports needs to be reevaluated against the new strategic environment. Cybersecurity
and EMP resilience measures must be added to the criteria used by Military Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command to select ports for DoD use. Congress
must continue to fund grant programs meant to improve and secure the critical
infrastructure at US ports.
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4. SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE
Viewing national defense from the perspective of business has contributed to a
culture within the Department of Defense (DoD) that values efficient processes above
effectiveness and system redundancy.1 The business systems approach is financially
reasonable, but it may not make sense militarily. This approach, when applied to
military operations, can create points that are vulnerable to exploitation by enemies of
the United States; the approach also degrades the flexibility that may be needed
when handling a crisis. The cumulative effect of logistics capability reductions across
the services in the name of efficiency is far more significant when examined broadly
than when viewed in isolation. The rise of near-peer adversaries is a great concern in
the National Security Strategy.2 The risk imposed by near-peer adversaries may diminish
the value of efficiency and illuminate risks to US national security. A single point of
failure may be identified and exploited by our adversaries in a time of crisis, thereby
reducing our capacity to respond.
Culturally, Americans have become ingrained with a belief the US homeland is
secure from enemy attack. The United States has friendly neighbors to the north and
south and oceans to the east and west. For most of US history, the country has been
relatively safe from enemy attacks or invasions into the homeland. The September 11
attacks and other terrorist attacks, however, have begun to alter this sense of security.
The United States’ ability to strike its enemies abroad and successfully deter attacks
on its homeland has reinforced the sense of safety in Americans, creating opportunities
for our adversaries. Any competent, capable foe would want to target an adversary’s
munitions infrastructure and supplies.
The rise of near-peer adversaries, such as Russia and China, with the resources to
locate and exploit vulnerabilities in the munitions logistics process, requires the United
States to reassess its cost-versus-risk criteria for crucial infrastructure. A business
mindset that focuses on efficiency and removal of redundant capabilities may narrow
the targets of enemies.3 Determining an exploitable point of failure within the logistics
nodes handling munitions for the US military will likely be accomplished by capable
adversaries. Munitions are the most vulnerable class of supply to attack and, naturally,
have more restrictions than other commodities.4 The United States must reexamine how
it can prevent attacks, protect its logistics infrastructure, mitigate the effects of attacks,
and recover from attacks.5
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PREVENTION
Preventing an attack on the munitions supply and distribution chain requires
constant vigilance and information sharing among the federal, state, and local levels of
government. To prevent an attack, the United States must determine credible threats to
the force projection of munitions and how enemies will potentially exploit vulnerabilities.
Preventing an attack on US munitions ports and supporting infrastructure requires
acknowledging the growing threat to the homeland and actively including this mindset
into plans and preventative measures, such as the layered approach currently used by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).6 The layered approach “has entailed the
creation of a framework that uses a layered strategy to vet transportation workers, vessels,
cargo, and crew, beginning at the international origin and continuing throughout the
global supply chain.”7 The Department of Defense should reexamine the risk to mission
effectiveness and the cost of becoming a harder target with redundant capabilities.
Finally, reviewing vulnerabilities externally and internally will possibly reveal insider
threats and cybersecurity are the greatest concerns. According to Everett C. Dolman,
“Part of the challenge that America faces is a business approach that stresses efficiency.”8
According to the think tank the Lexington Institute, “[W]hile reducing excess capacity
measured in terms of current requirements is desirable, it is more important to maintain
a capability to respond rapidly to unplanned and changing circumstances. In peacetime,
the focus is naturally on efficiency and minimizing costs. In wartime, the measures of
success must be effectiveness and timeliness.”9
To counter the efficiency mindset and prevent attacks on the homeland’s munitions
assets, the Department of Defense may have to show Congress the credible threats
the US critical munitions nodes are facing. In a resource-constrained environment, the
case for investment in prevention must be made to justify expenditures in security
enhancements.10 In this case, the justification is the capabilities of China, North Korea,
and Russia.11 These countries have demonstrated their capabilities, especially in
cyberwarfare, and have been identified by the Defense Science Board as credible threats
and thus can be held up as examples.12
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To make the United States a harder target and less vulnerable to attack, the
prioritization of efficiency needs to give way to maintaining redundant, less efficient
capabilities.13 Redundancy in capabilities will frustrate an adversary’s ability to disrupt
military operations. Excess and dispersed capabilities have a preventative impact on
their own. If an asset is redundant, would it meet the payoff-versus-risk calculus of our
adversaries? Redundancy reduces the targeting threat. Opponents naturally look for the
most limiting areas to attack. Concentrating capabilities in a few geographic locations
creates targets, such as the two munitions ports located on the East and West Coasts of
the continental United States.
A potential, concerning Russian action for the munitions discussion is the destruction
of a munitions depot in Ukraine in 2017. The massive explosion possibly resulted from
an insider act of sabotage.14 A nonconventional or gray-zone attack that could be denied
by our enemies is a possibility on American soil.15 Gray-zone attacks “are frequently
shrouded in misinformation and deception, and are often conducted in ways that are
meant to make proper attribution of the responsible party difficult to nail down.”16 A
well-executed, unconventional assault is difficult to prove and easy to execute, especially
with the backing and resources of nations such as China and Russia.
The US military must always consider insider threats when examining US port
security systems.17 The actions of Edward Snowden and the damage he inflicted to
national security should make the United States reflect on the real possibility of insider
threats and the risk they present to the security of vital US munitions ports.18 The volume
of containers arriving at US munitions ports from road, rail, air, and sea precludes
personnel from physically inspecting all containerized cargo.19 A layered system
identifies high-risk containers based on the country of origin, and inspection resources
focus on the countries highlighted in intelligence reports.20 The lack of inspection
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capacity creates a vulnerability.21 An insider could readily provide information on the
types of uninspected containers and enable an attack on a key port.22
External threats are also present, especially when examining the cyber domain, and
valuable information can be gathered to find a weak link. North Korea has launched
successful cyberattacks without possessing the resources China and Russia have.23
Security is considered to be crucial, but excess capacity is seen as wasteful when viewed
through the business mindset that permeates current military thinking.24 Cybersecurity
is growing in importance and its maintenance is essential to prevent attacks. Hackers
and the ever-increasing automation of global shipping have made the maritime domain
increasingly vulnerable.25 Streamlining costs via automation has resulted in massive
container vessels operated with minimal crews, which creates a perfect environment for
a cyberattack.26 As Jayson Ahern stated in an article on the Cipher Brief website:
The US Coast Guard has taken actions to improve cybersecurity at ports, including
the August 2015 roll out of a Cyber Strategy aimed at defending ports, companies,
and infrastructure from cyberattacks. The uncovering of a 2013 drug smuggling
operation in which smugglers successfully hacked cargo tracking systems at the Port
of Antwerp to avoid detection, as well as a seven-hour [Global Positioning System
(GPS)] signal disruption that shut down operations of a major US port in 2014,
demonstrate the seriousness of the cyber threat.27

Preventing an attack by active cyber detection and risk management is part of the
solution, but the United States must also put protective measures in place.
PROTECTION
Protecting the US munitions infrastructure is a fundamental part of successfully
preserving the country’s capacity to fight. The defense against such attacks is primarily
outside the realm of the Department of Defense and is the responsibility of either the
Department of Homeland Security and federal agencies or local law enforcement.28
According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, “In carrying out the
functions assigned in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary [of DHS] shall
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be responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of
the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States.”29
Overall protection is a shared responsibility among the Department of Defense,
Department of Homeland Security, and state and local authorities.30 The National Guard
can also play an essential role by providing additional security assets, including aircraft
for surveillance, explosive ordnance disposal teams, and other capabilities that can
augment civilian law enforcement agencies in a time of crisis.31 Protecting munitions can
also be achieved by producing arms in a manner that decreases vulnerability to attack.32
A near-peer adversary will have likely identified US force projection capabilities,
including “logistics nodes such as ports, airheads, and ammunition storage areas as
key targets for enemy attack” and a center of gravity to disable in a confrontation with
the United States.33 According to Robert A. Rossi of the US Army Defense Ammunition
Logistics Activity, “The Army Armament Research Development and Engineering
Center (ARDEC) concluded that the munitions logistics system is severely vulnerable
to disruption during initial buildup in wartime operations due to enemy attack.”34
Adversaries could potentially focus their efforts on munitions, and an asymmetric attack,
including a terrorist attack, is a possible course of action.35
The US Coast Guard is responsible for protecting US ports.36 The growing cyber
threat is very concerning because of the high degree of automation in the shipping
industry. Currently, “the United States Coast Guard—does not have specific authority
to regulate cybersecurity in port facilities or any other area of maritime critical
infrastructure.”37 The lack of cybersecurity authority within the US Coast Guard creates
a gap that can be exploited in the future if the issue is not addressed. The Coast Guard
and other law enforcement agencies have a role in protecting DoD munitions assets. The
Department of Defense must interact with the Department of Homeland Security and local
law enforcement to ensure the protection of munitions infrastructure and movements.
In the homeland, the Department of Defense depends on law enforcement and
coordinates with other agencies to ensure protection.38 Fortunately, fusion centers exist
to facilitate broad coordination across the Department of Defense and the federal, state,
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and local levels of government. According to a DHS press release, “State and major urban
area fusion centers provide critical links for information sharing between and across all
levels of government.”39
Despite the provision of financial support by the federal government, a lack
of resources and the immense area that must be protected at the state and local
levels create gaps and seams adversaries could exploit. To address possible gaps in
infrastructure security, the FBI has improved information sharing with local law
enforcement.40 The US military has more resources than any other agency for
addressing a weak link, but posse comitatus is a limiting factor that restricts DoD law
enforcement functions.41 The FBI may request a waiver to posse comitatus when
the Bureau requires law enforcement support from the US Army, US Navy, and
US Air Force.42 The National Guard, when acting under Title 32 of US Code, and
the Coast Guard, in peacetime, are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and
can be used to protect potential gaps, especially in surveillance and detection
activities.43 More planning and war gaming are needed to identify likely soft spots
that require more protection.
Significant effort has been initiated since the September 11 attacks to ensure
US infrastructure and munitions ports are safe and secure.44 An attack on Military
Ocean Terminal Sunny Point on the East Coast or Military Ocean Terminal Concord
on the West Coast would be difficult, but not be impossible.45 An asymmetric attack
from a near-peer adversary with vast resources at its disposal is a possibility we must
be prepared to address. An attack on critical logistics nodes would be possible in an
armed conflict with state or nonstate aggressors.46
Protecting munitions infrastructure also includes producing munitions that are safer
to handle, ship, and store. The Army initiated the Munitions Survivability Program
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Centers Combat Terrorism,” DHS, September 14, 2009, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/09/14
/new-information-sharing-tool-fusion-centers-announced.
40. Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to
Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, Audit Report 04-10 (Washington, DC:
Department of Justice, December 2003), iv.
41.

Larson and Peters, Preparing the US Army, 243–44.

42. “1614. Posse Comitatus Waiver—18 U.S.C. 351” US Department of Justice Archives, updated
January 17, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1614-posse-comitatus
-waiver-18-usc-351.
43.

Larson and Peters, Preparing the US Army, 244.

44. Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to
Protect the Nation’s Seaports, Audit Report 06-26 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice,
March 2006), i–iii.
45. Kimberly Hanson, “Military Ocean Terminals Play Strategic Role in Defense,” US Army
(website),
October
17,
2013,
https://www.army.mil/article/113348/military_ocean_terminals
_play_strategic_role_in_defense.
46.

Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts, ix.

42

to address safety issues in munitions manufacturing.47 The program identifies ports,
airheads, and ammunition storage areas as critical targets for enemy attack.48 The United
States now produces munitions in a manner that reduces the possibility of explosions
and susceptibility to detonation by outside sources.49 Rossi’s report on the program,
however, focuses on threats from adversaries in forward storage locations and fails to
recognize risks would also be met domestically in the homeland.
A port, by its very nature, faces threats from land, sea, and air.50 Adversaries may not
have to disable the port itself; choke points, such as canals, are less secure, but they are
essential for the port to function successfully. Incoming cargo is a threat to US munitions
terminals since cargo comes in a variety of forms, causing a great deal of turbulence and
frustration.51 A near-peer or capable adversary may not allow the United States to project
forward and build combat power, and will seek to challenge the United States on its
soil. According to Barry D. Watts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
“China’s growing cyber capabilities are not only enabling the theft of US intellectual
property and military secrets but could provide the [People’s Liberation Army] with
the means to impose severe damage on the US infrastructure.”52 Collectively, the US
military needs to reexamine its munitions infrastructure through the eyes of a peer
adversary to determine the amount of risk the infrastructure faces. According to Larry
Wyche and Greg Pieratt, “The Army should apply the same level of effort that it invests
in safeguarding its networks and information systems toward protecting its armaments
and its ability to sustain them.”53
MITIGATION
A US vulnerabilities mitigation strategy cannot merely focus on one aspect of
munitions logistics. Port capabilities and capacities, available lift, skilled labor,
alternate locations, storage locations, and the industrial base are areas that
require consideration.54 Redundancy is severely lacking in the US logistics system
architecture as well as the capacity for surge capacity.55 During the Persian Gulf War,
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Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point served as the primary port for shipping
munitions, but it could not keep pace with the demand, causing delays.56 To address
the problem, the Army paid for high-speed cranes that have increased the processing
capacity of the port and reduced manpower requirements.57 As another benefit, the
cranes decreased risk by processing munitions quickly and preventing backlogs.58
Removing a munitions port from either coast may require munitions to transit the
Panama Canal, which Chinese-owned companies essentially control. According to
Yojiro Konno and Nancy Menges, “It is highly plausible that [the Chinese-owned
company] Hutchison Whampoa has the potential to act as Beijing’s political agent
and that their possession of the ports at either end of the Panama Canal constitutes a
serious US national security issue.”59 Also, according to Christopher J. McMahon,
“China controls more ports and terminals around the world than any other nation,
including terminals on both sides of the Panama Canal.”60
Alternative ports in the United States are available for munitions, but these ports
present much higher risk to port operations. For example, as a result of Military Ocean
Terminal Concord being in disrepair, the Army considered an alternate port on the West
Coast; the Army also considered Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point as a backup.
Ultimately, these proposals were rejected for logistics and safety reasons, among others.61
Military Ocean Terminal Concord is the only West Coast port capable of safely handling
munitions.62 Neutralizing these terminals in some fashion would possibly reduce the
United States’ ability to respond quickly to an attack. A focus on efficiency has possibly
created a vulnerability our enemies can exploit.
The Army should assess the viability of alternate ports and identify potential negative
issues before using the ports. The military needs to conduct logistics training operations
to test capabilities. Actual use is the best way to identify and address deficiencies at
alternate locations. Many shortcomings become apparent only when putting a plan into
practice. Driven by efficiency, the military has focused on high-speed equipment at two
locations on opposite coasts that can process munitions quickly.
If these ports are eliminated, what is the speed and capability of cranes at
alternate locations? Can they do the same job or will munitions handlers be required?
Many of these answers are not broadly known, but they could be explored by using
alternative ports. Coordinating for alternate locations can involve expansion of the
workforce and increased security the military must coordinate through the Military
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Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.63 Fortunately, the command has the
Strategic Seaport Program to address the need for surge capacity.64 According to the
command, “The [Strategic Seaport Program] is a key component to transportation and
materiel readiness. It enables surge deployments and responses to national security
contingencies by providing a reserve seaport capacity to meet elevated demand for
military cargo.”65 Though the command has port assessments for alternate locations,
using an alternate location as part of a force rotation involving munitions could
potentially confirm those assessments.
A robust sealift and workforce capability to process munitions and project forward
may be critically important and could enable the use of multiple smaller ports to either
augment or replace a munitions seaport if it is disabled by adversaries. Unfortunately,
the United States’ once-robust sealift availability and capacity have declined since the
Cold War.66 The US Merchant Marine and vessels under contract have significantly
degraded. In 2015 Chris Dupin wrote, “There were more than 1,200 such ships
just after World War II. The fleet had fallen to about 200 in the 1980s, to 100 a year
ago and to about 80 today.”67 In a contested environment, this lack of capability
would be a vulnerability exploited by a near-peer adversary.68 A conflict with a
near-peer adversary would naturally spill over into economics and trade relations,
forcing countries with sealift capabilities to choose sides.69
The US Merchant Marine is underfunded by the federal government. Currently, “the
US Merchant Marine receives only a minuscule amount of federal support. It is certainly
not enough to encourage the expansion of the US-flag fleet.”70 The US Merchant Marine
needs revitalization to counter the global shipping business shift, which currently
favors the Chinese.71 Can the United States merely contract for additional sealift? This
assumption may no longer be viable. Many companies and countries may not want to
support US military operations, primarily if the United States were in a confrontation
with a near-peer adversary, such as China.72 If companies or nations assist the United
States, they could lose the support and business of an adversary. Supporting the United
States in a conflict may not be worth the cost for many countries or organizations
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that also trade with US adversaries.73 This effect occurred previously with Russia’s
economy, which is much smaller than China’s economy. Many European allies were
hesitant about taking a firm stance against Russian aggression after the Ukraine crisis.74
As China grows in power and prominence and more companies and countries’
economies become more dependent on Chinese trade than on US trade, supporting
US efforts may become too costly.75
To mitigate the loss of a port, airlift is the fastest, most flexible, and most
expensive means to ship munitions, but this method would not mitigate the loss of
either Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point or Military Ocean Terminal Concord.76
Shipping munitions via aircraft is necessary for the highest-priority pieces, but aircraft
cannot move enough stock to meet the requirements of a response to an attack by a
potent adversary.77 Airlift may also be in high competition for the prioritization of
supplies and personnel, and the military does not have enough aircraft to supply the
quantities of ammunition likely needed to respond to an attack on the homeland. Using
airlift as a primary method of transporting munitions is not feasible.78
In addition to revitalizing the US Merchant Marine, the military must monitor
foreign ownership of rail and truck transportation assets and maintain discipline in
this area. Fortunately, regulation has ensured US control of railroad dispatching.79
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, “[I]n the absence of a waiver . . . all
dispatching of railroad operations that occur in the United States [must] be performed
in the United States, with two minor exceptions. First, a railroad is allowed to
conduct extraterritorial dispatching from Mexico or Canada in emergency situations,
but only for the duration of the emergency.”80 Rail can be used to ship munitions
to alternate locations or across the country, if necessary. The US’ freight rail system
is in excellent condition.81
Labor capacity must be increased to mitigate effectively the results of an attack on
the US munitions infrastructure.82 During the Persian Gulf War, the military could not
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move enough munitions through Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point to keep pace
with the demand, and the terminal has lost manpower since then.83 Is contracting for
munitions handlers a viable option if one of the primary ports is destroyed? A continual
justification for the reduction of munitions-capable units and an option is contracting
logistics capabilities, including material-handling equipment or sealift. During the
Persian Gulf War, a shortage of skilled labor caused munitions stocks to back up,
creating security and safety concerns.84 In addition, these labor shortages occurred
at a time when the military was much larger and more flexible than it is today.85
A significant drawdown of forces has reduced the private pool available for companies’
recruiting efforts. Furthermore, the demand for skilled munitions handlers in the
active-duty Army has diminished because of outsourcing to contractors.86 Contracting
could cause delays because new personnel need to be trained. Also, more time would
likely be required to award contracts and train personnel, even if these processes
were rushed, and the US response time in an attack could be delayed as a result.
If necessary, to mitigate the effects of an attack, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
could be used to establish an alternate location or to operate from a strategic port such
as Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point or Military Ocean Terminal Concord if it had
been damaged in an attack.87 A logistics rehearsal of concept (ROC) helps to identify
munitions vulnerabilities or shortfalls. US Army Sustainment Command has hosted
ROC drills in the past and gathered many lessons learned.88 Joint and multinational
ROC drills involving the United States’ closest allies may also prove beneficial. If the
US military shifted to an alternate port location, what would be the impact on other
commodities? Perhaps this question and others can be answered by conducting further
exercises, which provide valuable information to help determine the risk inherent in
the United States’ current munitions logistics posture. Conducting exercises and
publishing the results at the unclassified level broadens the audience for lessons learned.
Another avenue to explore is the storage locations for munitions. Currently, the
the military stores most munitions within the continental United States, keeping more
money in the US economy and eliminating the requirement to maintain ammunition
supply points on foreign soil.89 Storing munitions in the continental United States may
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make targeting of ports a stronger consideration for adversaries. Storing munitions out
of the reach of adversaries is arguably safer, but the United States may be vulnerable
in the homeland as well. The nation may not have the capabilities it once did to
project munitions forward rapidly. A reduced projection capability increases the
likelihood of munitions being destroyed by adversaries, even if they are stored
farther away from the source of danger.
Conversely, storing munitions forward outside of the United States and closer
to the threat reduces the number of munitions to be processed for deployment and
the competition with other resources that are deploying. Prepositioned stocks and
munitions are gaining increased attention, but they require a significant amount of
resources.90 In October 2016, the United States shipped over 600 containers of munitions
to Germany to help set the European theater to deter Russian aggression.91 Munitions
storage depots abroad have been allowed to decay and do not have the capacity
and stockage levels they once did.92 Redundancy and disbursement merit further
consideration when investigating munitions vulnerabilities and storage locations.
Forward storage would ease the cumbersome process of moving massive amounts
of munitions and other supplies forward in a timely matter.
The fall of the Soviet Union made the United States the undisputed world
hegemon.93 Congress and military leaders could likely not see the justification for
maintaining an expensive global posture with multiple munitions-capable ports
on both coasts.94 Simultaneously, justifying the costs of storing massive amounts of
munitions outside the United States was difficult, and the military and Congress began
reducing military infrastructure.95 Eventually, munitions-capable ports in the continental
United States were streamlined, leaving only two available ports—one on the East Coast
and one on the West Coast. Munitions storage shifted from a robust forward capacity
abroad to a posture of storing most munitions within the continental United States. In
Europe, only a single theater bulk munitions storage remains.96
As the threat of a belligerent Russia reemerged, coupled with a nuclear-weaponarmed North Korea and a rising China, many planners realized the United States did
not have enough munitions storage capacity abroad to sustain combat operations
90.

HQDA, Munitions Support, 2-1.

91. Jacob McDonald, “The Biggest Ammo Shipment in 20 Years Arrives in Germany,” US Army
(website), November 8, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/177936/the_biggest_ammo_shipment
_in_20_years_arrives_in_germany.
92. Jen Judson, “Army Concerned over Shrinking Munitions Stockpile,” Defense News (website),
March 8, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-symposium/2017/03
/08/army-concerned-over-shrinking-munitions-stockpile/.
93. Stacie L. Pettyjohn, US Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2012), 83–89.
94.

Pettyjohn, US Global Defense Posture.

95.

Pettyjohn, US Global Defense Posture.

96.

Pettyjohn, US Global Defense Posture, 90.

48

in an enduring conflict with a near-peer adversary.97 Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine under the guise of independence fighters
coordinating with ethnic Russian militias caught Europe off guard and sent a wake-up
call throughout Europe and to the United States.98 Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine
and pattern of belligerence has coincided with China’s aggressive territorial claims in
the South China Sea. Adversaries of the United States noticed the uncontested buildup
of US forces in Iraq and the devastating results for the country in not challenging
the United States. A strong adversary such as China or Russia would adapt and not
repeat Saddam Hussein’s mistakes.99
Retaining US industrial capacity is critical for preventing and mitigating the effects of
an attack on the US munitions infrastructure. Many leaders now realize the importance
of the industrial base; this realization is apparent in the National Security Strategy
released by the Trump administration.100 Unfortunately, “the period from the end of the
Cold War to present saw a 68 percent reduction in the overall capacity of the munitions
industrial base.”101
The United States cannot afford further decline and must reinvest in its munitions
infrastructure.102 Complicating matters further is the severe impact the Iraq War, the
Afghanistan War, and the Syrian Civil War have had on US munitions stores, reducing
munitions stocks more quickly than factories are replenishing them. In 2010, the lack
of industrial capacity and shortages began to impact combat operations. According
to Thomas S. Schorr Jr. and Kenneth Deal, “The industrial base cannot manufacture
preferred precision munitions on a grand scale, nor can it afford to. Many preferred
munitions, such as Hellfire missiles and 30-millimeter high-explosive dual-purpose
rounds, and common items, such as caliber .50 armor-piercing-incendiary rounds, are
in short supply and have had, or are currently under, controlled supply rates.”103
According to a 2017 article on the Army’s website, Lieutenant General Aundre F. Piggee
stated “ ’preferred munitions’ ” were still in short supply, including munitions “used
for the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, as well as Hellfire
missiles and Excalibur rounds used for howitzers.”104
US European Command, US Pacific Command, and US Central Command
have the strongest demand for munitions stocks, with all three commands needing
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increases to existing stocks to counter threats effectively.105 Shortages at these commands
have revealed the US supplies need to be increased, and if a significant conflict
arises, the US industrial base would need to expand. Consequently, newly produced
stocks, along with existing supplies, may get processed through ports such as
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point and Military Ocean Terminal Concord.
In 2004, the Lexington Institute wrote:
No part of the defense industrial base is more critical to the success of the US military
in conflict than that which produces munitions. At its most basic level, the function of
the US military in conflict is to place energy on targets. Everything else that the military
does is to create the conditions that will allow sufficient energy to be deposited in a
timely manner on such targets, the destruction of which will lead to the defeat of any
enemy. It is ammunition that makes the military an instrument of war.106

Today, the US military stores and produces most of its munitions in the continental
United States and must, therefore, have a robust logistics capability to project munitions
forward in the event of a military crisis.107 Efforts are underway to address this issue by
increasing munitions stocks at forward bases.108 Exercising contingency plans, however,
may reveal the assumption that munitions-handler contractors will be readily available
is flawed. In addition, having only two munitions ports, one on each coast, perhaps
indicates the US military has assumed the homeland is uncontested. The Munitions
Survivability Program was initiated to address perceived munitions risks during the
Bosnian War and the Persian Gulf War.109 Near-peer adversaries may not allow the
United States to build combat power uncontested as Saddam Hussein did in the Persian
Gulf War, and they could challenge and disrupt US operations in the continental United
States in a variety of ways, including hybrid warfare and cyberattacks in combination
with conventional methods.110 Perhaps the United States should consider the capabilities
of near-peer adversaries to strike the homeland and adjust the Munitions Survivability
Program accordingly.
RECOVERY
How can the United States increase its resiliency to an attack on its essential logistics
infrastructure? The logistics capabilities of the US military and its ability to project
power have been distinguishing characteristics of the United States over its adversaries.
These capabilities have vulnerabilities, as stated above; thus, they should be protected
and resourced by shifting more of the logistics assets that handle munitions to active
status as opposed to reserve status or dramatically reducing reserve mobilization
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timelines.111 Placing most of the US logistics capacity, including munitions handlers and
cargo transfer companies, in a reserve status creates complications for the US military.
Combat forces can prepare for mobilization quickly, but delays may occur because of
force projection issues.112
An examination of mobilization timelines suggests the Army needs quicker and
more agile response capabilities.113 Faster response would be made possible by placing
more logistics assets in the active-duty Army or rapidly preparing the reserves.114
Logistics are important at the beginning of a conflict because forces and their munitions
must be quickly projected into the theater of operations. Precious time is wasted waiting
for logistics preparation to occur. If the logistics capabilities are ready at the onset
of a crisis and function smoothly, the whole process can occur much more seamlessly
than the speed at which the US military currently conducts business. Recovery from
an attack would happen much more quickly if more logistics capabilities were in the
active-duty Army or reserve logistics forces could mobilize in days.115
The best way to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for mobilizing rapidly is
to conduct exercises.116 Recently, less emphasis has been placed on logistics, even though
US military leadership understands a robust logistics capability makes the United
States a superpower and distinguishes it from its rivals. With most logistics capability
now in the reserves, a reevaluation of the mobilization of US forces is necessary.
The US Army Reserve has proposed changes to its mobilization timelines: “To provide
this significant surge capacity to counter full-spectrum threats, the USAR is now
focused on developing 25,000 to 33,000 soldiers in key enabling units it calls ‘Ready
Force X’ that can deploy to the fight in a matter of days and weeks.” The Ready Force X
concept would go a long way in resolving the logistics mobilization problem currently
facing the US military.117
The US military’s training exercises and logistics ROC drills are not as effective
as they should be. Rotations going to Europe offer prime opportunities to deploy
forces and gain valuable lessons learned.118 The exercises never assume a contested
environment and skip or waive the logistics buildup portions of the training. Logistics
training exercises or ROC drills could draw more attention to the issue and provide
a greater understanding of the resources required for a quick recovery.
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Could allies and partners assist the United States if it were attacked? Attacking the
US munitions storage and distribution network could destroy essential stocks. The
United States may need the support and assistance of allies and partners if the munitions
infrastructure is attacked. Multinational training in logistics and the standardization
of weapons and munitions across NATO and other alliances should be a primary goal
for the US government and NATO.119 In addition, multinational exercises that stress
logistics, including munitions logistics, should be conducted.120 The NATO alliance has
not dedicated enough resources to developing logistics interoperability.121 Furthermore,
NATO should value interoperability and redundancy more to make the alliance more
resilient to attack.
If the United States were attacked and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty were
invoked, the nation would be able to recover and respond more quickly with the
support of interoperable allies. Standardization and interoperability are essential, and
many leaders within the military do not appreciate that munitions, in many cases, are
produced specifically for a single country’s weapons. For example, during the
Persian Gulf War, “the small-arms purchases from our allies did not go well.
Ammunition procured from the United Kingdom performed to NATO standards
in our weapons, but a difference in propellant mixes quickly fouled those weapons.
The Department of the Army quickly directed that United Kingdom ammunition
would not be allowed into combat areas and would only be designated as training
ammunition.”122 The same issue could affect the US military and its allies if the
goal of achieving interoperability fails. Munitions interoperability would likely reduce
tensions in warfare significantly and increase US resiliency.
CONCLUSION
When viewed in isolation, many of the resource cuts and streamlining that have
occurred by following a business model that stresses efficiency in the maintenance
of munitions logistics infrastructure have made sense. Making military reductions
at a time when the Soviet Union had collapsed and no near-peer adversary existed
was the prudent course to follow. Cashing in on a peace dividend seemed to be
the best course and in the best interest of the American people at the time. But the
power balance in the world is shifting, and new and growing threats are emerging.
The US military must defend against these threats. Though the United States is
working diligently to protect and prevent attacks on its soil, a near-peer adversary
could breach the nation’s preventative and protective measures. The combined effects
of the entire logistics infrastructure that enables force projection need to be studied.
Locating choke points and overcoming them are essential to ensure a seamless flow
of supplies. The erosion of the industrial base, cuts in the workforce (placing most
logistics in the reserves with slow mobilization timelines), and a dwindling supply of
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US Merchant Marine ships have put the United States in a precarious position.
Collective resource cuts across the services have created single points of failure
that would make recovering from an attack on the US munitions infrastructure—
especially Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point or Military Ocean Terminal
Concord—very difficult.
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5. THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM: REINVESTMENT NEEDED
Established in the late 1950s, the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of
Interstate and Defense Highways, also known as the Interstate Highway System, is
one of the greatest public-works projects in US history. The system has made travel
faster, easier, and safer.1 The system has also significantly enhanced the US economy
and is “the engine that has driven America’s industrial growth.”2 By 1979, the
final section of Interstate 5 connected Canada and Mexico.3 In 1990–91, the system
contributed significantly to the success of Operation Desert Storm. “The US Highway
System supported the mobilization of troops and moved equipment and forces to
embarkment ports—this was key to the successful deployment.”4 The system has
facilitated commerce exponentially, boosting the US economy by trillions of dollars.
For example, US gross domestic product rose from $426 billion in 1955, the year
before the Federal Aid Highway Act authorized the system’s creation, to $18,745
billion in 2016.5
The 2017 National Security Strategy lists “promote American prosperity” as one of
four vital national interests.6 Subsequently, the strategy underscores the need for federal,
state, and local governments to work with private industry to improve the nation’s
infrastructure.7 While facilitating significant economic growth, the Interstate Highway
System has simultaneously saved hundreds of thousands of lives by improving
safety with wider lanes, uniform standards, and universal signage and numbering.
As of 1996, the system was credited with saving at least 187,000 lives.8 Its significant
contributions to the US economy, the source of US power, as well as its vulnerabilities
justify designating the conditions of the Interstate Highway System a national
security issue.
Title 32 of the US Code states, “it shall be policy of the DOD to integrate the
highway needs of the national defense into the civil highway programs of the various
state and federal agencies and cooperate with those agencies in matters pertaining to
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the use of public highways and in planning their development and construction.”9 To
date, adversaries have not interfered with US military deployments from the homeland
to a theater of conflict.10 The US military uses the Interstate Highway System in
peacetime and during conflicts to move to ports to deploy without concern over
adversarial actions during deployment. But the military may no longer be able to do
so uncontested. “The security we have historically enjoyed between two oceans and
with well-meaning neighbors to our north and south can no longer be relied upon.”11
Adversaries of the United States have demonstrated capabilities that project reach to the
homeland and the motivation to change the American way of war, which is to deploy
unopposed and fight outside the continental United States. Consequently, “[i]t is now
undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary” and must be protected.12
Our forces’ ability to deploy is even more critical today, after the decision was
made in the mid-2000s to base the US Army primarily in the continental United States.13 If
the United States no longer has enough forward-deployed servicemembers, it must have
the ability to deploy the military quickly to the fight. This chapter discusses President
Eisenhower’s original intent for the Interstate Highway System, its current status, and
the actions the US government must take to ensure the effective use of the system in a
contested deployment scenario. The chapter also outlines two vulnerabilities: sabotage
activities in the gray zone (aggression short of armed conflict) by a state adversary
and potential terrorist actions by a lone wolf or terrorist cell. The chapter recommends
the US government assess and appropriate focused resources to reverse the declining
condition of the Interstate Highway System, especially the interstate highway
strategic connectors that connect forts to ports, and take moderate, proactive security
measures to secure the system for use in a contested deployment. The chapter
concludes with additional recommendations for preparing the system for use in a
contested deployment.
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BACKGROUND OF THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM
President Eisenhower wanted to make the Interstate Highway System a reality. Two events in his life prior to his presidency solidified this motivation. The first
event was a cross-country trip he took in 1919 when he had joined the first Army
Cross-Country Motor Transport Train, which set out to learn how motor vehicles
could cross the country.15 The convoy averaged about five miles per hour, had many
breakdowns, and took 56 days to complete the trip. The train ride was Eisenhower’s
first involvement with US roads.16 The second event that impressed him happened during his service in Germany during World War II, when he saw the wide,
four-lane roads built across that country for its military transport. Years later, after he
was elected president, the United States still clearly needed a highway system. In addition,
Eisenhower wanted the highways as part of his overall Cold War program—to be available for the evacuation of major cities in a nuclear-attack scenario and to help facilitate
US military movement across the country.17
According to The Best Investment a Nation Ever Made, “On June 29, 1956, President
Eisenhower signed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 which authorized the
interstate highway system.”18 The federal government paid for the construction of
most of the highway system, leaving a small portion for the states to fund. “The
final system was 46,876 miles long and took thirty-seven years to complete.”19
The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) includes 1,700 miles of highways
called STRAHNET Connectors that link military installations and ports.20 Federal and
state governments—unlike much of the nation’s infrastructure, which is privately
owned—own the Interstate Highway System and have standardized road features
such as signage, dimensions, and numbering.21 These measures have led to increased
commerce and travel and improved safety. The Federal Aid Highway Act also
established the Highway Trust Fund, which levies taxes on gasoline and tires to
finance the Interstate Highway System. The system impacts everyday life and
serves as a catalyst for US economic power. The system also serves to forward
deploy military forces and move forces within US borders for domestic operations.
According to Mary A. Field, “Freedom of access and use of the highway system remains
14
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consistent with the underlying principles of democracy in the US.”22 Consequently,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Transportation
designated the Highway and Motor Carrier subsector as one of seven subsectors
under the Transportation Systems Sector, which is one of the 16 Critical
Infrastructure Sectors.23
USE OF THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM TODAY
The role of the Interstate Highway System in a deployment, contested or uncontested,
has not changed much; the system is an effective medium for getting military
equipment to an airport or port of debarkation.24 Whether to use rail or highways to
transport equipment to ports is often a cost-benefit decision.25 Usually, equipment
moves via highway from military installations such as Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, that are near a port.
The Interstate Highway System is also used to transport assets, such as
US Army National Guard units responding to a domestic crisis, within the continental
United States. But, the combination of organic semitrailer availability for military
units and size and weight limits of vehicles on state highways is a limiting factor.26
The Transportation Engineering Agency within Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command maintains the data on equipment weight to make these
strategic deployment decisions.27
Shipping equipment via boat also remains a cost-effective means of moving
equipment from the continental United States to any theater. Hence, in its Port
Look 2008 study for Congress, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command recommended if a shipping port is going to be designated a
strategic port, its terminal access location must be within 10 miles of the Interstate
Highway System.28 Hence, the highway routes to the 22 (five military and 17 commercial)
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strategic seaports that move military equipment are publicly known and could
potentially be targeted.29
A present-day attack on the Interstate Highway System would certainly disrupt
a military deployment. At a minimum, such an attack would slow the progress of
a unit traveling to the port of debarkation. The threat of an attack would cause the
unit to posture in a higher-security status and would dictate additional security
actions. For example, more soldiers would be performing security, which would pull
manpower away from the tasks of deploying the unit. As another example, a
deploying brigade combat team may require one of its infantry companies to perform
security while the main body deploys.
Current Condition of US Roads and Bridges
According to Mark S. Kuhar, “As the US Interstate Highway System turns 60
years old, it faces increasing congestion, unprecedented levels of travel—
particularly by large trucks—and insufficient funding to make needed repairs.”30
Since 1998, the American Society of Civil Engineers has conducted a comprehensive
assessment of the nation’s infrastructure every four years. When the assessment
is complete, the society issues the Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, dividing
infrastructure into categories and grading each on a scale of “A” to “F.”
In 1988, Congress chartered a report on US infrastructure by the National
Council on Public Works Improvement, but, after 1988, the federal government
discontinued the report. As a result, the American Society of Civil Engineers
started publishing its report in 1998. The 2021 report card’s overall grade for
US infrastructure is a “C-,” which is a marginal improvement over the 2017
grade of “D+.”31 Despite the most recent uptick, the overall grade given to
US infrastructure has been trending downward since 1988, when the National Council
on Public Works Improvement gave infrastructure a “C” because the reinvestments
needed each year have not been made.32 According to the 2021 report card, state and
local maintenance budgets have also ignored ridership growth.33 As of 2016, Americans
were driving more, and “vehicle miles travelled [was] at its second highest-ever level,
second only to 2007.”34
The report card’s grades for US roads have not changed much since 1998. As
Americans continue to drive more, roads have become more congested, and their
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/Functions/SpecialAssistant/Pages/PortsNationalDefense.aspx.
30.

Mark S. Kuhar, “Interstate Highway System Turns 60,” Rock Products 119, no. 7 (July 2016): 88.

31. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 2021 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure:
A Comprehensive Assessment of America’s Infrastructure (Reston, VA: ASCE, March 3, 2021).
32. “Report Card History,” American Society of Civil Engineers’ 2021 Infrastructure Report Card,
2021, https://infrastructurereportcard.org/making-the-grade/report-card-history/.
33. ASCE, 2017 Infrastructure Report Card: A Comprehensive Assessment of America’s Infrastructure
(Reston, VA: ASCE, March 9, 2017).
34.

ASCE, 2017 Infrastructure Report Card.

59

condition continues to deteriorate. In 2014, drivers spent 6.9 billion hours in traffic
delays (42 hours per driver) on the four million miles of US roads, which translates
into approximately $160 billion wasted in time and fuel.35 The 2017 report card also
states the backlog of highway and bridge capital needs totaled $836 billion, $420
billion of which represented needed repairs.36 In 2015, President Obama signed the
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, which provided $305 billion for fiscal
years 2016–20 for surface transportation programs, including federal highways.37
The federal government remains the major funding source for new highway
construction through the Highway Trust Fund, and states are responsible for
the operations and maintenance of all highways except those on federal lands.38
The Highway Trust Fund, which represents the bulk of federal investment in the
Interstate Highway System and is funded by use-tax revenue, teeters on insolvency,
mostly because per-gallon gasoline taxes have not increased since 1993.39 The taxes
of 18.4 cents per gallon of gasoline and 24.4 cents per gallon of diesel have not been
raised since 1993, and inflation has cut its purchasing power by 40 percent.40
Bridges scored better than roads on the 2017 Infrastructure Report Card because
local, state, and federal governments have made a focused, funded effort to repair
structurally deficient bridges—defined as bridges that require replacement or
significant maintenance. But, of the nation’s 614,387 bridges, 9.1 percent, down from
12.3 percent in 2007, remain structurally deficient, almost 40 percent are 50 years
or older, and the maintenance backlog for bridges totals $123 billion.41
The report card’s recommendations for roads and bridges include an increase in
funding at all levels of government to improve the condition of the Interstate Highway
System. In addition, the report card recommends the US government raise the federal
motor fuels tax and index it to inflation to sustain the Highway Trust Fund, prioritize
maintenance to maximize road and bridge life span, and tackle congestion with
an optimized, multimodal transportation system for crowded metropolitan areas.
Furthermore, the report card recommends builders use newly innovative materials,
building technologies, and techniques to enable them to make bridges more effectively
and efficiently. Road design, planning models, and new materials have improved,
making roads more sustainable.42 For example, sensors on bridges provide feedback on
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conditions, enabling engineers to address issues sooner.43 Also, the National Guard’s
DHS vulnerability assessment teams could be used to conduct assessments on the 2,000
miles of STRAHNET Connectors used for deployments.
Interstate Highway System Vulnerabilities
Besides its deteriorating condition, the Interstate Highway System has several
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include being open to subversive actions in the
gray zone by adversaries as well as terrorist acts.44 The author acknowledges some
of the Interstate Highway System’s most serious vulnerabilities include various
types of cyberattacks, such as those that disable streetlights or disrupt traffic flow.
The focus here is on deliberate, physical acts perpetrated on the Interstate Highway
System. For the purposes of this chapter, “physical vulnerabilities” are vulnerabilities
that could result in human casualties, damage to equipment, or damage to tangible
infrastructure. Examples provided later will examine two Interstate Highway System
vulnerabilities exploited by ill-intentioned actors who executed deliberate, planned
acts to disrupt a US military deployment, cause casualties, or destroy property.
Gray-Zone Activities
According to Charles R. Burnett et al., “[T]he gray zone is a broad carrier
concept for a universe of often-dissimilar strategic challenges” between traditional
war and peace.45 State and nonstate actors with ill intentions operate in this
space. Gray-zone activities occur below the threshold contained in Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty and below the level of violence needed to call for
a UN Security Council resolution.46 Russia’s recent gray-zone activities have
triggered adverse US and Western responses, including economic sanctions, but
these transgressions remain well below the West’s vague threshold of provocation.47
Activities in the gray zone cause instabilities and can disrupt and delay US deployments.
Like many other pieces of infrastructure, the Interstate Highway System remains
vulnerable to gray-zone activities. Burnett et al. state, “The gray zone also includes
the less purposeful and more incidental confluence of destabilizing, competitive
forces.”48 Given the Interstate Highway System’s current, poor condition, the system
is even more vulnerable to gray-zone activity.
State actors do not need to be near the United States to engage in gray-zone activities.
Few resources are required for an actor to operate in the gray zone, and the gray
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zone limits the actor’s exposure, thereby maintaining the ability for denial. An
adversary would probably rely heavily on social media and cyber warfare to conduct
gray-zone activities against the United States. Some examples of potential adversarial,
gray-zone activities include spreading disinformation to incite protests or strikes
and disseminating lies about road conditions to delay a deployment. Russia spread
disinformation before the 2016 presidential election: “Russian operatives used Facebook
to publicize 129 phony event announcements during the 2016 presidential campaign,
drawing the attention of nearly 340,000 users—many of whom said they were
planning to attend” these phony events.49 At a minimum, gray-zone activities cause
the target to spend valuable resources in addressing the incident, but the activities
stop short of defeating the target—at least, in the traditional sense. In the case of the
Interstate Highway System, gray-zone activities could cause delays, prompting the
United States to spend more resources during mobilization. The additional resources
could be funding, such as spending money to repair a stretch of road; personnel,
such as deploying soldiers to secure a stretch of interstate; or time, such as spending
time navigating obstacles on the way to a port of debarkation.
One possible scenario is an adversary using gray-zone operations to delay and
disrupt a deployment of US forces to the adversary’s theater. China, Iran, and Russia
regularly operate in the gray zone.50 Russia, in particular, channels its gray-zone
activities toward the vulnerabilities of its adversaries.51 Russia has made gray-zone
activities part of its doctrine, as exemplified by its Gerasimov model or doctrine (named
after Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov),
which is a veritable playbook for gray-zone competition and conflict.52 Russia has
demonstrated gray-zone capabilities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where it sent
Russian journalists before invading the region to provide a pro-Russian media slant
during the invasion. Russia also repaired railways in Ukraine before the invasion
under the guise of humanitarian assistance and later used these railways to move
troops and equipment.53
Hypothetically, an adversary could destroy US private satellites, which control
navigational tools many interstate travelers rely on and which companies use to
track over-the-road shipments. Military systems also rely significantly on satellites.54
Many military systems could be disabled before US forces deploy overseas,
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preventing forces from mobilizing to the theater of conflict. Without satellites, the
US military would be forced to return to methods of fighting previously used.
Disinformation, another gray-zone tactic, could potentially disrupt use of the
Interstate Highway System. Disinformation spread by Russia could incite protesters
on and around a US interstate, cause a highway worker strike, or provoke terrorists
and sympathizers to disrupt troop movements, among other potential outcomes.
Terrorism
Another Interstate Highway System vulnerability that should concern strategic
planners is terrorism. Before the September 11 attacks, officials and the American
public had dedicated little thought to the idea a terrorist might intentionally destroy a
bridge or attack a convoy. The Transportation Security Task Force, formed post-9/11
by state transportation officials, identified explosive attacks on key infrastructure
as the principal threat to the highway physical infrastructure.55 In the early 1990s, the
transportation industry shipped 800,000 daily loads of hazardous material through
all US modes of transportation, with 94 percent of the loads transported by trucks,
according to a 1998 study for the Department of Transportation Research and Special
Programs Administration.56 The two most predominate hazardous material products
shipped by the transportation industry are chemicals and petroleum products.57
The US government and the transportation industry executed several actions to
counter an explosive attack on a piece of key infrastructure. Per President George
W. Bush’s Executive Order 13228, the Office of Homeland Security was charged
with coordinating the efforts to protect critical infrastructure, including highways.58
The Department of Transportation soon regulated hazardous material transportation
by all modes in 2001.59 The department requires motor carriers transporting
hazardous material greater than or equal to specified amounts for commerce,
both interstate and intrastate, to register their loads with the Research and Special
Programs Administration.60 States enforce this registration through roadside
inspection programs. But states do not require hazardous material carriers to register
in each state through which they travel.
The department does require carriers “to plan for and implement procedures to
prevent unauthorized persons from taking control of or attacking hazardous material
shipments.”61 Stated differently, the department requires carriers to develop a
security plan. Terrorists could attempt to steal the hazardous materials and
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commit numerous, terrible actions with them to spread panic, such as poisoning
a water reservoir or building bombs for later use. The methods at terrorists’ disposal
include “crashing shipments into large buildings, government installations, or
historic monuments.”62
Terrorists have used simpler tactics involving roadways, such as driving a truck
into a crowd. Data from the company Calpipe Security Bollards indicate “vehicular
terror attacks in 2016 killed 601 people in Western nations—more than bombings,
shootings, and stabbings combined.”63 For example, on October 31, 2017, Sayfullo
Saipov drove a rented truck down a pedestrian bike lane in New York City, killing
at least eight people.64 In October 2010, al-Qaeda published the article “The Ultimate
Mowing Machine” in its Inspire magazine. The article calls for using a truck as a
“mowing machine, not to mow grass, but to mow down the enemies of Allah.”65
Terrorists may easily obtain inexpensive vehicles, and such an act would be consistent
with calls by leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria to “use what you have on
hand.”66 Terrorists could learn of a tactical movement to a port and drive a truck
into an area where soldiers or marines are massing, such as a deployment staging
area, tactical halt formation, or marshaling area.
Terrorists could also combine the two previously mentioned strategies to fill a
truck with explosives and use it as a weapon, similar to suicide bombings overseas.
According to Brian Jenkins et al., “Terrorists, notably in Iraq, have attempted to increase
the lethality of their devices by adding propane tanks or toxic chemicals to them.”67
Terrorists could also disrupt troop movements by destroying a key part of the
Interstate Highway System, such as a bridge, or attack state troopers or state-level
transportation personnel who are responsible for providing convoy movement
control on the system (when requested by the military).68
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Currently, only five military seaports can execute large-scale military
deployments.69 Several of the military seaports are close to commercial ones. Hence,
terrorists or gray-zone actors, without much difficulty, could estimate the Interstate
Highway System or rail routes US forces would use to move to these five ports.
For example, Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, the largest military terminal
in the world and the place from which 90 percent of ammunition going to Iraq and
Afghanistan was shipped, has only one road leading to it from Interstate 95.70
Recommendations
To prepare for a contested deployment scenario, the United States needs to ensure
the Interstate Highway System is in adequate condition and protected. Despite
post-9/11 countermeasures taken to protect the Interstate Highway System, terrorists
or other adversaries may still exploit it. Highways are the most difficult infrastructure
to secure against threats. The National Bridge Inventory contains more than
3.9 million miles of public roads and 591,548 structures.71 The highway system
connects all modes and provides a readily available and affordable means for
would-be terrorists to gain access to the United States through Canada and Mexico.72
The protection recommendations that follow include some measures to protect
all infrastructure and others to protect the STRAHNET Connectors for use in
a contested deployment.
An example of a proactive infrastructure protection program is the National
Association of Chemical Distributors quality control program for members
who ship hazardous materials. The government should consider mandating
a standardized template to be used nationally. The program could then be able
executed consistently with inspections to prevent terrorists from acquiring
bomb-making materials.
Another proactive program for the Interstate Highway System at large is the
government’s “If You See Something, Say Something” public awareness campaign,
which calls for the public to report suspicious activity to local authorities. The federal
government could establish a national hotline for reporting incidents that may be
related to terrorism and consolidate the various state-level hotlines for reporting
suspected terrorist activities. For example, New York State uses 1-866-SAFENYS,
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and New York City uses 1-888-NYCSAFE.73 The federal government should establish
one hotline with a memorable phone number so it becomes nationally known,
similar to 911. A single hotline would also make data easier to capture and use for
trend analysis. Local responders should be able to receive the information
immediately, and analysts at the state and federal levels should be able to capture
and review the data quickly. Billboards and signage on the Interstate Highway
System could reinforce and promote the hotline, and it could be incorporated into
the National Response Framework. The hotline would fit neatly into the framework’s
mission area of “Response—the capabilities necessary to save lives, protect
property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has
occurred.”74 The hotline would also fit into the Response core capability of Public
Information and Warning: “[T]o deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable
information to the whole community.”75 These capabilities can warn the public,
and the public can use them to remain vigilant for terrorist or gray-zone activities.
Like the National Response Framework, the customer base for the hotline should
be entire communities.
A solution should also consider using the National Guard’s DHS vulnerability
assessment teams to evaluate all 2,000 miles of the STRAHNET Connectors.
Recommendations for improvements based on the evaluations could be made
to ensure the Interstate Highway System continues to be ready for deployments.
Additionally, federal and state governments should sustain maintenance budgets
to at least meet annual requirements and protect them from being raided for other
projects to prevent the United States from regressing into a significant backlog again.
After the Department of Defense reviews the vulnerability assessment team
evaluations, it could task the National Guard with protecting the critical sections of the
STRAHNET Connectors. Giving the National Guard this responsibility would reduce
the requirement for deploying units to perform security-related tasks and allow them
to concentrate on the many other tasks associated with deployment. Joint Task Force
Empire Shield provides a possible template for this strategy: New York National
Guard soldiers maintain a visible presence to deter terrorists throughout transit hubs
like Grand Central Station and Penn Station in the New York City area.
National Guard soldiers in Title 32 status, when the Posse Comitatus Act does not
apply, have law enforcement authorities that could be used to facilitate deployments
by securing the STRAHNET Connectors and ports. These missions should be assigned
to state National Guards where the critical infrastructure resides, enabling them to
rehearse their responsibilities and further develop interagency relationships. For
example, the Department of Defense could task the North Carolina National Guard
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with the responsibility of securing the route from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point.
The National Guards within these states already possess the interagency
relationships at the state and local level. These National Guards could coordinate
routine interagency exercises at the state and local levels to rehearse security
implementation on the Interstate Highway System. Many National Guards
already conduct similar interagency training with state and local agencies for evacuation
scenarios. More units, especially active-duty ones, are conducting tactical deployment
exercises on their way to Combat Training Center rotations.76 The 82nd Airborne
Division announced in March 2018 it had convoyed vehicles from Fort Bragg along
Interstate 95 to Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, to be transported via boat to
Fort Polk, Louisiana, for a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation.77 “The 82nd
Airborne said [it was] one of the division’s largest sealift deployment exercises
in decades.”78 Units could familiarize themselves with topics such as clearances
needed for oversize loads and alternate routes during periods of congestion.
Long stretches of the Interstate Highway System should be assigned a mobile yet
visible security solution.
Also known as the “ring of steel,” the United Kingdom’s Traffic and Environmental
Zone uses checkpoints and concrete barriers to protect civilians, an ideal technique for
countering terrorists who may wish to drive a heavy vehicle into a military formation.79
After two terror attacks occurred in London in 2017, during which terrorists driving
vehicles mowed down pedestrians, antiterror measures such as checkpoints, an
extended perimeter, and concrete barriers were installed in pedestrian areas in
major cities like London and Manchester to prevent heavy vehicles from driving into
crowds.80 These concepts may be applied to marshaling areas at home stations,
tactical pauses en route to ports of debarkation, or ports of debarkation. These measures
cost very little, but units should train on the procedures that are selected and develop
them into standardized operating procedures.
Finally, Congress should pass legislation providing for a focused reinvestment
in critical infrastructure—especially STRAHNET Connectors, rails, and ports used
for deployment. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 included
$83 billion to improve infrastructure, one of seven focus areas to help stimulate
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to Protect Revelers,” Daily Mirror, October 16, 2017, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news
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the economy.81 As of September 2021, proposed legislation dedicates an additional
$110 billion for “roads, bridges, and other major projects” as part of a larger $550
billion infrastructure package.82 Until this bill passes, it is unknown what percentage
of projects will focus on infrastructure identified by the Department of Homeland
Security as critical infrastructure, but we suggest roads, bridges, ports, and airfields
needed for the Department of Defense to project assets should be a priority.83
The 2017 American Society of Civil Engineers report card estimates bringing
US infrastructureup to a “B” grade would require spending $4.59 trillion over 10
years. According tothis report card, “The Federal Highway Administration estimates
that each dollar spent on road, highway, and bridge improvements returns $5.20 in
the form of lower vehicle maintenance costs, decreased delays, reduced fuel
consumption, improved safety, lower road and bridge maintenance costs,
and reduced emissions.”84
CONCLUSION
In summary, the tremendous economic and societal impacts of the Interstate
Highway System over the last 65 years have revolutionized the Americans way of
life. The system’s poor condition remains undeniable. Though one of the primary
reasons Eisenhower built the system was military mobilization, Americans have
spent little time considering this use of the system. The US armed forces have never
had a contested deployment involving adversarial actions within US borders. As a
result, the military seems to assume deployments will be uncontested. This assumption
may no longer be valid. The Interstate Highway System has physical vulnerabilities—
namely, from gray-zone actors and terrorists, each capable of disrupting and
delaying deploying forces.
The Interstate Highway System, including the STRAHNET Connectors, requires
substantial, focused investment and security for the military to be prepared for
a contested deployment. Proactive security measures to counter the system’s
vulnerabilities include making the National Association of Chemical Distributors
quality control program mandatory, consolidating counterterrorism reporting
hotlines, and using the National Guard in Title 32 status to provide physical
security at designated bridges and STRAHNET Connectors. Most of all, like most
US critical infrastructure, the Interstate Highway System needs the government to
assess it and make focused reinvestment in the roads, bridges, and other pieces of
infrastructure needed for the deployment of forces. These measures would protect the
81. Residential Retrofit Working Group, Roadmap for the Home Energy Upgrade Market
(Washington, DC: State & Local Energy Efficiency Action Network, June 2011), ix, 15, 23.
82. White House, Fact Sheet: Historic Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal, July 28, 2021, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/28/fact-sheet-hi storic
-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/.
83. Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-Peltier, The US Employment Effects of Military and Domestic
Spending Priorities: 2011 Update (Amherst, MA: Political Economy Research Institute, December 2011), 4.
84.
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system and the US way of war—projecting forces from the continental United States—
and fit in with President Eisenhower’s vision of “a mighty network of highways spread
across the country.”85

85. “50th Anniversary Interstate Highway System—Eisenhower Audio Gallery,”
(website), updated June 27, 2017, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/interstate/audiogallery.cfm.
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APPENDIX A
CONTESTED DEPLOYMENT CYBER INDEX
INTRODUCTION
This appendix includes the findings of a US Army War College research team
consisting of faculty and students. The team explored how Department of Defense (DoD)
cyber units should respond to a cyberattack on US critical infrastructure that supports
the deployment of forces from the United States and what these cyber units could do to
speed the recovery of critical infrastructure systems. This research continues the efforts
of the Maneuver Support Battle Lab, which published the Contested Deployment Seminar
(CDS) Event Report on October 5, 2016. Seminar participants explored the impact of a
state actor conducting anti-access operations within the United States to disrupt and
delay a deployment of forces. The scenario included a major hurricane and cyberattacks
on the electrical grid and deployment infrastructure. Despite these challenges, the
seminar concluded the deployment system was resilient and noted only minor delays.1
In addition, the participants found “[a] number of doctrinal and policy issues impact
the use of military cyber capability in the homeland as well as potential kinetic
attacks on cyber targets within the homeland. These issues would likely leave these
actions in the hands of civilian authorities unless they are updated.”2
The Department of Defense has recognized it must be prepared to defend the
ation’s critical infrastructure from a cyberattack, and assumed in its 2015 cyber
strategy that during a conflict, “a potential adversary will seek to target US or allied
critical infrastructure and military networks to gain a strategic advantage . . . and a
sophisticated actor could target an industrial control system (ICS) on a public utility.”3
The strategy then states while the Department of Defense depends on private-sector
critical infrastructure to conduct operations, it is unsure of the state of the cybersecurity
of these systems.4 The department, therefore, must work with critical infrastructure
owners and operators to mitigate and respond to cyberattacks.5 The cyber strategy directs
the Department of Defense to conduct exercises with the Department of Homeland
Security and the FBI to protect critical infrastructure “under partner agencies’ lead.”6
Following guidance in the DoD cyber strategy, US Cyber Command missions
include deterring and defeating threats to critical infrastructure. In 2017, Admiral
Michael S. Rogers, commander, US Cyber Command, stated, “We are particularly
1. David Nobles, Contested Deployment Seminar (CDS) Event Report (Fort Leonard Wood, MO:
US Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, October 5, 2016), 4.
2.

Nobles, Contested Deployment Seminar, 15.

3. Department of Defense (DoD), The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (Washington, DC:
DoD, April 2015), 2.
4.

DoD, Cyber Strategy, 7.

5.

DoD, Cyber Strategy, 11.

6.

DoD, Cyber Strategy, 22.
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concerned as adversaries probe and even exploit systems used by . . . critical
infrastructure in the United States and abroad.”7 He goes on to state the command
has observed cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure both in the United States
and abroad. He highlighted the 2015 cyberattack against the Ukrainian electrical
power grid and stated the Department of Homeland Security notified systems
administrators about malware used in this attack.8 If these cyberattacks were directed
at American critical infrastructure that supports the military, the resulting
effects could hamper deployments and the command and control of US forces.9
US Cyber Command manages only a portion of the whole-of-nation effort required
to defend US critical infrastructure. The command coordinates with the FBI and
the Department of Homeland Security to protect national critical infrastructure and
includes the US Army Reserve and the National Guard when responding to significant
cyber incidents.10
For the past nine years, US Cyber Command has conducted annual Cyber Guard
exercises to evaluate the Cyber Mission Force, other government agencies, and state
organizations’ capabilities to defend critical infrastructure. During Cyber Guard 2017,
over 700 government and critical infrastructure cybersecurity experts coordinated
efforts to respond to a variety of cyber threats. The Cyber Mission Force supported
the Department of Homeland Security in helping a private-sector organization recover
from a cyberattack on the electrical grid. National Guard cyber teams responded in
their Title 32 role, testing the dual-status command concept in this complex technical
and policy environment.11 With the Contested Deployment Seminar having effectively
explored the cyber vulnerabilities and resiliency of the deployment system and
the Cyber Guard exercises having evaluated cyber team responses, the US Army War
College team authored a series of research papers to address the following questions.
• CAN: Do DoD cyber units have the capability to assist private-sector critical
infrastructure organizations?
• MAY: Do current laws and policies permit DoD cyber units to assist
private-sector critical infrastructure organizations?
• WHAT: What should critical infrastructure owners and operators do to
enhance their cybersecurity?
• HOW: If DoD cyber units are directed to assist private-sector critical
infrastructure organizations, who will command and control these units?
7. United States Cyber Command, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Michael S. Rogers, commander,
US Cyber Command).
8.

United States Cyber Command.

9. Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for US Cyber Command: Preparing for Operations in the Cyber Domain,
114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Michael S. Rogers, commander, US Cyber Command).
10.

United States Cyber Command.

11. United States Cyber Command, “Teams Defend against Simulated Attacks in Cyber Guard
Exercise,” DoD (website), July 5, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1237898/.
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Lieutenant Colonel Christian A. Haffey begins the appendix section by
addressing the CAN question with his part titled, “Critical Infrastructure: Are Cyber
Mission Forces Equipped to Defend?” This part of the appendix is not included in this
integrated research project because it is classified. He examines the ability of the Cyber
Mission Force, including National Guard units, to defend critical infrastructure that
supports the deployment of forces from a US home station to its port of embarkation.
He then explores DoD cyberspace training to determine whether Cyber Misson Force
teams have the sufficient skills and resources to help public and private-sector critical
infrastructure organizations defend against and recover from a cyberattack.
Haffey shows the defense of critical infrastructure requires DoD cyber teams
that possess a high level of expertise in the cybersecurity of traditional information
technology (IT) and operational technology, including supervisory control and data
acquisition systems. He proposes the Department of Defense assess the Cyber Mission
Force to determine the appropriate force structure and required team composition.
He recommends US Cyber Command standardize critical infrastructure training and
equipment. Teams within the Cyber Mission Force should continue to enhance their
expertise through exercises that integrate government, academia, and public and
private-sector cybersecurity professionals.
Next, in “Cyberspace Defense of Critical Infrastructure: Legal and Policy
Limitations,” Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. Boling addresses the MAY question.
He explores legal and policy issues for DoD cyber assistance to private-sector
organizations and provides an overview of the development of national cybersecurity
policy and authority and policy recommendations to enable better public-private
collaboration. Better interaction would allow stakeholders to prepare for, and respond to,
cyber crises on public and private- sector critical infrastructure. He analyzes the Defense
Critical Infrastructure Program, which “consists of actions taken to prevent, remediate,
or mitigate the risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets.”12 He
further reviews the laws, policies, and regulations that apply to defense support of civil
authorities and applies these standards to DoD support of critical infrastructure owned
and operated by the private sector. His findings support the statement by General
Keith B. Alexander, US Army retired, to Congress that clear authorities and rules of
engagement are necessary to respond to cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.13
Boling proposes a national cyber defense plan that focuses on critical
infrastructure protection. He recommends Cyber Mission Force National
Mission Teams receive training and certification on the nation’s most
important critical infrastructure through partnerships with public and private
infrastructure owners and operators. He then states many National Guard cyber team
members are uniquely qualified for these tasks because their civilian positions often
involve the protection of private-sector operational technology. The Department
of Defense should take advantage of this opportunity to enhance National Guard
12. “Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(website), n.d., https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Homeland-Defense-and-Global
-Security/Defense-Critical-Infrastructure-Program/.
13. Cyber Strategy and Policy, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Keith B. Alexander, chief executive
officer and president, IronNet Cybersecurity).
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cyber team response capabilities to cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. Boling
also echoes the previous part in calling for more DoD cybersecurity exercises with
governmental partners.
The next part addresses the WHAT question. Colonel Brian D. Wisniewski’s,
“Framework for a Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience Assessment,” examines
the processes critical infrastructure owners and operators should implement to
enhance cybersecurity and attempts by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia to gain
advantage through cyberspace activities resembling Indian strategist Chanakya’s
concept of “silent war.” Wisniewski then assesses current international standards and
best practices and concludes with recommendations for improving these practices.
Wisniewski’s first recommendation is for the continued support and expansion of
international standards and industry best practices designed to improve cybersecurity
constantly. He then proposes a framework for the cyber resilience of critical
infrastructure assets beyond vulnerability assessments. Finally, he recommends the
United States reestablish a critical infrastructure assessment program, with a renewed
focus on both security and cyber resilience.
The appendix concludes with research and findings on HOW the Department
of Defense should command and control its forces in response to a cyberattack on
critical infrastructure. Colonel James L. Boling, US Army retired, and Colonel Steven
E. Landis, US Army retired, provide a detailed analysis in “Command and Control
of Domestic Cyber Response Operations in a Complex Catastrophe.” They outline
a challenging scenario in which a nation-state conducts a significant cyberattack
on US critical infrastructure while the Department of Defense prepares to deploy
to an overseas contingency, and they compare and contrast the response to a
natural disaster and a cyberattack. This part explores whether the Department of
Homeland Security’s National Cyber Incident Response Plan is sufficient to act as the
command-and-control blueprint for a synchronized US response to a major domestic
cyber incident, with particular attention to DoD roles and responsibilities in defense
support of civil authorities. Boling and Landis then explore show how the US government
should exercise whole-of-government command and control during cyber incidents.
National, state, local, and private-sector leaders must become aware of the
significant vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. With awareness comes the
requirement to enhance the cybersecurity of the systems that are essential to the
survival of the United States. The Department of Defense is equally dependent on
these systems to project power and support civil authorities in response to crises in
the homeland.
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APPENDIX A-1
CYBERSPACE DEFENSE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE:
LEGAL AND POLICY LIMITATIONS
The 2018 National Defense Strategy summary bleakly states the United States
homeland “is no longer a sanctuary.”1 With a few minor exceptions, the country
has been free from major terrorist attacks since 2001 and from major world-power
attacks on the homeland since World War II. The explosive growth of technology
has infiltrated every aspect of life, including homes, businesses, and the federal
government, and multiple areas of science, such as energy, neuroscience,
genetics, and nanotechnology.2 Much of this technology has naturally wound
up in the critical infrastructures that run our world, making them more reliable,
easier to maintain, cheaper, and more responsive. Unfortunately, in the race to make
these improvements, the same technology advances introduce potentially highrisk vulnerabilities that enable foreign manipulation or introduce the possibility of
cascading failures that would interfere with the software and mechanical operations of
information technology (IT) systems to disastrous effect.
Attempts to compromise these infrastructure vulnerabilities have been well
documented. At a September 2017 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security
Conference, Kaspersky Lab reported “it had detected roughly 18,000 malware samples
belonging to more than 2,500 families on industrial control systems (ICS) in the first half
of 2017” alone.3 Compromising cyber-enabled components of transportation, energy,
or financial systems offers compelling, asymmetric advantages that could cause
devastating or destructive effects on the infrastructures the components service.4
The cybersecurity company FireEye reported in December 2017 the detection of a
complex, targeted malware specifically designed to manipulate industrial processes.
Speculation suggests authorship by nation-state-level expertise, and, consistent
with other Stuxnet-like attacks, this malware was intended to “prevent safety mechanisms
from executing their intended function, resulting in a physical consequence.”5 The
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, the “federal-civilian
interface for sharing cyber threat indicators,” said, in 2017, it “responded to diverse
incidents, conducted exercises to support operational awareness, and provided
1. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, January 2018), 3.
2. “Big Idea: Technology Grows Exponentially,” Big Think (website), March 21, 2011, https://
bigthink.com/think-tank/big-idea-technology-grows-exponentially.
3. Eduard Kovacs, “Thousands of Malware Variants Found on Industrial Systems: Report,”
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security Conference, September 28, 2017, https://www.icscyber
securityconference.com/thousands-malware-variants-found-industrial-systems-report/.
4.

Kovacs, “Thousands of Malware Variants.”

5. Blake Johnson et al., “Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework ‘TRITON’ and Cause
Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure,” FireEye Threat Research Blog, December 14, 2017,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework
-triton.html.
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guidance” to a variety of public and private organizations.6 It shared over 15,600
alerts and 3,000 indicators of compromise and received “more than 106,000 incident
reports from federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and the
private sector, affecting communications, enterprise, and control systems.”7
Because critical infrastructures are vital to the movement of deploying forces, the
Department of Defense (DoD) must understand this high-threat environment and
the associated cyberspace vulnerabilities and risks. In testimony to the US Senate
Committee on Armed Services in 2017, General Keith B. Alexander, US Army retired,
stated the Department of Defense has the responsibility to defend the nation in
cyberspace, and the private sector “controls most of the real estate in cyberspace . . . and
the notion that the government might have control over, or even a constant active
defensive presence on these private systems and networks, is simply not something our
nation seeks today.”8
Although much has changed in recent years, significant legal and policy
limitations remain that inhibit DoD cybersecurity resources from effectively defending
the nation or responding in the event of cyberattack on DoD-dependent critical
infrastructures. This part of the appendix will present a brief history of the development
of cybersecurity national policy, present the current capabilities under existing
authorities, and provide policy recommendations to enable better public-private
collaborations to prepare for and respond to cyber crises on public and private-sector
critical infrastructures.
OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
Policy of the Department of Defense defines Defense Support of Civi Authorities
(DSCA) in the following way:
Support provided by US Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract
personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary
of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and
requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for
assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support,
and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.9

Defense support of civil authorities, which has evolved over the years as civilmilitary relations have evolved, is tailored mostly to national disaster response;
border security augmentation; and special-event security, such as protests or political

6. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), NCCIC Year in Review
2017: Operation Cyber Guardian (Washington, DC: NCCIC, April 2, 2018), 3.
7.

NCCIC, Operation Cyber Guardian, 20.

8. Cyber Strategy and Policy, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Keith B. Alexander, chief executive
officer and president, IronNet Cybersecurity).
9. William J. Lynn III, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, DoD Directive 3025.18 (Washington, DC:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, updated March 19, 2018).
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event support.10 Invoking DSCA in a crisis following a critical infrastructure event is a
relatively new concept.
The complexities involving federal military personnel in domestic response to
traditional crises have a long and nuanced history in the United States. For many reasons
outside the scope of this part of the appendix, US civil society has an abiding “wariness
of standing armies . . . rooted in the colonial experience.”11 Federal law inhibits military
involvement in law enforcement in the United States. There is much debate on the
implementation of the Posse Comitatus Act—an 1878 law—and whether military leaders
and lawyers understand its application and interpretation in today’s context. Many
advocate for better-defined rules of engagement.12
The Department of Defense has significant resources available to assist SLTT
governments during national disasters and civil unrest, and a lawful mechanism
permits SLTT authorities to request federal military support and enables support at the
president’s request. Authorities for traditional DSCA missions, such as domestic disaster
recovery or law enforcement, at the request of local authorities or when approved by
the president or secretary of defense have long been established.13 A national crisis
following a cyberattack on domestic critical infrastructures has many similarities to
traditional crises, and little reason exists to believe a model other than DSCA would
be appropriate in response. The US government has a long history of evolving policies
to ensure the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure against the growing terrorist and
criminal cyber threat.
The concern about the vulnerabilities inherent in critical infrastructures,
especially with the modern introduction of cyber-based capabilities, has been growing
for more than 25 years. Former President George H. W. Bush’s 1990 National Security
Directive 42 recognized the necessity for securing national security systems increasingly
dependent on emergent IT capabilities to ensure their operation in crisis. The directive
modernized policy from the 1980s on national security systems, recognizing the
need to update the policy based on the introduction of new technology.14 Though the
term “critical infrastructure” had not become popular yet, the spate of terrorist and
criminal attacks in the early 1990s focused national attention on the topic.
In 1996, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order 13010. The order
established a commission that spent 15 months assessing the scope and nature
of vulnerabilities inherent in the nation’s haphazard interconnection of critical
10.

Lynn, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2.

11. Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, “The Role of the Military in
the Policy Process,” in American National Security, 7th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2009), 203.
12. For more information, see Donald J. Currier, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Harmless Relic from
the Post-Reconstruction Era or a Legal Impediment to Transformation? (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College Press, 2003); and Thomas D. Cook, The Posse Comitatus Act: An Act in Need of a Regulatory
Update (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2008).
13.

Lynn, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 3.

14. George H. W. Bush, National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems, National Security Directive 42 (Washington, DC: White House, July 5, 1990).
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infrastructures.15 These systems were developed, interconnected, and upgraded over time
with little thought to security in general and little-to-no consideration of cyber threats.16
As a result of the commission’s work, Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63,
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Coordinators, in 1998. This first-of-its-kind directive
began assigning responsibility for critical infrastructure protection to US government
agencies. Because the directive primarily focused on infrastructures used for commerce
(such as banking, manufacturing, and transportation), the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration within the Department of Commerce was appointed
the lead agency.17
Before the September 11 attacks, the Department of Defense primarily focused
on threats outside US territorial boundaries.18 After 2001, the development of
US critical infrastructure protection policy expanded, and the scope of the problem
affecting critical infrastructures threatened by newly discovered terroristic threats
became starkly evident. As stated by Walter Neal Anderson, “In the aftermath of 9/11,
the entire US government was compelled to rethink its concepts of homeland defense
(HD), homeland security (HS), and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).”19
Two rapid developments were the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security in March 2003, a new agency that would be responsible for homeland
security, and the establishment of US Northern Command, a new DoD Combatant
Command providing a single commander responsible for the DoD’s involvement in
homeland defense and DSCA response in the homeland.20 The Department of Homeland
Security was deemed the authority for “the prevention, preemption, and deterrence
of, and defense against, aggression targeted at US territory, sovereignty, domestic
population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such
aggression and other domestic emergencies.”21 Homeland defense “is the protection
of US territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks
emanating from outside the United States.”22 US Northern Command is tasked with
support to the homeland security effort.
15. Robert T. Marsh, “Foreword,” in Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action Can
Reduce Public Vulnerability, ed. Phillip E. Auerswald et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), xii.
16.

Marsh, “Foreword,” xii.

17. William J. Clinton, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Coordinators, Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (Washington, DC: White House, May 22, 1998).
18. Walter Neal Anderson, Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities
(DSCA): The Military’s Role to Support and Defend, ed. Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight (Boca Raton,
FL: CRC Press, 2015), 39.
19.

Anderson, Introduction to Homeland Defense, 39.

20.

Anderson, Introduction to Homeland Defense, 39–40.

21. Peter Stinson, “Homeland Security and Homeland Defense: Flexible, Multi-Capable Agencies
Best for Federal Homeland Interventions,” Peter Stinson, March 3, 2004, http://papers.peterstinson
.com/2004/03/homeland-security-and-homeland-defense.html.
22.
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Both organizations evolved to develop capabilities and frameworks to respond
to natural disasters and external, conventional attacks, but crises such as Hurricane
Katrina highlighted the need for better integration among homeland security, homeland
defense, and DSCA activities.23 In addition, Bush’s 2003 Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, established
multiple-agency responsibility over nine categories of critical infrastructures and
appointed the Department of Defense as the lead agency for the defense industrial base.
The directive lists the Critical Infrastructure Sectors as “[i]nformation technology;
telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation,
maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems; emergency services; and postal
and shipping.” Sector-specific federal agencies are defined as follows:
• Department of Agriculture—agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products);
• Health and Human Services—public health, healthcare, and food (other than
meat, poultry, egg products);
• Environmental Protection Agency—drinking water and water treatment systems;
• Department of Energy—energy, including the production refining, storage,
and distribution of oil and gas, and electric power except for commercial
nuclear-power facilities;
• Department of the Treasury—banking and finance;
• Department of the Interior—national monuments and icons; and
• Department of Defense—defense industrial base.24
The directive resulted in the Department of Homeland Security National
Infrastructure Protection Plan in 2006, which was revised in 2009 and 2013. In 2013,
Bush’s directive was superseded by President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy
Directive 21 (PPD-21), which established a more robust framework for organizing
federal and SLTT government collaboration with private-sector entities for critical
infrastructure protection. The directive paired with Executive Order 13636, Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, by directing the executive branch to “develop a
technology-neutral cybersecurity framework, promote . . . the adoption ofcybersecurity
practices, increase . . . cyber threat information sharing, incorporate . . . privacy and civil
liberties protections, and explore . . . existing regulation to promote cybersecurity.”25 The

23.

Anderson, Introduction to Homeland Defense, 47–49.

24. George W. Bush, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 (Washington, DC: White House, December 17, 2003).
25. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy
Directive 21 Fact Sheet,” United States Department of Agriculture Departmental Management,
March 12, 2013, https://www.dm.usda.gov/ohsec/nsps/EO-13636-PPD-21-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
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list of Critical Infrastructure Sectors grew to 16, with each assigned a lead federal agency,
as seen in table A-1.26
Table A-1. Critical infrastructure sectors and the corresponding lead federal agencies
Critical Infrastructure Sectors
1. Chemical
2. Commercial Facilities
3. Communications
4. Critical Manufacturing

Lead Federal Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security

5. Dams

Department of Homeland Security

6. Defense Industrial Base
7. Emergency Services

Department of Defense
Department of Homeland Security

8. Energy

Department of Energy

9. Financial Services Sector

12. Healthcare and Public Health

Department of Treasury
Department of Agriculture and Department
of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security and
General Services Administration
Department of Health and Human Services

13. Information Technology

Department of Homeland Security

14. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste

Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security and
Department of Transportation
Environmental Protection Agency

10. Food and Agriculture
11. Government Facilities

15. Transportation Systems
16. Water and Wastewater Systems

In 2016, following the public reporting on the Democratic National Committee
e-mail hack, Obama signed PPD-41. This directive and its associated plans
formalized a scale of severity for cyber incidents from zero to five (“inconsequential” to
“imminent threat to national security”) and assigned investigative responsibility to the
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security (lead for asset protection),
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (lead for intelligence support).27
The directive also appointed the National Security Council’s Cyber Response Group
to author national policy objectives and established an entity to coordinate the national,
interagency operational activities through a Cyber Unified Coordination Group.28

26. “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (website), n.d.,
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
27. Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, “Overview and Analysis of PPD-41: US Cyber
Incident Coordination,” Lawfare (blog), July 27, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/overview
-and-analysis-ppd-41-us-cyber-incident-coordination.
28.
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The most recent executive action to address the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure was Executive Order 13800, which built on the previous administration’s
PPD-21 and Executive Order 13636. Executive Order 13800 directs federal agency
heads to identify and prioritize cybersecurity preparations for the sectors determined
“to be at greatest risk of attacks that could reasonably result in catastrophic regional
or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security.”29
Executive Order 13800 directed a report from the secretary of homeland security on
findings and recommendations.30 Media reporting indicated the federal government’s
response to the executive order was slow. WIRED quoted a National Security Council
official as saying, “Departments and agencies continue implementing Cybersecurity
Executive Order 13800 and have made significant progress. While they continue to
work toward the deadlines outlined in the Executive Order, the release of products
may vary over time. However, many of the deliverables will be used to inform
work going forward.”31
Congress drafted a requirement to incorporate a national cyber policy into
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. President Trump
objected to this provision, but he ultimately signed the act with the requirement
intact.32 The National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America was published
in September 2018.33
CURRENT DSCA POLICIES REGARDING CYBERSPACE SUPPORT
In the event of a crisis, the Department of Defense provides support to SLTT
governments or other federal agencies at their request or at the direction of the
president. Recent developments in cybersecurity and the growth of DoD capabilities in
cyberspace demonstrate a new capability that may prove useful during a cyberattack
on the homeland. As a result, in 2016 and 2017, the deputy secretary of defense
released two memoranda to provide an avenue, under existing DSCA authority,
for facilitating the provision of DoD cyber expertise when requested by civil
authorities or at presidential direction. The first—Deputy Secretary of Defense
Policy Memorandum 16-002, Cyber Support and Services Provided Incidental
to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software,
and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities—outlines authority to “coordinate, train,
advise and assist (CTAA) cyber support and services provided incidental to military
training to organizations and activities outside the Department of Defense and for

29.
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National Guard personnel use of DoD information networks, software and hardware for
State cyberspace activities.”34
The second memorandum of note, Directive-Type Memorandum 17-007,
coins the new term, “Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response” and clarifies
the mechanism under DSCA to provide DoD cyber resources at the request of
other federal agencies or SLTT governments through the DoD executive secretary.
The memorandum clearly establishes a legal mechanism whereby DoD assets can
be used for incident response and identifies situations in which support is not
authorized, such as offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations
response actions, or activities incident to military training.35 These exclusions are
consistent with the intent of the Posse Comitatus Act and in line with existing
DSCA procedures.
As national policies on cyber defense and warfare have evolved, the Government
Accountability Office has released several reports on the topic—specifically,
DoD preparedness in responding to attacks on critical infrastructures. Three
reports, summarized below, indicate disconnects in cyber incident planning continue
to be addressed slowly.
The April 2016 Government Accountability report, Civil Support: DOD Needs to
Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber
Incidents, clearly outlines three significant shortcomings in existing DSCA guidance. The
report criticizes the absence of clearly defined DSCA roles and responsibilities in the
event of a cyberattack. Second, it criticizes the Department of Defense’s lack of clarity
on the defense organizations that would take the lead during a crisis.36 The report
highlights, for example, “US Northern Command’s DSCA response concept plan states
that US Northern Command would be the supported command for a DSCA mission that
may include cyber domain incidents and activities. However, other guidance directs, and
DOD officials stated that another command, US Cyber Command, would be responsible
for supporting civil authorities in a cyber incident.”37
A third criticism points out ambiguity in the roles and responsibilities of a dualstatus commander—“the commander who has authority over federal military and
National Guard forces” in the event of a cyber crisis.38 In its response, the Department
of Defense acknowledged the gaps in the roles and responsibilities and indicated
it was continuing to develop its policies for DSCA response to cyber incidents.
34. John Tuohy, “Brigadier General John Tuohy’s Speech: National Guard’s Role in Cybersecurity
for the U.S. Power Grid,” Lexington Institute (website), June 23, 2016, https://www.lexingtoninstitute
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Directive Type Memorandum 17-007 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 21, 2017).
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The Department of Defense did not give a timeline for when it would finalize the
policy.39 Updated DoD Directive 3025.18 was published on March 19, 2018.
A second report, Defense Civil Support: DOD Needs to Identify National Guard’s Cyber
Capabilities and Address Challenges in Its Exercises, found National Guard units have
developed various cyber incident response capabilities, but the Department of Defense
may not be aware of these capabilities because they are not listed in a single database
for quick recall in a time of crisis.40 The Government Accountability Office asserts by not
having this data, “DOD may not have timely access to these capabilities when requested
by civil authorities during a cyber incident.”41 The report also recommended the
Department of Defense conduct a tier-1 exercise (involving “national-level organizations,
combatant commanders and staffs in highly complex environments”) to practice DSCA
in response to a cyber incident. In its response, US Cyber Command indicated it is
planning such an exercise.42
A third Government Accountability Ofice report from November 2017, Defense
Civil Support: DOD Needs to Address Cyber Incident Training Requirements, rehighlights
the Department of Defense’s deficiency and inconsistency in DSCA policy for
cyber incident response. The report identifies two additional recommendations.
First, it advises the Department of Defense to update applicable cyber incident
coordination training to be consistent with PPD-41; and, second, it recommends the
Department of Defense maintain a list of senior departmental officials trained in
the National Incident Management System to ensure it has a cadre of officials ready
to go in a crisis response.43
PROTECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION PROGRAM
The Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program also impacts the
Department of Defense. The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 established
the program, which is managed by the Department of Homeland Security, to protect
private-sector information related to critical infrastructure vulnerabilities with national
security implications. The program sought to establish an information-sharing
mechanism whereby nongovernmental entities could voluntarily exchange data with
government organizations. This data exchange would be protected from Freedom of
Information Act disclosure, state and local disclosure laws, and use in civil litigation.44
The Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program also established
training and storage systems to protect the data that would only be accessible to
39.
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trained, authorized users with a need to know.45 This information was to be used
solely for national security and defense purposes. According to the under secretary
of defense for policy website, the program allows the private sector to “more freely
share sensitive and proprietary critical infrastructure information with government
partners with the confidence that it will be protected from public release.”46 In
exchange, the government has access to information it otherwise would not. The
government uses the information to analyze and secure critical infrastructures and
protected systems, identify vulnerabilities, develop risk assessments, and enhance
recovery preparedness measures.47
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS
INTEGRATION CENTER
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center would
likely be the first government organization to receive indications of a large-scale
attack on US critical infrastructures. The center analyzes SLTT and private-sector
cyber threat notifications and Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program
submissions.48 The Department of Homeland Security formed this integrated command
center in 2009 and eventually consolidated the National Communications System,
National Coordinating Center for Communications, the US Computer Emergency
Readiness Team, and the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
into one organization. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center was codified in the National Cybersecurity Protection Act in 2014, and,
according to the 2017 NCCIC Year in Review report, has since evolved to serve “as the
federal-civilian interface for sharing cyber threat indicators” and coordinating response
activities across all associated entities.49
With this information sharing comes the enormous responsibility of protecting
data and sources. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center is careful to share information responsibly while observing Americans’
civil liberties. The center works to build trust and transparency to ensure effective
communications between organizations. The center was directly involved in the
Department of Homeland Security monitoring of the integrity of the US election
infrastructure before and during the November 2016 general election.50 In addition,
the center works with multiple international agencies and partners to counter the
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global threat posed by cyberattacks.51 The center announced in its 2017 NCCIC Year in
Review report it had:
•

“[s]hared more than 15,600 alerts, bulletins, and other information products”;

• “[s]hared more than 3,000 indicators of compromise”;
• “[r]eceived more than 727,000 reported cyber and communications threats”;
• “[c]onducted 71 risk and vulnerability assessments for government and private
sector clients”; and
• “[p]rovided on-site incident response support to roughly 30 government and
private sector customers.”52
Most recently, the 2015 Cyber Information Sharing Act made this information
sharing possible. This law permits federal government organizations to share
cybersecurity threat data with private-sector companies. The law also established
a program in which private industry could voluntarily provide threat information
to the government and be protected from criminal or regulatory liability.53 This
law is controversial; critics protest the potential for privacy-sharing violations
between companies and the federal government.54 A recent media report based
on an National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center site visit
indicates the center actively balances information exchange and the protection
of consumer privacy as much as possible. As the center develops its data
aggregation techniques, its degree of success in protecting consumers’ privacy remains
to be seen.55
In 2010, the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security
signed a memorandum of agreement. This memorandum enables the agencies
to collaborate on cybersecurity monitoring in near-real time and allows for the
exchange of personnel between the two agencies and the sharing of automated
threat data between the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center and the National Security Agency Cybersecurity Threat Operations Center.
The memorandum represented the beginning of the cooperation needed to share
situational awareness and overcome cultural hurdles between the agencies.56
Likely, the Department of Defense, through this agency, will first receive notice
51.

NCCIC, NCCIC Year in Review, 11–15.

52.

NCCIC, NCCIC Year in Review, 19–20.

53.

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015).

54. “The Following Companies Just Betrayed Billions of People,” You Betrayed Us (website), n.d.,
https://www.youbetrayedus.org/.
55. Ashley Carman, “A Look inside the Department of Homeland Security’s Cyberhub,” Verge
(website), May 6, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/6/11601248/nccic-tour-photos-cyber-attack
-hq-dhs.
56. Calvin Biesecker, “DHS, DoD Agree to Align Civil, Military Cyber Protection,” Defense Daily
(website), October 14, 2010.

85

of a significant attack on homeland critical infrastructures and leverage shared
information to apply DoD resources when requested.
PRIVATE-SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY AND REGULATION ISSUES
Several issues complicate the use of DoD resources, especially as they relate to
national security attacks on SLTT or private-sector critical infrastructures. As discussed
earlier, the use of DoD personnel within the homeland is restricted. In times of crisis,
SLTT organizations can request federal assistance through the Department of Homeland
Security, which can then request DoD resources. Alternatively, the president can
direct federal response from the Department of Defense, and certain standing
authorities allow it to intervene to prevent damage or loss of life in an emergency.57
Relatively new guidance in federal law, presidential directives, and DoD directives
extends DSCA capabilities in support of cyber crises—specifically, attacks on critical
infrastructure. Several issues, however, complicate the implementation of this
assistance. The first issue is uncertainty about what constitutes an attack in cyberspace.
History has shown hostile activity in cyberspace is not necessarily perceived as an
armed attack that could lead to war, and attribution of the source of the attack is
problematic. One might look to the effect of the attack or the intent of the attacker.
The former can be deterministic, but the latter is more difficult to discern and
requires deeper forensic investigation. Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41)
provides a useful severity guide from an effects-based perspective, defining
graduated responses based on how harmful or deadly the attack becomes.58
The second issue is how a private entity or SLTT organization should request
assistance, or even if it would want to request assistance in the first place. As the
national focus on cybersecurity continues to develop, these organizations have
invested heavily in their own internal cybersecurity. Some sectors have become
quite good at detecting and remediating cyber threats by themselves. Ultimately, a
private entity’s request for DoD assistance would likely depend on the given scenario.
For these reasons, many private entities may avoid asking for assistance.59
The third concern is whether the Department of Defense has the expertise
to respond in a decisive way. Critical infrastructure cyber systems have unique
characteristics and protocols of which cyber responders within the Department
of Defense may simply not be aware. Further, system architecture is different for
each organization, and effective response requires intimate knowledge of the specific
implementation. Without a working knowledge of the specific systems and their
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interconnections, protocols, and operating systems, an effective response with short
notice is impossible.60
In 2017, the US Navy conducted a critical infrastructure tabletop war game to
assess current US policies. The war game involved a robust sampling of participants
from across the federal government, various SLTT organizations, and privatesector infrastructure specialists. This war game was one of the first to bring together
such a wide variety of players to address cyberattacks on critical infrastructure
specifically. The war-game planners recognized the high degree of interdependence
between domestic military missions and operations and private and SLTT critical
infrastructure, including power and water for military facilities and transportation
infrastructure for deployment operations.61 This interdependency is a potential
vulnerability an adversary could take advantage of to impede military operations
in the homeland and prevent power projection abroad. The war game sought to
determine how severe or widespread a cyberattack on critical infrastructure needed
to be to impact operations. The war game broadly found attacks would need to be
targeted strategically both in time and location to cause a detrimental impact to national
security. Likewise, the war-game report suggests if an attack is not targeted in both
time and location, it will likely not have a severe impact on national security.62
In addition, the Navy war game found private infrastructure owner-operators
were not keen on seeking DoD resources when responding to a cyberattack. Among
several possible reasons, the primary one was infrastructure owners feel responsible
for their own cybersecurity and would call upon traditional first responders in
local and state government for assistance in triage, remediation, and reconstitution
in a catastrophic situation. In line with the Department of Defense structure for privatesector or SLTT security, the first touchpoint with the Department of Defense would
be through a request for assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. The
aforementioned reticence could be chalked up to the artificial nature of the war game
and a lack of familiarity with or precedence in DoD capabilities in this type of crisis.
Regardless, exercise directors noted this reticence as a significant observation in the
war-game report.63
On the other hand, private-sector owners opined the DoD assistance was appropriate
in both passive defense of the nation’s IT and telecommunications infrastructure and
active defensive or offensive actions necessary to prevent or stop an attack.64 Regardless,
the implications of this war game are the Department of Defense needs to focus more on

60. Raj Chaudhary and Jared Hamilton, The Five Critical Attributes of Effective Cybersecurity
Management (New York: Crowe Global, July 2015), 6–7.
61. Jacquelyn Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, and Rachel Shafer, Navy–Private Sector Critical
Infrastructure War Game 2017 Game Report (Newport, RI: US Navy War College, July 2017), 2.
62.

Schneider, Schechter, and Shafer, Game Report.

63.

Schneider, Schechter, and Shafer, Game Report, 25.

64.

Schneider, Schechter, and Shafer, Game Report, 25.

87

preattack deterrence and stopping adversaries during an attack rather than defense or
reconstitution activities.65
RECOMMENDATIONS
Currently, federal cybersecurity policy does not permit direct federal intervention
in response to a cyberattack on private-sector critical infrastructure. Perhaps the
best model for a military response is the Army and Air National Guard capabilities
several states have been developing. Many members of National Guard cyber units
are also employed in private industry in their respective states and have expertise
on dual-use critical infrastructures (with civilian and military uses).66 This expertise,
combined with the unique authorities afforded to the National Guard under Title
32 (state status) and Title 10 (federal status) of the US Code, make developing
National Guard capability the most promising avenue for bridging the gap between
DoD countercyber response and private industry’s desire to be free from federal
intervention.67 This approach leverages citizen-soldiers who potentially have working,
day-to-day knowledge of the impacted equipment and the authority to protect national
security during a crisis. These National Guard forces would need to be familiar with
the elements of infrastructure that are essential to national security within their
respective states and would need to participate in response and recovery training
and exercises to hone their skills.
For a deeper DoD response, Cyber Misson Force National Mission Teams could
train and become certified on the most critical infrastructures through publicprivate partnerships (with the invitation of private-sector stakeholders and SLTT
organizations). Though having personnel in the active force with expertise on every
infrastructure element is not feasible, an analysis of unit availability and capability
and the corresponding critical, domestic missions would suggest where high-demand,
low-density assets should be allocated. To minimize response time, establishing
these relationships and familiarizing National Mission Team responders with critical
infrastructure systems and networks before an adversary conducts a cyberattack of
significant consequence is essential.
A third recommendation, inspired by the Defense Science Board, is to establish a
national cyber defense plan for the cyber defense of homeland critical infrastructures
that assigns responsibilities to the relevant agencies and acknowledges the existing legal
authorities.68 A 2017 report by the Defense Science Board concluded, “a more proactive
and systematic approach to US cyber deterrence is urgently needed.”69 Such a deterrent
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strategy needs to be publicly documented, establishing redlines and clear consequences
for violating standards, and must be known and communicated in advance. As recently
highlighted by Senator Angus King of the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
“[A] secret deterrent is not a deterrent.”70
Finally, once roles and responsibilities have been established and agreed upon
within the federal government, the Department of Defense needs to conduct tier-1
exercises that include interagency partners and span from the Combatant Command
level down to the tactical level to integrate activities, responses, and battle rhythms
and develop procedures for addressing a crisis. The United States cannot afford to
allow the response to a significant attack on national security via critical infrastructure
to be a pickup game. During such a crisis, preparation and strong interagency
working relationships are key to a rapid recovery and ensuring the ability to continue
operations in a degraded environment.71 Arriving on day one of a crisis fully prepared
with the familiarity, skills, and interagency relationships and procedures to respond
effectively with competence is imperative. A strong national security to prevent
and rapidly recover from the potentially devastating effects of a targeted attack on
US critical infrastructure is also imperative.
CONCLUSION
In a worst-case scenario, an attacker who directs a devastating cyber barrage at
critical infrastructure at a strategic time and location could create a national security
crisis with a high probability of success. Effective planning and coordination among
stakeholders are crucial to prepare the nation to counter the effects of a determined
adversary and ensure, if attacked, infrastructures degrade gracefully and can be
reconstituted rapidly. Achieving these goals will not be an easy task given the wide
array of private and governmental organizations that are responsible for operating
critical infrastructure.
Clearly, the current statutory and regulatory environment does not readily
permit the Department of Defense to respond to a significant attack on critical
infrastructure. The existing structure led by the Department of Homeland Security
is a coalition of the willing, untested by an actual crisis. While the early stages of a
response structure are in place, shortcomings remain. The response, recovery, and
reconstitution actions of the Department of Defense following an event should
be provided initially by the National Guard with support from specially trained,
active-duty National Mission Teams. Ideally, these cyber teams would follow a
unified script spelled out in a national cyber defense plan that would be continually
updated and improved through recurring tier-1 exercises that build upon lessons
learned to train the next generation of responders. Through these actions, the
likelihood of a debilitating cyberattack on domestic critical infrastructure would
be greatly diminished.
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APPENDIX A-2
FRAMEWORK FOR A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBER RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT
According to a study published by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, “On December 23, 2015, the Ukrainian Kyivoblenergo, a regional electricity
distribution company, reported service outages to customers.”1 Analysis of the outages
revealed coordinated cyberattacks had taken place against Kyivoblenergo and two other
regional electricity distribution companies in the Ukraine within 30 minutes of each other.
An estimated 225,000 customers were impacted.2 The sophistication of the attack and its
targeting of Ukrainian infrastructure implicated Russia as the likely culprit. The incident
became just one of the latest in a series of increasingly sophisticated and malicious attacks
against advanced technology and, in particular, the critical infrastructure upon which the
modern world is growing ever more dependent.3 Power failures during the cold winter
months can certainly be inconvenient; however, cyberattacks that cause simultaneous
disruptions across multiple critical infrastructure sectors during an international crisis
requiring the mobilization and deployment of the military constitute a much more
dangerous scenario. This part of the appendix proposes three approaches nations should
adopt to address this threat.
• In the near term, emphasis must be placed on evaluating critical infrastructure and
key resources both in terms of vulnerabilities and reliability and in the context of
resilience.
• Secondly, manufacturers, system integrators, and asset owners must undertake
a comprehensive effort to incorporate resilience engineering into life-cycle
development, rather than implementing a solution after the fact.
• Finally, the United States and its allies and partners must globally advocate for
international standards supporting the broadest adoption of security and resilience
best practices possible.
Today, the United States and most modern societies rely upon a collection of
advanced technologies to provide vital services to support daily activities. The services
most Americans take for granted, such as electricity, clean water, and transportation, are
considered to be critical infrastructure. To establish a common vocabulary and frame of
reference, this part of the appendix uses US government definitions for the terms “critical
infrastructure,” “system,” “security,” and “cyber resilience.”
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection, defines critical infrastructure as the “systems and
1. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian
Power Grid: Defense Use Case (Atlanta, GA: North American Electric Reliability Corporation, March 18,
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assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.”4 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines system
as “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated
purposes. The interacting elements that compose a system include hardware, software,
data, humans, processes, procedures, facilities, materials, and naturally occurring
entities.”5 The institute also provides definitions for security and cyber resilience as
they relate to critical infrastructure. Security, in the context of this discussion, is defined
“as the freedom from those conditions that can cause loss of assets with unacceptable
consequences.”6
Cyber resilience is “the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to
adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled
by cyber resources,” regardless of the source.7 “Cyber resiliency supports mission
assurance in a contested environment for missions that depend on systems which
include cyber resources.”8 Systems security engineering concerns the systems, security,
and cyber resilience for countering threats to critical infrastructure. The institute
defines systems security engineering as a “specialty discipline of systems engineering.
It provides considerations for the security-oriented activities and tasks that produce
security-oriented outcomes as part of every systems engineering process activity with
focus given to the appropriate level of fidelity and rigor in analyses to achieve assurance
and trustworthiness objectives.”9 These terms provide a foundation for the assessment of
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, security, and resilience.
The first recommendation is for the establishment of a critical infrastructure
assessment program within the US Army Reserve. Assessments could be conducted
over the course of several assembly weekends and would culminate in a debriefing to
the supported element. Figure A-2-1 outlines this program, including current Defense
Critical Infrastructure Program requirements.
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Figure A-2-1. Proposed critical infrastructure assessment program

The proposed team structure would be built with a reachback capability as required
(see figure A-2-2). This capability would allow for simultaneously scaling the program
up as mission requirements expanded and centralizing key subject matter experts in a
supporting role.

Figure A-2-2. Organization of proposed critical infrastructure assessment program

National security leaders need a way to assess these programs and understand their
impact on the ability of the US military to mobilize and deploy its forces to respond to an
international crisis. Several organizations have recognized the Department of Defense’s
(DoD’s) dependence on public and privately owned critical infrastructure. The Defense
Science Board Task Force on Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber
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Threat warned, “[F]ull manifestation of the cyber threat could even produce existential
consequences to the United States, particularly with respect to critical infrastructure.”10
One DoD response has been the creation of the Defense Critical Infrastructure
Program. The program serves as the implementation of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Instruction 3209.01. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program is a “DoD risk
management program that seeks to ensure the availability of networked assets critical
to DoD missions.”11 Under this program, the Department of Defense identifies Defense
Critical Assets and Task Critical Assets.
Defense Critical Asset is “an asset of such extraordinary importance to DoD
operations in peace, crisis, and war that its incapacitation or destruction would have a
very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of DoD to fulfill its mission.”12
A Task Critical Asset is “an asset that is of such extraordinary importance that its
incapacitation or destruction would have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of
one or more DoD or OSD Components to execute the capability or mission-essential task
it supports.”13
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency created two programs to support this effort: the
Joint Mission Assurance Assessment and Balanced Survivability Assessment.14 Though
both of these assessments provide a comprehensive view of an asset’s vulnerabilities, the
former assesses the impact of the vulnerabilities on the mission the asset is supporting.
The Department of Homeland Security also has several tools available for critical
infrastructure asset owners to use in evaluating their environments. These tools include
the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool and the Cyber Resilience Review (CRR).
According to the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center,
the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool is:
[A] desktop software tool that guides asset owners and operators through a stepby-step process to evaluate their industrial control system (ICS) and information
technology (IT) network security practices. Users can evaluate their own
cybersecurity stance using many recognized government and industry standards
and recommendations. . . . CSET helps asset owners assess their information and
operational systems cybersecurity practices by asking a series of detailed questions
about system components and architectures, as well as operational policies and
procedures. These questions are derived from accepted industry cybersecurity
standards. When the questionnaires are completed, CSET provides a dashboard
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of charts showing areas of strength and weakness, as well as a prioritized list of
recommendations for increasing the site’s cybersecurity posture.15

The CRR was developed in conjunction with the Carnegie Mellon University
Software Engineering Institute’s Computer Emergency Response Team Division
as “a no-cost, voluntary, non-technical assessment” designed to help asset owners
evaluate the operational resilience of an organization.16 The CRR is derived from the
Computer Emergency Response Team Division’s Resilience Management Model and
has been tailored to organizations in the Critical Infrastructure Sectors identified by
the Department of Homeland Security. The program allows for self-assessments or a
facilitated option through the Department of Homeland Security. “The CRR assesses
enterprise programs and practices across a range of ten domains including risk
management, incident management, service continuity, and others. The assessment is
designed to measure existing organizational resilience as well as provide a gap analysis
for improvement based on recognized best practices.”17
While the focus of the CRR on the broader enterprise allows for a more holistic
assessment, it does not address the configuration resiliency of industrial control systems
directly. Understanding organizational resilience, vulnerabilities, and overall architecture
shortcomings is essential; however, the emerging threat environment requires critical
infrastructure stakeholders to consider shifting their focus toward cyber resilience.
The dependence upon a wide variety of public and private sector industrial control
systems by the Department of Defense and US society as a whole must be addressed as
a key priority.
The second recommendation is the adoption of a framework for the comprehensive
and consistent evaluation of the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure assets. This
part of the appendix uses NIST Special Publication 600-180, Volume 2, Developing Cyber
Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach as a foundation for assessing
the techniques most likely to reduce the impact of adversary activity against a critical
infrastructure asset. A driving assumption of this framework is an adversary is already
operating within the networks and systems of the organization. The primary goal is to
provide a mechanism for asset owners to assess the ability of their organization to remain
functional despite adversary actions. The key techniques underlying the framework
are adaptive response, coordinated protection, contextual awareness, diversity,
dynamic positioning, nonpersistence, privilege restriction, realignment, redundancy,
segmentation, substantiated integrity, and unpredictability.18

15. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), “NCCIC ICS Cyber
Security Evaluation Tool,” Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, n.d., https://us-cert.cisa.gov
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Adaptive response is akin to an Army company commander applying his or her
professional judgment to adjust force protection levels or increase security based upon
an evolving threat environment within the area of operations. This technique leverages
several approaches to provide critical infrastructure asset owners with a collection of
courses of action to manage risks quickly and efficiently. Among these approaches,
dynamic reconfiguration allows for changes to be made to “individual systems,
system elements, components, or sets of cyber resources to change functionality or
behavior without interrupting service.”19 Dynamic resource allocation allows for the
reallocation of “resources to tasks or functions without terminating critical functions
or processes.”20 Adaptive management allows for alterations to how “mechanisms
are used based on changes in the operational environment as well as changes in the
threat environment.”21
Coordinated protection is a technique that ensures “protection mechanisms operate
in a coordinated and effective manner,” similar to soldiers ensuring their force protection
measures are included in a broader, regional force protection strategy (including
supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; quick reaction forces; and fires)
when operating from a forward operating base.22 Approaches that address coordinated
protection include calibrated defense-in-depth, consistency analysis, orchestration, and
self-challenge.23
• Calibrated defense-in-depth is a proven approach within cybersecurity. The
approach, which is recommended by the Department of Homeland Security
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, aligns well with
initiatives currently underway at international standard organizations.24 The goal
of calibrated defense-in-depth is to provide overlapping controls at each layer of
an architecture to dramatically increase the cost in time and effort required of an
adversary.
• Consistency analysis and orchestration focus on the coordinated assessment of the
various defense-in-depth control measures, ideally identifying complementary
approaches and potential gaps within the overall infrastructure. Organizations
must leverage their finite cybersecurity resources in the most efficient and effective
manner possible.25
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• Self-challenge effectively tests and validates the control measures implemented
as part of the overall coordinated protection effort to assess where improvements
should be made or where coverage may be sufficient given the operating
environment.26
Diversity is a technique that uses “heterogeneity to minimize common mode failures,
particularly threat events exploiting common vulnerabilities.”27 This technique may be
the most challenging to place into practice in large, commercial, critical infrastructure
environments, but if it is applied across the board, it significantly raises the cost in time
and effort required of an adversary to conduct an attack against large infrastructure.
The steps taken at a technical level are similar to those espoused in the Army’s annual
Level I Antiterrorism Awareness Training. A key tenet of the antiterrorism training for
servicemembers traveling through areas where the risk of targeting may be increased
is to avoid setting patterns or routines throughout the day. Similarly, diversity aims
to confuse an adversary and make mapping a targeted network more challenging by
incorporating unexpected technologies, control measures, design patterns, information
sources, topologies, or suppliers.
Approaches involved in diversity include architectural diversity, design diversity,
synthetic diversity, information diversity, path diversity, and supply chain diversity.28
• Architectural diversity is the application of “multiple sets of technical standards,
different technologies, and different architectural patterns.”29
• Design diversity recommends using “different designs to meet the same
requirements or provide equivalent functionality.”30
• A good example of synthetic diversity would be implementation of “address space
layout randomization.”31
• Information diversity includes the use of a variety of data sources.
• Path diversity allows for separate command, control, and communications
methods to prevent an adversary from intercepting both application data and the
command signaling. A good example of this approach is the use of “out-of-band
channels.”32
• The full scope of supply chain diversity extends beyond this discussion, but, as
a best practice, organizations must carefully vet and monitor their key suppliers.
26.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

27.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

28.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

29.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

30.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

31.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

32.

Ross et al., Developing Cyber Resilient Systems.

97

Dynamic positioning is a technique that focuses on the ability of an organization to
reconfigure key systems and processes on demand. Approaches to dynamic positioning
include functional relocation of sensors, functional relocation of cyber resources,
asset mobility, fragmentation, and distributed functionality.
• Functional relocation of sensors is not unlike the steps taken by a company
commander in conducting unexpected patrols in different areas. The goal is to
disrupt adversary activity by being proactive and showing up in unanticipated
locations.
• Functional relocation of cyber resources and, to an extent, distributed functionality
are techniques in which specific processes are dynamically moved from one
infrastructure to another.
• Cloud implementations offer enormous potential in this area by allowing
organizations to shift resources as needed or in response to a perceived threat.
• Asset mobility is an extension of asset management, a best practice cited in several
IT management system frameworks. Asset mobility is the ability of an organization
to monitor the physical movement of a network-connected device from one part of
the infrastructure to another.
• Fragmentation has long been used in redundant arrays of inexpensive disks to
distribute the risk of hardware failure across multiple mathematically interlaced
components. The failure of one component could be mitigated by the ability of
the redundant arrays of inexpensive disks to reconstruct the data on the failed
component through a collection of algorithms used to distribute slices of the data
across multiple disks. Fragmentation can be considered in much the same way in
this context.33
Contextual awareness is a technique meant to allow for the creation and nearreal-time updating of “current representations of the posture of missions or business
functions considering threat events and courses of action.”34 Approaches within this
technique include dynamic resource awareness, dynamic threat awareness, and mission
dependency and status visualization.
• The goal of dynamic resource awareness is to ensure consistent situational understanding. This approach calls for comprehensive insight into the overall environment, not just simple monitoring of the infrastructure and components.
• Dynamic threat awareness focuses on collecting, aggregating, and correlating relevant threat information into a concise and consumable format to support proactive mitigations.35
• Mission dependency and status visualization is intended to support decision
makers by providing an integrated view of the organization and its critical
33.
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processes.36 One example of this is the emergence of cyber threat intelligence platforms, such as Hive-IQ from TeamWorx Security. Hive-IQ incorporates a variety of data sources and integrates them with artificial intelligence capabilities that
help provide near-real-time collaboration and visibility into an environment.37
Nonpersistence is a technique that focuses on only generating and retaining resources
as needed. Approaches include nonpersistent information, nonpersistent services,
and nonpersistent connectivity.38 These ideas have been leveraged in military and
commercial realms for decades. Soldiers have often been tasked with manning burn
barrels to destroy sensitive papers that no longer needed to be retained. This requirement
was often set by a command retention policy intended to prevent outdated yet sensitive
information from being carelessly left unsecured in the back of a filing cabinet.
Nonpersistent services and nonpersistent connectivity can be found within best practices
for IT service management. Virtualized infrastructures allow for only using resources
as required, rather than keeping separate physical servers for each service. Similarly,
nonpersistent connectivity is used in the physical security realm where employee
badges only allow access to buildings during normal business hours unless an exception
has been specified.
Privilege restriction ensures a user, component, or service is only given access that
is appropriate for the performance of the assigned tasks. Approaches within privilege
restriction include trust-based privilege management, attribute-based usage restriction,
and dynamic privileges.39 These approaches are applied through the use of employee
badges and access control measures. This technique ensures only the privileges
required by a user, component, or service are extended, and they are extended in a
controlled and auditable way. The principle of least privilege is a key aspect of privilege
restriction because least privilege requires an adversary to overcome another hurdle
(for example, gaining additional administrative rights) even if the adversary has already
compromised the account in question. Dynamic privileges are a best practice when
unique access is granted only under certain circumstances and is withdrawn when the
circumstances no longer apply. Homeowners practice dynamic privileges when they
call for a home repair. The repairman is granted access for the duration of the repair,
his activities are monitored during this timeframe, and he is escorted to the door when
the repairs have been completed. Repairmen are never granted unrestricted access again
unless their services are required again.
Realignment is a technique that focuses on ensuring system resources are aligned
“with current organizational mission or business function needs.”40 Approaches
within realignment include purposing, offloading, restriction, replacement, and
specialization. Overall, these approaches are meant to simplify the operations of an
36.
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infrastructure to reduce the size of the attack surface that is available to an adversary.
The more unneeded systems and applications that can be decommissioned or removed
from an environment, the less chance an adversary has to use them as a way into the
target infrastructure. Purposing supports creating white lists and removing extraneous
services. Specialization is a slightly different aspect of realignment because it recommends
carefully engineered, custom components where they are critical to a mission or business
function. The goal is to provide a highly controlled, trustworthy component that is
tailored to the local environment.41
Redundancy is a technique that is designed to “provide multiple protected instances
of critical resources.”42 Approaches within redundancy include protected backup
and restore, surplus capacity, and replication.43 Though certain critical infrastructure
industries may require organizations to provide a certain percentage of redundant
capacity, this technique implies a real cost for the asset owner. Investment in redundancy
should be carefully weighed for its overall value in supporting critical mission and
business functions. A good analogy is the allowance for bench stock within maintenance
shops in the Army. A fully redundant capability would require every spare part for
every vehicle serviced by the maintenance shop be maintained on-site to ensure the least
downtime possible. Military leaders know this type of requirement is not practical or
economically viable. Bench stock is based on multiple factors and optimized to keep the
most mission-critical vehicles operational to the highest degree possible.44 Similarly, in
the critical infrastructure realm, asset owners should weigh their investment in surplus
capacity and replication carefully and conduct realistic assessments on the likelihood the
resources will be required and the frequency at which they will be required.
Segmentation is a technique that focuses on the separation of “system elements based
on criticality and trustworthiness.”45 This technique mirrors recommendations based on
a survey conducted by the SANS Institute in 2017.46 Establishing multiple control points
allows for cybersecurity analysts to gain better visibility into an environment and makes
an adversary’s maneuvers within a system or network after having gained access to it
more difficult. Predefined segmentation and dynamic segmentation and isolation are
approaches within this technique.
• Predefined segmentation is using the physical and logical design of applications,
systems, components, and networks to separate different processes. One example
is ensuring security tools and sensors are segmented from operational traffic. This
measure prevents an adversary from gaining access to both an operational network
41.
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and the security and sensor network and discovering everything the cybersecurity
analysts know about the adversary’s behavior.
• Dynamic segmentation and isolation, which is supported by new, software-defined networking capabilities, allows an organization to gain increasingly detailed
control over its infrastructure.47
Substantiated integrity is one of the core techniques of the framework recommended
in this part of the appendix. Components that have incorporated this capability can
“[a]scertain whether critical system elements have been corrupted.”48 This technique
is being vigorously pursued in the space system realm as the challenge of defending
this environment grows more urgent. The parallels between substantiated integrity as
proposed by NIST Special Publication 600-180 and runtime assurance in space-flight
software are significant.49 The approaches included in this technique are integrity checks,
provenance tracking, and behavior validation.
• Integrity checks ensure the integrity of “information, components, or services.”50
The goal of this approach is to ensure a process is performing as expected and
within the parameters established by the operational environment.
• Provenance tracking is somewhat related to the supply chain diversity approach
described above. The purpose of provenance tracking is to ensure any software,
hardware, or related component incorporated into a component, system, or asset
can be traced back to its origination and validated against attacks aimed at corrupting the supply chain itself.51
• Behavior validation considers the overall “patterns of prior usage” and establishes
expected thresholds of performance.52 In the context of the operational environment, activities by a system outside of this threshold should raise an alarm that
something unexpected has occurred.
Unpredictability is another technique related to the dynamic positioning and
nonpersistence techniques described earlier. Approaches within unpredictability
include temporal unpredictability and contextual unpredictability. The overall goal
of these approaches is to keep an adversary off-balance and raise the cost in time and
effort required to fully penetrate an environment.53 This type of approach is often used
in finance and accounting best practices to prevent a person from serving in a position
of significant fiscal responsibility with no checks and balances. Many organizations
47.
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mandate employees in key positions (for example, comptroller) take a vacation for at
least one or two weeks a year. During this timeframe, another employee steps in to
assume the duties of the individual and can assess whether the individual is acting in
the best interests of the organization and being a good steward of the organization’s
resources. Like a digital version of the checks and balances outlined above, the approach
recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology would change
system behavior in unpredictable ways to catch an adversarial process or attack that was
counting on a static structure.
A key benefit of this framework is given its origins at the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, one can expect to see integration of many of these techniques into the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework for broader adoption across the operational technology
and IT realms. The need to focus on the cyber resilience and integrated cybersecurity of
individual components, systems, and assets, rather than performing simple assessments
and applying mitigating control measures after the fact, continues to grow.
So far, the twenty-first century has presented significant challenges to the
post-World War II world order. In a presentation at the 2017 International Conference
on Cyber Conflict, then Chief of Staff of the Army Mark A. Milley argued, “[T]he
character of war is evolving rapidly.”54 The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
of the United States asserts the United States faces a security environment “defined
by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain,
and the impact on current readiness from the longest stretch of armed conflict in
our Nation’s history.”55
In “Kautilya’s Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” Roger Boesche
discusses the statements of Indian statesman and strategist Chanakya (also known
as “Kautilya” or “Vishnugupta”) on war and diplomacy. Chanakya viewed conflict
through the lens of competition. When considering other nation-states, one must identify
which are “natural allies and which are inevitable enemies.”56 Chanakya’s doctrine of
silent war provides a relevant approach to analysis of the geopolitical situation today.57
The silent-war concept in particular provides a lens through which one may assess
Russia, China, and Iran’s economic, informational, and offensive cyber operations
“short of war” to extend their influence and dilute that of the United States and its
allies. 58 These operations include “legal action, economic pressure, cyberattacks, and
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terrorism,” and, in the case of China, appear to have been codified in a 1999 report by
two senior Chinese military officers.59
The concept of silent war aligns well with the operations these countries and other nonnation-state actors have been taking to further their interests around the world. “Silent
war is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king and his ministers—and
unknowingly, the people—all act publicly as if they were at peace with the opposing
kingdom, but all the while secret agents and spies are assassinating important leaders in
the other kingdom, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading
propaganda and disinformation.”60 These operations are a key aspect of the changing
character of war and the continuum of competition in today’s world.
China and Russia appear to be applying Chanakya’s concept of silent war in
the realm of international standards and technical regulations. China has been a
member of the World Trade Organization since 2001, and Russia, since 2012; as such,
they are bound by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. This agreement
“establishes rules and procedures regarding the development, adoption and application
of standards, technical regulations and the conformity assessment procedures (such
as testing or certification) used to determine whether a particular product meets such
standards or regulations.”61
A recent report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative asserts, “China
seems to be actively pursuing the development of unique requirements, despite the
existence of well-established international standards, as a means for protecting domestic
companies from competing foreign standards and technologies.”62 Aside from protection
for its domestic industry, China appears to be using its World Trade Organization
membership to gather foreign technology and intellectual property through one-sided
licensing requirements while ignoring its obligations under the organization.
Russia also appears unwilling to apply transparent processes to their licensing
requirements. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative
report, in the United States, electronics exporters “continue to raise concerns about
the seemingly inconsistent application of the import licensing regime, absence of
a written explanation when licenses are denied, issuance of licenses only for individual
shipments rather than for all shipments of the ‘product family,’ requirement that
information be submitted on a product-specific basis, rather than on a family-specific
basis, and delays in issuing a license.”63
The potential subversion of international standards is particularly noteworthy. The
importance of international standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessments
have only grown as societies pursue and adopt increasingly more advanced technologies
in the twenty-first century. The United States and its allies and partners must continue
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to support and advance the consistent development of international standards and best
practices and encourage their transparent adoption globally.
This imperative applies to the realm of security as well. The mounting complexity
of defense-related systems and their increasing reliance on commercial-off-the-shelf
technologies require specific steps to be taken against the serious threat of an intentional
or unintentional vulnerability finding its way into an operational system. These
challenges include:
•

“the increasing reliance on commercially available technology,”

• “complex supply chains that include thousands of suppliers worldwide,”
• “system interconnectedness,” and
• “the identification and exploitation of the supply chain and commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) vulnerabilities.”64
Strategic leaders must have confidence in the trustworthiness of the systems
employed. According to NIST Special Publication 800-53, trustworthiness “means
worthy of being trusted to fulfill whatever requirements may be needed for a
component, subsystem, system, network, application, mission, business function,
enterprise, or other entity. Trustworthiness requirements can include attributes
of reliability, dependability, performance, resilience, safety, security, privacy, and
survivability under a range of potential adversity in the form of disruptions, hazards,
threats, and privacy risks.”65
The global continuum of competition and attempts by countries like Russia, China,
Iran, and North Korea to gain advantage through silent-war tactics illustrate the risks
that must be considered as US society becomes more dependent on technology from a
wide variety of sources.
The development and publication of standards such as the International
Organization for Standardization 27000 series on IT security and information security
management systems were a giant leap forward in helping to pull together multiple
fundamental principles and best practices in information security. Similarly, the
International Electrotechnical Commission 62443 series of standards provides guidance
for the industrial automation realm. The “series of standards, technical reports,
and related information . . . define[s] procedures for implementing electronically
secure Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). This guidance applies to
end-users (i.e. asset owner), system integrators, security practitioners, and control
systems manufacturers responsible for manufacturing, designing, implementing, or
managing industrial automation and control systems.”66
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The broad scope of International Electrotechnical Commission 62443 makes it
particularly flexible as an international standard. The collection of technical requirements
and guidance provides recommendations from the initial design and development of
individual components to their integration into a system, their operation by an asset
owner, and their decommissioning and secure disposal.
The comprehensive nature of the standard and its monitoring by multiple national and
regional compliance agencies are helping to shift the discussion within the IT industry
toward building in, rather than bolting on, security. Similarly, NIST Special Publication
600-180, Volume 1, Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary
Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems encourages the use of systems
security engineering practices that build on the international standards published by
the International Organization for Standardization, the International Electrotechnical
Commission, and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The special
publication provides a clear and concise approach to incorporating security throughout
the life cycle of a system, including the initial specification of requirements, acquisition,
design, development, engineering, implementation, operation, and retirement.67
According to the special publication, systems security engineering “helps to ensure
that the appropriate security principles, concepts, methods, and practices are applied
during the system life cycle.” Systems security engineering also “helps to reduce
system defects that can lead to security vulnerability and as a result, reduces the
susceptibility of the system to adversity.”68 Systems security engineering provides an
initial starting point toward improving the security of a system throughout its life cycle.
But extending this approach and acknowledging the need for improving resilience,
particularly within the critical infrastructure realm, are important. Considering the
attack against the Ukrainian power distribution system, the security of the infrastructure
itself becomes a secondary concern when weighed against the ability of the regional
electricity distribution company to provide power to its customers. A new approach
toward cyber resiliency is required. Volume 2 of NIST Special Publication 600-180
provides a framework for engineering practices that go beyond simple security
and include the ability of a system to continue to function in the face of threats to it
and its underlying components.
The application of international standards and best practices works well for new
systems or those undergoing a significant technology refresh. Though future attacks will
no doubt be unique in many aspects, conducting an ongoing assessment of techniques
for ensuring the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure and key resources would
provide additional insight into the ability of assets to continue operations while under
attack or recovering from one.
The attacks against the Ukrainian power distribution system are only one example
of the challenge facing critical infrastructure operators today. International standards,
technical requirements, and processes for fair and transparent conformity assessment
must be actively protected. The abuse of World Trade Organization membership
by China and Russia and their disregard for their obligations and generally accepted
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principles in these areas should be cause for alarm throughout the capitals of the
developed world. The attempts by these countries to subvert and undermine many of
the institutions that have evolved in the post-World War II era must be countered and
challenged in the appropriate forums.
The United States and its allies and partners must continue to support the
development and adoption of international standards, technical requirements,
conformity assessments, and best practices designed to improve the security of
twenty-first-century technology. Critical infrastructure assessments must evolve
to include both traditional security controls and vulnerability assessments and an
assessment of cyber resilience techniques. Though these cyber resilience techniques may
not mitigate every potential attack, they help shift the discussion away from a strict focus
on the prevention of an attack and toward continuity of operations during an attack.
The goal of the framework presented in this part of the appendix is to provide
stakeholders with a more accurate picture of their environment and how it may continue
to perform its mission. The reestablishment of a formal, ongoing, critical infrastructure
assessment program is essential for providing national security leaders with a better
understanding of the ability of critical infrastructure to continue to function during an
attack. This reestablishment would provide a mechanism for evaluating the progress
made toward improving the cyber resilience of assets over time.
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APPENDIX A-3
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DOMESTIC CYBER RESPONSE OPERATIONS
IN A COMPLEX CATASTROPHE
In today’s world, the nexus of the ever-accelerating depth and breadth of, and
dependence on, cyber connectivity matched with the ever-growing capability and
sophistication of malicious actors in the cyber domain creates significant vulnerabilities
for societies and their governments. These vulnerabilities are most pronounced in the
industries that provide essential services to the public and private sectors—especially
cross-cutting services, such as electrical power, transportation, and water distribution.
Large, successful attacks against these cross-cutting services would likely trigger
compounding effects that could cascade across other services, causing widespread
economic disruption and human suffering. To illustrate the severity of the problem,
the US government experienced 77,000 successful cyberattacks in 2015—a 10 percent
increase over the amount experienced in 2014.1
Against the backdrop of this grim strategic landscape, this part of the appendix
addresses the question of whether the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) is sufficient to act as the command-andcontrol blueprint for a synchronized US response to a major, domestic, cyber incident,
paying particular attention to DoD roles and responsibilities. Our methodology is the
notional application of the tenets of the NCIRP to an unclassified and improbable, yet
technologically possible, “significant cyber incident,” as defined in the NCIRP, resulting
in a complex catastrophic event.2
The NCIRP is the result of the trail of taskings, guidance, assessment, opinion, and
policy that began with Congress, moved through the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and concluded with Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41). But would the
NCIRP, in execution, fulfill the spirit of Congress’s guidance, address GAO findings, and
accomplish the intent of PPD-41?
The geopolitical aspects of the scenario used in this part of the appendix are the
invention of the authors. The scenario is based on a Lloyd’s and University of Cambridge
Centre for Risk Studies study on the insurance impacts of a major cyberattack on the
US electrical grid.3 The geopolitical factors of the scenario provide strategic context and
desired complexity. The cyberattack portrayed in the Lloyd’s and Centre for Risk Studies
study presents a very challenging, large-scale scenario with catastrophic consequences.
This study was deliberately selected to engage and stress the entirety of the provisions
of the NCIRP and to maximize the extent of the likely federal defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA) response.
1. Reuters, “US Hit by 77,000 Cyber Attacks in 2015—a 10 Percent Jump,” Newsweek, March 21, 2016,
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of a Cyber Attack on the US Power Grid (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies,
May 2015).
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BACKGROUND
In 2015, faced with mounting evidence of potential cyber vulnerabilities, Congress
was understandably concerned about the ability of the United States to detect, respond
to, and recover from attacks against military and civilian cyber infrastructure. The
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2016 explicitly noted the growing scope, sophistication,
and destructive potential of such attacks and mentioned the possibility of DoD cyber
capabilities being used in a DSCA role. “Although the Department of Defense generally
does not resource support to civil authorities in response to a domestic cyber incident,
the Department possesses an array of capabilities that may be requested when civilian
response capabilities are overwhelmed or exhausted, or in instances where the
Department offers unique capabilities not likely to be found elsewhere.”4
This language is a brief restatement of the key “request and provide” elements of the
1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)
and is essentially the same phrasing used to describe the circumstances under which the
DoD provides support to civil authorities in response to wildfires, floods, hurricanes,
earthquakes, and other disasters.5
But the committee acknowledged the differences between the character and
challenges of natural disasters and those of a potential major cyberattack. On these
differing challenges, the report highlights “gaps in the Department of Defense’s plans
and guidance for assisting civil authorities in the event of a domestic cyber incident.”6
Specifically, the report notes the DoD’s inability to accurately forecast the type or
quantity of support that might be requested and the impediments to providing effective
command and control for a likely admixture of military personnel under active duty
(Title 10 of the US Code, federal command, and federally funded), full-time National
Guard duty for operational homeland defense activities (Title 32 of the US Code, state
command, and federally funded), and National Guard state active duty (SAD) (state
command and funded by the state).7
The concerns of Congress were reflected in the NDAA, which directed the secretary
of defense to “develop a comprehensive plan for the United States Cyber Command to
support civil authorities in responding to cyber attacks by foreign powers . . . against the
United States.”8 The NDAA also directed the DoD to conduct interagency-coordinated,
biennial exercises that focus on responding to cyberattacks against critical infrastructure

4. Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. Rep.
No. 114-102 (2015), 289–90.
5. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707 (1988); and
William J. Lynn III, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, DoD Directive 3025.18 (Washington, DC: Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, updated March 19, 2018).
6.

Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act, 290.

7.

Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act, 290.

8.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 129 Stat. 1119 (2015).
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“in consultation with Governors of the States and the owners and operators of
critical infrastructure.”9
The NDAA required the DoD plan to include DoD internal training and exercises
integrated and coordinated with other federal agencies; state and local plans and
exercises; descriptions of the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of federal, state,
and local authorities; and descriptions of the roles, responsibilities, and expectations
of the active components and reserve components of the armed forces. Congress was
sufficiently concerned about the challenges of a DSCA cyber response and the probability
of such an occurrence that the NDAA, rather than simply requiring a DoD report on the
matter, directed the GAO to review this plan.10
Over the course of 10 months and focused on the tasking contained in the
Committee on Armed Services report to “assess the extent to which Department of
Defense has developed guidance that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities for
providing support to civil authorities in response to cyber incidents,” GAO conducted
a comprehensive survey of key US government, Department of Defense, and DoD
components’ policies, guidance, strategies, and instructions on cyber operations and
DSCA.11 The survey consisted of a literature review augmented by interviews with senior
leaders from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security,
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. In this assessment, GAO found, although the Department of
Defense had developed and issued key DSCA guidance for the execution and oversight
of DSCA, the guidance did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of DoD
components; the supported command (typically, USNORTHCOM); or any appointed,
dual-status commander.12
The question of clarifying roles and responsibilities, as explored by the GAO
report, points to a greater and more fundamental question: How exactly should the
US government exercise whole-of-government command and control during cyber
incidents? Several closely related documents subsequently published in 2016 sought to
answer this question.
The first of these documents was PPD-41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination,
published on July 26, 2016. The directive provided key definitions, announced principles
to guide incident response, set lines of effort (LOEs), and assigned specific department
and agency responsibilities.
Additionally, and most importantly for command and control, PPD-41 established
lead federal agencies (LFAs) for specific LOEs during significant cyber incidents.
•

Threat response LOE: LFA = Department of Justice (DOJ), through the FBI and the
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force.

9.

National Defense Authorization Act, 129 Stat. 1119.

10.

National Defense Authorization Act, 129 Stat. 1119.

11. Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Civil Support: DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense
Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents, GAO-16-332 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 2016).
12.
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•

Asset response LOE: LFA = DHS, through the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC).

•

Intelligence support LOE: LFA = Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), through the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.13

The directive also created two coordination entities: the standing policy
coordination Cyber Response Group within the National Security Council and an on-call
Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG). According to its charter, the UCG must
coordinate among federal agencies and integrate “private sector partners into incident
response efforts, as appropriate.”14 This interagency, collaborative approach is required
because no single US government entity alone has the authority, capabilities, and
expertise to effectively counter and resolve major cyber incidents.
The annex to PPD-41 provides additional details for the federal coordination
architecture and directs the execution of certain implementation tasks. These tasks
include numerous planning and coordination requirements for the sector-specific
agencies responsible for the 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors established by PPD-21,
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, in February 2013.15 The last paragraph of the
PPD-41 annex directs the secretary of homeland security to achieve the following:
[I]n coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the SSAs . . .
submit a national cyber incident response plan to address cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure
. . . that is consistent with the principles, policies, and coordination architecture set forth in this
directive . . . [and] developed in consultation with SLTT governments, sector coordinating councils,
information sharing and analysis organizations, owners and operators of critical infrastructure,
and other appropriate entities and individuals; [taking] into account how these stakeholders will
coordinate with Federal agencies to mitigate, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents affecting
critical infrastructure.16

In response to this tasking, DHS published the NCIRP in December 2016. Despite
its title, the NCIRP is not a true plan. Rather, the NCIRP describes itself as a strategic
framework document that “articulates the roles and responsibilities, capabilities, and
coordinating structures that support how the Nation responds to and recovers from
significant cyber incidents posing risks to critical infrastructure” and “establishes
the strategic framework and doctrine for a whole-of-Nation approach to mitigating,
responding to, and recovering from a cyber incident.”17

13. Barack Obama, United States Cyber Incident Coordination, Presidential Policy Directive 41
(Washington, DC: White House, July 26, 2016).
14.

Obama, Cyber Incident Coordination.

15. Barack Obama, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, Presidential Policy Directive 21
(Washington, DC: White House, February 12, 2013).
16. Barack Obama, “Annex: Federal Government Coordination Architecture for Significant Cyber
Incidents,” in Obama, Cyber Incident Coordination.
17.
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A COMPLEX CATASTROPHE
The scenario in this section could have come from today’s headlines. A capable and
well-resourced foreign power that has traditionally poor relations with the United States
perceives a negative shift in American foreign policy. Next, strong US rhetoric further
erodes the foreign power’s relationship with the United States, which starts to label
the foreign power as an adversary. Envisioning an increasingly confrontational future
and knowing the decisive overmatch in conventional military capability, the foreign
power begins to build a multidimensional, state-of-the-art, cyber warfare capability
while initiating an intelligence campaign to identify exploitable cyber weaknesses in key
US infrastructure. Over the next 18 months, as Washington’s messaging becomes ever
more hostile, foreign-power internal operatives and outsourced hackers of dubious
morals analyze and defeat selected US power generation cybersecurity systems in the
northeastern United States.18 Next, the operatives and hackers install custom-made
malware in control rooms that directly manage power generator operations.
Once installed, the malware goes undetected and lies dormant. Covert efforts
supported by the foreign power continue to infect ever-greater portions of the
electrical generation capability. Ultimately, 100 sites are infected.19 Weak, erratic,
soft-power attempts by the United States to influence foreign-power behavior and
assemble a like-minded coalition are predictably unsuccessful, garnering the support of
only a few, small, habitual allies in a tepid “coalition of the willing.”
Finally, citing an allegedly egregious, amoral, regional action by the foreign power,
a strident and politically isolated United States begins unilateral, in-theater, military
deterrence measures and hints at “regime change” as a solution to the threat posed by
the foreign power, now characterized as “bellicose and recalcitrant.” The US government
punctuates this equivocal, trial-balloon dialogue with highly publicized preparations
for a significant, Joint, expeditionary, regional deployment.
The foreign power watches these developments with mounting dread and anxiety.
With its diplomatic credibility in sharp decline, regime change in the wind, and the
United States gearing up for regional combat, the foreign power decides to launch
its cyberattack. The foreign power has no hope its cyberattack will derail US military
preparations because the duration of the attack’s effects may be limited, and the
military has redundant systems and work-arounds that will likely minimize the impact
of power outages on ongoing deployment activities. The cyberattack, however, might
check the US administration’s headlong rush into war if it is accompanied by the right
information operations messaging.
On command, the malware releases its payload, which takes control of 50 vulnerable
generators, forcing them into electrical overload.20 The overload severely damages or
destroys the generators and causes secondary explosions at a gas turbine facility. The
resulting blackout impacts 15 states across Federal Emergency Management Agency
Regions 1, 2, 3, and 5, which include Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, and
18.

Lloyd’s and University of Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, Business Blackout.

19.
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20.
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Washington, DC.21 As the extent of the problem is realized, undamaged generators
across the region are shut down as a precaution until the cause of the damage can be
identified. Shutting down the generators amplifies the impact of the original attack and
further inhibits efforts to restore power. The effects of this temporary but widespread
destabilization of the regional electrical grid are catastrophic. Ninety-three million
people are without electricity, mortality rates rise as heath and public safety systems fail,
and trade declines as port facilities and transportation systems collapse.22 In addition to
these consequences envisioned by the Lloyd’s and Centre for Risk Studies report, major
urban centers would likely experience a spike in criminal activity and increased societal
friction as the duration of the blackout grows.
On the heels of this attack, the foreign power sends a private, back-channel
communication to the US president. This message admits responsibility for the attack
and validates this claim by identifying the 50 generators that were damaged by the
malware. This proof lends credibility to the foreign power’s coercive threats, also
contained in the message, of additional and more devastating attacks against other
key US infrastructure systems. In exchange for staying its hand, the foreign power
demands the United States slow its deployment and publicly eschew regime change.
Regardless of how the administration would respond to these events, the outlines
of the national, domestic disaster response would be guided by the National Response
Framework (NRF) and the NCIRP, and the military’s DSCA contributions would be
guided by DoD policy and regulation and Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities. The time-tested, procedural path to employ federal military forces for
domestic disaster response missions and to address the scenario’s cyber and noncyber
consequences begins at the local level.
As power is lost and essential services are impacted, local power companies and
community first responders act to “save lives, protect property and the environment,
meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, restore basic services and community
functionality, and establish a safe and secure environment moving toward the
transition to recovery.”23 The magnitude of the attack and the geographic area impacted
by the blackout is likely to overwhelm local resources quickly. As more counties turn to
their state governors for assistance, and the state governments realize the extent of the
disaster, the governors will declare a state of emergency, execute their state emergency
action plans, mobilize portions of their National Guards under state active duty, and
execute the appropriate emergency management assistance compacts.24 If governors
assess these measures will be insufficient to address the disaster, they may request
federal assistance from the president, including, if necessary, a presidential declaration
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of disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act.25 If governors anticipate the use
of federal military forces within their states, they may also proactively request the
designation of dual-status commander.26 One might reasonably guess some, but not all,
governors would request and receive DSCA support.
Within this scenario, command and control for DSCA support, to supply
emergency power and provide essential life support services and supplies to the
various states, would largely resemble the structures employed for Hurricane Sandy
in 2012. These structures fit the USNORTHCOM concept for structuring a “large-scale
DoD response” (see figure A-3-1), with US Army North acting as the Joint Force land
component commander and exercising command and control over several subordinate
Joint task forces (JTFs), although the large-scale disaster in the scenario would likely call
for adjustments to be made.27 As a note, figure A-3-1 does not show the New Jersey JTF.

Figure A-3-1. Hurricane Sandy command and coordination

The scenario would call for multiple “JTF Sandy” organizations, one for each of the
15 states impacted by the power outage and requesting federal support. Only the states
that employed subordinate, Title 10, active-duty forces would require a dual-status
commander, who would exercise command authority simultaneously over Title 10,

25.

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

26. Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual
Status Commander (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, April 2015), 30.
27. Christopher D. Miller, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN
3501-08 (Peterson Air Force Base, CO: United States Northern Command, May 16, 2008), viii; and Burke
and McNeil, Unified Military Response, 31.
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Title 32, and SAD military units.28 Dual-status commanders are the “usual and
customary command and control arrangement in cases where Federal military
and State National Guard forces are employed simultaneously in support of civil
authorities within the United States.”29
This dramatic expansion of state-level JTFs calls into question the ability of
Joint Task Force Civil Support to exercise effective control, but USNORTHCOM has
options to reinforce the standing structure of the Joint task force, if required. Likewise,
the scenario may require multiple Joint field offices (JFOs), with one JFO serving as
the primary office.30 Fully staffing these multiple, interagency coordination nodes would
be challenging for the affected states and agencies.
Turning to the cyber aspects of the scenario, other important differences emerge.
Unlike damage caused by floods or tornadoes, damage caused by cyberattacks may
be difficult to recognize at first. In the scenario, the information systems that were
targeted, compromised, infected, and leveraged to damage US power generation are
owned, operated, secured, and maintained by private-sector companies, either in-house
or through contracted support. Because these companies are not part of the defense
industrial base, they have no legal obligation to report information technology (IT)
system anomalies, increased traffic (often an indicator of malware communicating with
its controller), or IT security breaches.
Even if signs of an intrusion were detected, the information would likely not be
voluntarily shared within the industry because of fears of exposing vulnerabilities,
panicking investors, or damaging company reputations, credit, and industry standings.
Moreover, even after the generator malfunctions have been correctly attributed
to malicious intrusion and malware, private companies may hesitate to request
government assistance. Such a request could ultimately demand a degree of system
transparency and access that could compromise proprietary software and IT systems
design or invite novice tinkering with systems and software that were previously
opaque to outsiders. No private-sector IT systems manager wants a government body
watching over his or her digital shoulder, nor does the manager want inexperienced
“experts” attempting to fix a complex system they do not truly understand.31
Government assistance, however, may be a vital aspect of attack resolution.
According to a report by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
“[I]ndustry’s capability to analyze malware is limited and would require expertise likely

28. Daniel J. O’Donohue, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 2018).
29. Leon E. Panetta, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Washington,
DC: DoD, February 2013), 21.
30.
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31. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Prosecuting Computer Crimes (Washington,
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Cybecrimes to Law Enforcement,” CSO, May 30, 2019, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3398700
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available from software suppliers, control system vendors, or government resources.”32
Perhaps more importantly, “electricity system recovery and restoration would be
delayed or may not begin until the nature of the cyber risks are understood [sic] and
mitigation strategies are available.”33 Collectively, these cyber-unique factors may
combine to hinder preattack efforts to counter the malware threat; delay full postattack
recognition of the threat; and impede investigative efforts to identify, eradicate, and
protect against the threat. An additional element identified by researchers is the
insufficient legal authorities necessary to overcome natural and institutional barriers to
cooperation between government agencies and the private sector.34
In the scenario, as in real life, private sector power-generating companies may
neglect to approach a government entity for assistance. Conversely, every affected,
private-sector, power-generating company may request government assistance. The
middle ground—just some companies asking for help—is a reasonable assumption
given the extent of the cyberattack and the severity of its consequences. But what help,
specifically military help, would be available, and how might its command and control
be best structured?
The National Guard has a robust and growing menu of cyber-capable organizations
available for federal or state missions to support civil authorities in a cyber incident.
The size, capabilities, and funding of these organizations vary widely among the
50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia. The organizations’
capabilities generally fall into three categories: state communications directorates,
which operate and maintain the state’s part of the National Guard information network
(GuardNet); computer network defense teams tasked with protecting National Guard
information systems against cyber threats; and National Guard cyber units, whose
capabilities support the mission of USCYBERCOM.35 Depending on the unit, these
National Guard forces could conduct or support threat and vulnerability assessments,
network analysis, penetration testing, remediation of cyber vulnerabilities, forensic
operations, or cyber incident response and recovery efforts.36
These National Guard capabilities could be available through SAD or Title 32
activation and assignment by state governors, although, as stated, private-sector
companies may be reluctant to request help from military organizations. On the other
hand, not knowing where or how the next cyberattack (if any) might fall, governors
may be disinclined to assign their few, cyber-dedicated National Guard members to
missions that would take them away from direct support of GuardNet and other state
32. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Grid Security Exercise: GridEx III Report
(Atlanta, GA: North American Electric Reliability Corporation, March 2016), v.
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cyber networks, particularly within this scenario, in which multiple power-generating
sites in each state have been attacked and damaged. Additionally, isolating, defeating,
and eradicating the malware from the networks of potentially several different companies
and their many separate sites would severely strain the capacity of even the largest and
most capable National Guard cyber units.
These challenges—particularly information sharing and full access—are likely
to be further complicated by the hiring of independent cyber support contractors by
private-sector companies, both before and after the cyberattack. Even companies that
were not initially attacked may fear the presence of malware in their IT systems. This
fear could create a cyber version of the “civilians on the battlefield” conundrum that
has long confronted conventional forces. Working out the triangular relationship
among company IT leaders, contracted support, and military assistance forces would be
exceptionally challenging. In this scenario, deconflicting the battlespace by not assigning
military assistance to the companies employing third-party contract support might be
the best option.
At best, National Guard units in some states could be helpful if they have been
requested by a private-sector company and granted the appropriate access. In addition,
the units would need to be able to resolve any legal or privacy impediments favorably
and to access Top Secret information while in SAD or Title 32 status (currently denied
by DoD policy). Furthermore, the units would need to be available and not committed
by the governor to a higher-priority task or contingency. The chances of these conditions
being met are slim, but they are not impossible. Thus, in a DSCA response to an attack,
one should assume limited National Guard personnel will be assigned to provide cyber
support to companies. But what about federal support, especially military support?
The NCIRP and its parent guidance, PPD-41, would guide the organization and
employment of federal support in a response to a cyberattack. The directive and the
NCIRP specify LFAs for each of the three LOEs and identify the key tasks within the
LOEs. This overarching federal structure is shown in figure A-3-2.

Figure A-3-2. NCIRP federal structure for cyber incident response
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In the scenario, DHS leads the Unified Command Group, which includes the three
LOE leads (per PPD-41 and the NCIRP) plus the Department of Energy, DHS, and the
Department of Transportation as affected sector-specific agencies (again, per PPD-41
and the NCIRP).37 The Department of Defense is included in the UCG because of the
probability of support being provided by USCYBERCOM and because of the depth
of DoD expertise in cyber operations and defense. The private, not-for-profit North
American Electric Reliability Corporation is included in the UCG because of its expertise
in ensuring the reliability of the bulk power system in North America. The National
Security Agency is part of the Department of Defense and operates under the authority of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Because the National Security Agency
is subsumed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the lead federal
agency for the intelligence support LOE, the agency is not called out in the diagram.
A fourth LOE is identified in the NCIRP—the “affected entity’s [internal] response
activities”—but the NCIRP also states, “the Federal government typically will not play
a role in this line of effort.”38 These statements suggest, but do not prohibit, the use of
federal (including DoD) cyber response capabilities—perhaps even in support of private
enterprise. But a policy that indicates a potential for federal “rescue” may de-incentivize
the development of robust cyber defense capabilities in the private sector.39 Nevertheless,
some literature suggests DoD capabilities are no better than those of private industry,
albeit this reporting is at an unclassified level.40 If the Department of Defense had nothing
more to offer, then the discussion of DoD involvement in private-sector cyber incident
response would be moot.
Despite these issues and concerns, the NCIRP does provide guidance for federal—
and, thus, DoD—participation in cyber incident response. On the threat response
LOE, the NCIRP states the “DoD can also support civil authorities for cyber incidents
outside the DoDIN when requested by the lead federal agency, and approved by the
appropriate DoD official, or directed by the President. Such support would be provided
based upon the needs of the incident, the capabilities required, and the readiness of
available forces.”41 This passage specifically identifies an LFA request as the initiation
point of support, although the original request could originate with a civil authority.
For the DoD, this terrain is comfortable. The department routinely supports other
federal agencies under the authority of the Economy Act of 1932. A request from the
Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Justice as the LOE lead would
be sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Staff for validation
and sourcing along a path similar to a Combatant Commander’s request for forces.
37.
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Given the scenario, any reasonable request that did not place higher-priority missions
at risk would almost certainly be granted. But whether these DoD assets could be used
in support of the private sector, rather than in the more limited and specific support of
civil authorities, as is stated in the NCIRP is uncertain. Yet in the scenario, with no civil
authority cyber networks under attack, determining the rationale officials would use to
justify a request for DoD cyber support is difficult. Perhaps a governor, having used
his or her own National Guard cyber capabilities to support a request from the private
sector or to protect National Guard or other state networks, could request DoD support
to augment their own limited resources. But such an action by a governor would cause
active-duty DoD personnel to indirectly support the private sector, which is a legal issue,
or to backfill National Guard personnel in state duties while they support private sector
victims, which would be nonsensical. Similar concerns influence DoD forces acting
within the asset response LOE.
On the asset response LOE, the NCIRP states, “Federal asset response support to the
private sector from the NCCIC in the form of on-site technical assistance is generally
contingent on a request from or consent of the supported entity.”42 This language
specifically identifies the private sector as the recipient of “Federal asset response,”
but, unlike the threat response paragraph, the language does not mention the DoD.
The language also implies a request is originating from the private sector and going to
the NCCIC, perhaps directly or perhaps through the DHS as the LFA for the LOE or the
lead for the UCG. Once again, this situation is not representative of a traditional DSCA
request process because the commercial entity would be supported, not a civil authority.
Whether DoD assets would be allowed to fulfill a support request from a private
entity through the NCCIC is uncertain. To do so, the NCCIC would need to already
have, or request through DHS under the Economy Act, DoD support that could be
passed down to the commercial entity. But despite no legal hindrances preventing the
DoD from supporting another federal agency, significant legal and privacy impediments
prevent the DoD from becoming directly involved with private enterprise.
Additionally, the command of individuals, teams, and units provided to other
agencies is never outside the normal DoD chain of command, and Combatant Command
authority for cyber personnel would remain with USCYBERCOM. In practice, this
support to other federal agencies would be akin to temporary duty for individual
augmentees or direct support for teams and units, with the direct support (or other)
relationship being assigned by the Combatant Commander.43 Units provided in a direct
support relationship may not be subdivided or reassigned by the supported unit. In this
context, for DHS or the NCCIC to abide by “the letter of the law” in a direct support
relationship and still use DoD assets in support of a private entity would be extremely
difficult, even if such use were permissible under federal law.
If DoD resources were able to support either of these LOEs, the support would
almost certainly be resourced from USCYBERCOM, where virtually all of the DoD’s
cyber expertise resides. United States Cyber Command’s three main focus areas are
42.
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“[d]efending the DoDIN, providing support to combatant commanders for execution
of their missions around the world, and strengthening our nation’s ability to withstand
and respond to cyber attack.”44 The command organizes its 5,000 cyber personnel
around these main focus areas with three types of functional teams: National Mission
Teams (NMTs) (13 teams) to “defend the United States and its interests against
cyberattacks of significant consequence”; Cyber Protection Teams (68 teams) to
“defend priority DoD networks and systems against priority threats”; and Combat
Mission Teams (27 teams) to “support Combatant Commands by generating integrated
cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations.”45
Twenty-five additional teams provide planning and analytical support to the Combat
Mission Teams and NMTs.46 As of October 2016, all 133 of these teams had achieved
initial operational capability and were on path to reach full operational capability in
2018.47 Figure A-3-3 maps the most likely relationships among USCYBERCOM main
focus areas, USCYBERCOM teams, and NCIRP LOEs.

Figure A-3-3. Line of effort (LOE) and USCYBERCOM crosswalk

The putative relationships between USCYBERCOM teams and NCIRP LOEs contain
some anomalies and inherent challenges. First, although the intelligence support
LOE and USCYBERCOM teams do not seem to be connected, the NCIRP states, “The
44. “Our Mission and Vision,” United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) (website), n.d.,
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DoD actively characterizes and assesses foreign cybersecurity threats and informs the
relevant interagency partners of current and potential malicious cyberactivity.
Upon request, the DoD intelligence components may provide technical assistance to
US government departments and agencies; other DoD elements may provide support to
civil authorities in accordance with applicable law and policy.”48
Interestingly, this language is virtually identical to the roles and missions ascribed
to the National Security Agency’s Cybersecurity Threat Operations Center.49 Thus, the
role USCYBERCOM might fill is unclear, and a support request from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence is highly unlikely—particularly because, presently, the
National Security Agency and USCYBERCOM are so closely tied together.
Secondly, having enough troops available for cyber support would be problematic.
Based on NCIRP language and USCYBERCOM mission capabilities, if a sourcing request
were submitted, it would probably be for threat response and probably come from
the FBI or the Department of Justice. Both the Combat Mission Teams and the NMTs
seem suited for threat response tasks. But how many, if any, of the 27 Combat Mission
Teams dedicated to the nine Combatant Commands would be available for the tasking
is unclear, particularly because of the regional deployment and combat operations
implied by the scenario. This problem might force the 13 NMTs to perform their
routine USCYBERCOM missions while also covering any requests emanating
from the threat response LOE and, perhaps with Cyber Protection Teams, the asset
response LOE.
To exacerbate this problem and diminish the pool of DoD resources available to
address the cyberattack, the foreign power may opt to conduct a series of supporting
cyberattacks against the DoD Information Network or other infrastructure targets.
These attacks need not be sophisticated or even successful; they would only need to be
high-volume and persistent to consume DoD resources. A lesser alternative that might
achieve the same effect would be to create a cyber deception with a dramatic spike
in terrorist or jihadi Web chatter involving attack plans against US civilians to divert
analytical capability and dilute federal efforts against the real cyberattack. Given the
scenario and these possible additional stressors, the cyber capability demand would
perhaps be greater than the cyber warrior supply, and the DoD would have to make
some difficult prioritization decisions.
FINDINGS
This part of the appendix began by posing the question of how the US government
should exercise whole-of-government command and control during cyber incidents.
Next, strategic documents were explored to understand the current guidance and
policies that would influence command-and-control decisions. The documents were
scrutinized through the lens of a challenging, multifaceted cyberattack scenario and
tempered by professional judgment to further refine the thinking on cyber command
and control at the implementation level. By overlaying the template of the NCIRP with
48.

DHS, Cyber Incident Response Plan, 20.

49.

DHS, Cyber Incident Response Plan, 20.

120

the scenario-based realities of execution, including a simultaneous, conventional DSCA
effort, a picture emerges that suggests a reasonable construct for whole-of-government
command and control of large-scale cyber response efforts. This tentative concept is
shown in figure A-3-4.

Figure A-3-4. Tentative structure and command and control

GENERAL
Figure A-3-4 depicts the simultaneous employment within a single state of traditional
humanitarian assistance DSCA (in gray area) and the cyber incident response structure
(in blue area). The affected power-generation private-sector entities, which would
be more numerous than illustrated here, are backlighted in gold. The humanitarian
assistance DSCA and the cyber incident response structure are stand-alone in that one
does not require the existence of the other to be fully functional. Solid lines represent
command relationships. Dashed lines represent support or coordinating relationships.
Dotted lines represent possible future command relationships and are explained more
fully later. The humanitarian assistance DSCA structure and command relationships are
adapted from figure A-3-1 and not explained further here.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL/CYBER RESPONSE GROUP/UCG
These organizations and their relationships were explained earlier. A complete
discussion of these organizations can be found in PPD-41 (and its annex) and the NCIRP.
In the Cyber Response Group, the DoD representation is provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense through the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense
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and global security, which offers the best alignment of responsibilities.50 United States
Cyber Command provides the UCG’s DoD representative.
JOINT FIELD OFFICE (JFO)
Likely, many JFOs would be created to support a complex disaster of the scale
presented in the scenario, but, for clarity’s sake, only a single JFO is shown here. The
internal structure of the JFOs for cyber incident response would be similar to that of
the JFO for humanitarian assistance DSCA. The Information Technology – Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, however, is included in the cyber response JFO structure
to facilitate information sharing through the center’s structure and processes. The
defense coordinating officer is sourced from USCYBERCOM, rather than
USNORTHCOM, to provide the necessary cyber expertise and to leverage his or her
deep knowledge of USCYBERCOM’s organization and capabilities.
JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) CYBER
Cyber response operations and the employment of military personnel, teams,
and units will vary from state to state and will be distributed over a large geographic
area. Provided the span of control is not overwhelmed and effective communications
can be established and sustained, a single JTF could provide command and control
over the entire DoD cyber response effort. If these conditions are not met, multiple
JTFs would have to be created. The limiting factor in creating multiple JTFs would be
communications capability and the capacity and depth of qualified personnel resources.
These limiting factors would apply in particular to JTF commanders and key staff,
who would need an in-depth understanding of the cyber domain, cyber operations,
and USCYBERCOM. Absent this understanding, JTF commanders may be unable to
exercise effective mission command over cyber response forces.
Based on the guidance implied by the language in the NCIRP and accepting the
high probability of legal restrictions on the use of active component forces in working
directly with private-sector entities, the structure presented here separates active
component and National Guard capabilities. Most likely, the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Justice, acting as LOE leads, would request DoD support.
This request is shown by the solid lines surrounding the T10 boxes within the LOE
portion of the diagram. The relationship between the DoD capabilities and the federal
requesting agency is equivalent to direct support, which is shown with the annotation
“(DS)” on the diagram. Department of Defense support to the intelligence support LOE
is possible, but unlikely, as indicated by the dotted lines.
Joint Task Force Cyber would exercise operational control over the assigned
active component forces.51 Because of the likely preponderance of active component
cyber support forces being employed, JTF commanders would have to be active
50. “Defense
Critical
Infrastructure
Program
Roles
&
Responsibilities,”
Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy(website), n.d., https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices
/ASD-for-Homeland-Defense-and-Global-Security/Defense-Critical-Infrastructure-Program/Roles/.
51.

HQDA, Operational Terms, 1-74.
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component officers. Moreover, because of the specialized knowledge required,
these officers would most likely be sourced by USCYBERCOM.
Joint Task Force Cyber (or multiple JTFs) could be sourced by USCYBERCOM
component commands. The command is already moving in this direction with the
establishment of Joint Force commands within each of its components. These commands
are tasked with supporting designated, geographic Combatant Commands with
cyber support.52 These standing headquarters arrangements allow USCYBERCOM
to structure, man, and equip the organizations to suit the unique needs of the cyber
domain and to tailor them to specific missions as required. This arrangement will also
enable the development of standing procedures for alert, deployment, operations,
and recovery. Routinely using these headquarters in national exercises would support
the development of lessons learned that would inform future JTF operations and
procedures and the greater US military cyber domain community.
State active duty (SAD)/Title 32 National Guard forces serve in either status. This
proposed structure assumes National Guard organizations within the states have
sufficient depth of expertise and the legal authority to offer cyber support to affected
private-sector entities within their states and private-sector entities will request
and accept assistance. These efforts may be episodic and will not include all affected
entities. National Guard forces performing these missions would not be “federalized”
for domestic cyber response because the situation within the scenario does not meet
the criteria of foreign invasion, insurrection, or lawlessness required by federal law.53
Because these National Guard forces could be conducting missions parallel to the
federal effort within the LOEs, they should fall under a common commander for the
purposes of unity of effort and synchronization. For this reason, each JTF Cyber
commander must be prequalified as a dual-status commander and must be prepared
to exercise operational control over all military forces supporting the cyber response
in the event SAD or Title 32 forces begin supporting the effort—as annotated by
“(BPT DSC)” in the diagram.
CONCLUSION
As this part of the appendix has shown, the impediments to rapid and effective
cyber response operations to address a complex catastrophe are numerous and
highly nuanced. Law, policy, paucity of expertise, private-sector resistance, immature
coordination structures, an uneven distribution of capabilities and authorities, and lack
of large-scale, high-level exercises combine to create significant institutional friction.
Although limited in scale, previous exercises like GridEx and Cyber Guard have made
significant contributions to the collaborative examination of problems and exploration
of solutions in a field largely unfettered by precedent. This part of the appendix may
serve as a foundation for an alternative methodology for approaching the question of
cyber response command and control. It presents a workable structure and its associated
command and support relationships based on policy, strategy, and existing regulatory
52.

USCYBERCOM, “Cyber Mission Force Teams.”

53. Chief and Assistant Chief of Staff of National Guard Divisions and Wings in Federal Service:
Detail, 10 U.S.C. § 12502 (1994).
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guidance and provides a possible new end state for future exploratory efforts. Knowing
the end allows one to marshal deliberately the ways and means in a manner that
decisively contributes to achieving the end state.
Over the last decade, the United States has shown itself to be prepared to meet
the challenges of fire, flood, and storm effectively and efficiently at a national level.
The nation must now dedicate itself to preparing to meet the cyber storm. Effective
organization and clear command and control will be critical to this preparation and
execution. If the future looks like the recent past, the nation has no time to lose.
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APPENDIX B
IMPACTS OF FULL MOBILIZATION IN THE CONTESTED HOMELAND
The US Army depends on the reserve component to deploy during full mobilization.
In a contested homeland, however, the reserve component may have to compete with
other government agencies and critical industries for priority as it mobilizes. During
full mobilization, significant issues for both reserve soldiers and their civilian
employers will be encountered as the soldiers extricate themselves from work and report
for duty with the US Army Reserve (USAR).
With two friendly nations on its northern and southern borders and two large
oceans to the east and west, the United States has enjoyed a safe and secure homeland.
In the next conflict with a near-peer adversary, the United States should expect
enemies can and will engage in all domains within its borders and undertake kinetic
attacks on its cities, bases, reserve centers, lines of communication, ports, and
airports either by ballistic missile or sleeper cell terrorist attacks. Simultaneous cyber,
information, and economic attacks against US critical infrastructure networks and
families will occur. The nation will call upon the citizen-soldiers of the reserve
component to serve in multiple arenas. As civilians, many reserve component soldiers
serve in critical emergency service, medical, and transportation fields. These skills will
be in high demand and will compete for reserve component soldiers’ priorities in the
event the nation is under direct attack. A full mobilization within the context of a
contested homeland will stretch the ability of reserve component soldiers to answer the
mobilization call.
This appendix focuses on the following questions: What would the impact of full
mobilization be on government and private organizations in a contested homeland?
What impacts would federal, state, and local governments and private entities experience
as key, essential reserve component soldiers are pulled from their organizations and
businesses while the homeland is under attack? Finally, what is the impact on the reserve
component due to having soldiers whose civilian jobs will be essential? This appendix
examines current governmental policies and the potential impacts to the emergency
service, transportation, medical, and aviation fields and recommends improvements
to the nation’s mobilization preparation efforts. It provides a quick, historical review
of the US Army Reserve and how it became the “operational reserve” of today’s Total
Army, outlines the authorities that allow reserve forces to mobilize, and envisions USAR
operations in a contested homeland.
HISTORIC CONTEXT
The nation’s Founding Fathers recognized the need for a reserve component. In its
first century, the United States was a regional power, protected from foreign invasion
by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As a result, the federal government chose a military
model that funded a very small, professional Army, augmented in times of crisis with
militia and volunteer forces. During periods of conflict, the federal government would
mobilize a large force of citizen-soldiers and train them before conducting combat
operations. After completing these operations, mobilized soldiers would return home.
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Although the concept of the National Guard sprang from the tradition of local and
state militias, early military leaders such as General George Washington, General Baron
von Steuben, General Henry Knox, and General Alexander Hamilton recognized the need
for a federal reserve force and proposed its creation.1 Four significant events in world
history shaped the formation of the modern US Army Reserve: the Spanish-American
War and Philippine Revolution (1898–1902), World War II (1939–45), the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the end of the Cold War (1989), and the war on terrorism (2001–present).2
At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began to project power
outside the continental United States (CONUS) into the Caribbean and Pacific, which
ultimately led to the sinking of the USS Maine on February 15, 1898, and the beginning
of the Spanish-American War and Philippine Revolution. “Mobilization problems of the
Army during these conflicts, specifically shortages of medical professionals, trained
officers and non-commissioned officers, caused the national leadership to finally
establish a formal structure for federal volunteers during peacetime.”3 As a result,
Congress created the Medical Reserve Corps in 1908, the predecessor of the Organized
Reserve Corps. Subsequently, through the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, the
government created the Organized Reserve to provide a peacetime source of trained
officers and noncommissioned officers consisting of the officer cadre for up to 27 reserve
infantry divisions and six reserve cavalry divisions stationed throughout the country
and included the Officer’s Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps.4 This force went on to mobilize almost 90,000 officers and
80,000 enlisted personnel who served in World War I (1917–19). During the interwar
years (1920–40), the Army had plans for up to 33 paper or cadre reserve divisions.
Although funding and training opportunities for the Organized Reserve were virtually
nonexistent, a unique use for the reserve was found when more than 30,000 Organized
Reserve Corps officers served as commanders and staff officers in the Civilian
Conservation Corps camps between 1933 and 1939.5
The closest the United States has come to full mobilization as described by Title 10
of the US Code was World War II; however, the mobilization of Organized Reserve
soldiers began before the war started. In 1940, the Organized Reserve Corps began
mobilizing for war. In the following year, the number of Organized Reserve Corps
officers on duty rose from around 3,000 to more than 57,000.6 In 1941–45, the Army
mobilized 26 USAR infantry divisions. Over 100,000 Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps graduates and over 200,000 Organized Reserve Corps soldiers served during
1. “Brief History of the Army Reserve,” Homeland Security Digital Library (website), n.d., https://
www.hsdlorg/?view&did=437351, 1.
2. Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve: A Concise History (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Reserve
Command, 2013), 2.
3.

Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve, 4.

4.

Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve, 4.

5.

Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve, 6.

6.

Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve, 6.
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the war.7 This mobilization was the largest the US Army Reserve has ever seen, though
it would perhaps experience a similar mobilization if the United States were to go to
war with a modern, near-peer adversary. Notwithstanding the Pearl Harbor attack
and the occupation of several Alaskan islands, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have
provided the safe haven the United States has required to mobilize the nation’s
industrial base and deploy military forces. Advances in modern weapons across all
military domains suggest the buffers provided by the country’s geographic isolation
from its near-peer adversaries would not give it the time and space it enjoyed during the
full mobilization of World War II.
After World War II, the United States developed a strategy of Soviet containment.
For the first time in US history, the nation would require a large, active military force
with a robust reserve component to implement a new, global foreign policy. This global
foreign policy strategy led to significant changes to the Organized Reserve Corps and
began the evolution of the strategic reserve concept.8
The Organized Reserve Corps mobilized over 240,000 reservists during the Korean
War (1950–53). Based on lessons learned from this large mobilization, Congress enacted
several changes to the structure, roles, and authorities of the reserve component. These
changes included renaming the Organized Reserve Corps to the US Army Reserve,
authorizing 24 inactive and 17 active training days per year, and authorizing the president
to mobilize up to one million uniformed personnel from all services to active duty.9
After the Korean War, “the Army Reserve was mobilized only twice; over 68,500
Army Reserve Soldiers for the Berlin Crisis (1961–62) and nearly 6,000 for the Vietnam
War during the period from 1968 to 1969. In reality, it existed as a strategic reserve.”10
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm—and, to a lesser extent, the short-term
contingency operations of the 1990s—validated the strategic reserve model. During
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US Army Reserve mobilized over
80,000 soldiers to provide combat support and combat service support to the coalition.
Subsequently, it provided critical combat support and combat service support during
Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Sinai
Peninsula peacekeeping operations, and peacekeeping and stabilizing operations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.11
The September 11 attacks ushered in a new century and a fundamental change in
the concept of the strategic reserve. The demand for active-duty Army forces and the
critical enabling capabilities resident in the reserve component drove the development
of the Army Force Generation model. National Guard and USAR units and soldiers
were routinely mobilized to serve in the southwest Asia theater of operations, both in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to these mobilizations, reserve component soldiers
routinely mobilized to serve in the homeland and abroad supporting civil authorities in
7.

Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve.
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Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve.
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11.
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humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Sixteen years of persistent combat
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)
requirements, have transformed the US Army Reserve into an operational reserve.12 The
active component of the Army depends on reserve component soldiers to provide critical
enabling capabilities that are sparse in the active component. The US Army Reserve
possesses over 50 percent of the Total Army’s capacity in many specialties, including
medical support, quartermaster, chaplain, military information support operation, and
civil affairs.13
In addition to supporting the active component in overseas contingency operations
around the world, the US Army Reserve has increasingly supported DSCA operations
in the continental United States. Under authorizations provided by the 2018 revision
of the Stafford Act (Disaster Recovery Reform Act), the US Army Reserve can provide
federal assistance to civil authorities after a state governor has requested assistance
and the president has made a disaster declaration. Additionally, under DoD Directive
3025.18, USAR commanders may take action to “save lives, prevent human suffering,
or mitigate great property damage in response to a request for assistance from a civil
authority, under imminently serious conditions.”14 The US Army Reserve also maintains
a standing task force available for immediate mobilization and deployment in the
event of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosives attack.15 Based on
these authorizations, the US Army Reserve has become increasingly important in the
National Response Framework (NRF) plans to combat natural and manmade disasters
within the United States.
CONTESTED HOMELAND
In their 2015 book Ghost Fleet, P. W. Singer and August Cole present a vision of a
current-day war between the United States and a coalition consisting of China and Russia.
Though the book can be overly dramatic, its portrayal of a US war with a near-peer
competitor is very realistic. The authors vividly describe a scenario in which a massive
strike in the space and cyber domains cripples the US military’s technical dominance.
In a matter of hours, the United States’ space-based Global Positioning System (GPS);
communication; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and weather satellites
are taken out of commission through a combination of terrestrial and ground-based,
anti-satellite systems. Simultaneously, the coalition attacks the United States’ civil and
12.

Office of Army Reserve History, Army Reserve, 12, 15.

13. “Indispensable Capabilities for the Operational Force,” https://www.usar.army.mil/Portals
/98/Documents/infographics/MOS%20Breakdown.pdf?ver=2015-10-29-113631-337, US Army Reserve
(website), n.d., https://www.usar.army.mil/News/Infographics/.
14. William J. Lynn III, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, DoD Directive 3025.18 (Washington, DC:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, updated March 19, 2018), 18.
15. HQDA, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Command, Army Techniques
Publication 3-37.11 (Washington, DC: HQDA, August 2018); and US Army Reserve Specialized Disaster
Response Forces, “CRE: An Army Reserve Reference Guide,” US Army Reserve (website), n.d., https://
www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/Ambassadors/Chemical%20Response%20Enterprise%20
Brochure.pdf.
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military systems with massive cyberattacks.16 The authors do, however, omit some
events that could occur within the continental United States should this type of conflict
happen. Over the past 30 years, potential adversaries of the United States have been
observing its operations in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan and its large-scale withdrawal
from forward basing in Europe.17 These operations could be characterized as operations
in which the United States was able to conduct large-scale mobilizations and deployments
from the continental United States to staging bases near the areas of operations
unmolested by adversaries. If a near-peer competitor were entering into conflict with the
United States, allowing the United States to mobilize its Total Force and deploy from the
continental United States to forward staging bases near the area of operations would be
a strategic mistake. The near-peer competitor of the future will attack the United States
across multiple domains and within the homeland.18 In the United States’ next major
war, the homeland will be contested.
A contested homeland would severely test the ability of the Total Force to alert,
mobilize, organize, and deploy to the area of operations. Reserve component soldiers
of all types would be heavily involved in reacting to attacks on the homeland, in both
their civilian and military roles. Ghost Fleet and several recent articles describe in
depth potential, national vulnerabilities in the space, cyber, and information domains.
Space-based GPS; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and communications
assets are vulnerable to kinetic and electromagnetic attacks and cyberattacks. Losing
these assets would greatly reduce capabilities across all segments of American society,
complicating the command and control of the Total Force. Nowhere would this loss of
command and control be felt greater than in the execution of a total or full mobilization
under 10 US Code section 12301(a) or section 12302.
Cyberattacks would likely target critical government and business systems. The
federal government has previously recognized these vulnerabilities. President Bill
Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 on critical infrastructure protection in
1998. This directive was updated by President George W. Bush with Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 in 2003.19 An attack on critical and vulnerable infrastructure
segments could lead to infrastructure failures in commerce and banking, transportation
systems (air and sea traffic, public transportation, and transportation infrastructure),
energy (electrical power and the production, refining, storage, and distribution of
oil and gas), public health (health care and agriculture), environmental protection
(drinking water, water treatment, and hazardous waste storage), and government
16. P. W. Singer and August Cole, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2015), 1–4.
17. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial
Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003).
18. Kevin D. Scott, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and
Disordered World (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 14, 2016), 24–27.
19. William J. Clinton, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Presidential Decision Directive/National
Security Council 63 (Washington, DC: White House, May 22, 1998); and George W. Bush, Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
(Washington, DC: White House, December 17, 2003).
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(continuity of government, the defense industrial base, law enforcement, emergency
management, and state and local government).20
Although the cyberattacks and space attacks on the nation’s infrastructure
described in Ghost Fleet would wreak havoc, kinetic attacks on the homeland, would
be more damaging to the reserve component’s ability to mobilize. In the event of
conflict with China or Russia, the dilemma facing the United States would center on
its Joint Force gaining access to Asia and Europe. This dilemma is based on potential
adversaries’ development and deployment of sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) systems in both theaters. Most of the current A2/AD discussion centers on defensive
tactics are designed to limit the US Joint Force’s access to aerial ports and seaports of
debarkation in Europe and Asia.21 Sophisticated, defensive, ballistic missile defense
and air defense systems and offensive, land- and sea-launched, ballistic missile systems
are described in detail as denial mechanisms to keep the US Joint Force out of theater.
In the author’s opinion, adversaries with these sophisticated systems and capabilities
would not limit their attacks on the US homeland to the space and cyber domains. These
adversaries would attack US infrastructure, ports of embarkation, and military forces in
the homeland. The adversaries would attack across all domains to prevent the United
States from mobilizing and deploying outside the continental United States. Kinetic
attacks in the land, sea, and air domains would target and disrupt the United States’
unmatched capability to mobilize and project power from home. The most likely course
of action for a near-peer adversary would be to insert special operations forces into
the United States preconflict to attack select military and civil infrastructure
targets on order.
Near-peer competitors also have air- and sea-based missile systems that could
maneuver into range to attack critical targets in the United States. As noted by Ian
Williams in “The Russia-NATO A2AD Environment,” a critical component of NATO’s
ability to support alliance members is a series of aerial ports and seaports of debarkation
within the Russian A2/AD envelope.22 “Disabling these nodes would complicate
NATO’s ability to efficiently respond to crisis.”23 China is currently extending its
A2/AD capability through system development and expansion into the South China
Sea.24 Aerial ports and seaports of embarkation in the United States are as critical as
aerial ports and seaports of debarkation in theater. An adversary using cyberattacks,
special operations forces, and missile attacks on the aerial ports and seaports of
20.
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mbarkation within the continental United States would delay deploying forces and
cause casualties, damage, and confusion throughout the country. These attacks would
divert critical government and civilian assets away from the already difficult task of
mobilizing and deploying the Total Force outside the United States.
WHAT IS MOBILIZATION?
Mobilization, as defined by the Department of Defense, “is the process of
assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of
war or other emergencies.”25 The authorities for mobilizing the national resources are
enshrined in the Constitution of the United States of America, which states the following
in article 1, section 8:
The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.26

Title 10 of the US Code defines the different levels of mobilization, from voluntary
call to total, national mobilization.27 Each level of mobilization is characterized by
emergency authority, level of military commitment, and length of mobilization.28
The partial mobilizations are limited in both duration and level of commitment. If
the president were to mobilize the reserve component, as authorized by 10 US Code,
section 12304, a maximum of 200,000 Selected Reserve soldiers, including up to
30,000 Individual Ready Reserve soldiers, could be mobilized for up to 365 days. This
emergency authority may be delegated to the secretary of defense.29 Federal reserve
component soldiers mobilized under this section may be used either to support the states
in a disaster relief effort for up to 120 days (section 12304[a]), as described in section 102
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 US Code,
section 5122), or to support a combatant commander in a given operation for up to 365
days (section 12304[b]).30 Another level of mobilization short of full mobilization is partial
mobilization, which is enacted with a presidential declaration of national emergency per
25. Daniel O’Donohue, Joint Mobilization Planning, Joint Publication 4-05 (Washington, DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 23, 2018), I-1.
26.
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27. Reserve Components Generally, 10 US Code Section 12301 (2004); Ready Reserve,
10 US Code Section 12302 (2011); Ready Reserve: Members Not Assigned to, or Participating
Satisfactorily in, Units, 10 US Code, Section 12303 (1994); and Selected Reserve and Certain Individual
Ready Reserve Members; Order to Active Duty Other Than during War or National Emergency,
10 US Code, Section 12304 (2018).
28. Ken S. Gilliam and Barrett K. Parker, “Mobilization: The State of the Field,” Parameters 47, no. 2
(Summer 2017).
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10 US Code, section 12302. Not more than one million Ready Reserve members can be
mobilized on active duty for up to 24 months without their consent at any one time.31
In the event of a full-scale conflict with a near-peer adversary, the president would
most likely use 10 US Code, Section 12302, in conjunction with a presidential declaration
of national emergency to initiate a full mobilization of the Total Army. Mobilization of
the Total Army under Section 12302 would exclude members of the standby reserve
and the retired reserve.32 Most likely, a Congressional declaration of war would follow,
authorizing a full mobilization of the reserve component. Under Section 12301(a), the
President or another authority designated by the secretary of the military branch being
mobilized may order any member of the selected reserve, including standby reserve
and retired reserve members, to active duty for the duration of the war or national
emergency.33 In the event the secretary of the branch being mobilized determines the
reserve does not have enough active members with the requisite skill sets, the secretary,
with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, may recall inactive and retired reserve
members to active duty.34 The authorizations contained in Section 12301(a) and
the associated mobilization levels of the reserve component have not been used
since the total mobilization of World War II.35 See figure B-1 for a depiction of the levels
of mobilization.

Figure B-1. Levels of mobilization
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Because mobilization of the reserve component as part of the Total Force is so critical
to the National Defense Strategy of the nation, the Department of Defense has established
several policies to ensure the component is available to the department. Because the
nation has only used limited mobilizations since World War II, leaders with full reserve
component mobilization experience have long since retired from the force. To ensure
mission success in the event of a declared war or national emergency, full mobilization
should be exercised at multiple levels. In fact, DoD policy states, “Mobilization exercises
are conducted in conjunction with Military Service, joint, and CCMD exercises so that
RC access policy and procedures are regularly exercised, practiced, and understood
throughout the force. Pursuant to section 10208 of Reference (d), the Secretary of Defense
will conduct at least one major mobilization exercise each year.”36
Despite this requirement, the Department of Defense and, to some extent, the services
are not currently satisfying this requirement at the level of full or total mobilization.
GAPS IN FULL MOBILIZATION PLANNING, EXERCISES, AND REGULATIONS
Joint Publication 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, promulgates guidance to be used
by the armed forces in preparing their mobilization plans.37 This publication prescribes
the roles and responsibilities for the planning and execution of mobilization. The Joint
planning and execution community collectively plans for the mobilization and
deployment of the Joint Force.38 In addition to Joint Staff and service mobilization
planning, supporting US government agencies should conduct planning and
coordination activities to mobilize the national support base to sustain the fully
mobilized Joint Force.39 As part of the Joint planning and execution community, the
Joint Staff Logistics Directorate is the focal point for the integration of planning and
coordination of mobilization execution. The services are responsible for preparing
detailed mobilization plans, identifying the forces and support to be provided, and
executing mobilization at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.40 Based on several
telephone conversations with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Joint Staff, and Department of the Army mobilization representatives, the last DoD-wide
mobilization exercise occurred in 1982, before the commissioning of most senior Army
leaders.41 In 1978, the Department of Defense conducted Exercise Nifty Nugget, which

36. Peter Levine, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC), DoD Instruction 1235.12 (Washington, DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, updated February 28, 2017), 2.
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was followed by Exercise Proud Spirit in 1980 and Exercise Proud Saber in 1982.42 These
exercises were based on a hypothetical war with Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces
in Europe. Rather than focusing on multicomponent personnel mobilization issues,
Exercise Proud Spirit and Exercise Proud Saber focused on:
•

assessing the interface among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
federal agencies (the Federal Emergency Management Agency), the Army, and
other services;

•

assessing plans to facilitate and support the mobilization, deployment, and
sustainment of the reserve component;

•

evaluating the capabilities of the CONUS support base to expand and support
mobilization;

•

evaluating the capability of the automated data processing system to support
mobilization and deployment; and

•

evaluating the ability of command-and-control systems and communications to
support the planning and execution of mobilization and deployment.43

In recent years, the Army has begun to focus more time and effort on studying
mobilization issues. Several recent tabletop exercises have been conducted, beginning in
2016. Each of these tabletop exercises, however, have focused primarily on one region’s
operations plan and time-phased force and deployment data.44 Although these tabletop
exercises have generated discussion across the DoD enterprise, as of 2021, Headquarters,
Department of the Army has not exercised a full mobilization of the entire reserve
component, nor does it plan to in the near future.45
WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW MIGHT HURT US
In addition to the lack of comprehensive, Joint mobilization exercises, the US Army
Reserve suffers from a critical information deficit. Current USAR personnel systems do
not adequately provide senior USAR leaders with high-fidelity employment information
on their Ready Reserve soldier population. At this time, US Army Reserve Command
(USARC) does not possess a repository of historical or current data on the civilian
positions its soldiers occupy outside the Army.46 Additionally, it does not have policies
in place that address potential conflicts between the US Army Reserve and civilian

42. James W. Canan, “Up from Nifty Nugget,” Air Force Magazine (website), September 1, 1983,
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0983nifty/.
43. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Exercise Proud Spirit/MOBEX 80
After-Action Report (Washington, DC: HQDA, June 1981), I-3.
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January 17–18, 2018.

134

jobs during a full mobilization.47 Army Regulation 135-133, Ready Reserve Screening,
Qualification Records System, and Change of Address Reporting, provides guidance on “key
positions” in the federal government that disqualify soldiers from serving in the Ready
Reserve.48 The regulation also provides procedures for federal agencies to declare reserve
component soldiers as holding key positions and to request the soldiers be transferred to
the Standby Reserve.49 Figure B-2 shows the federal key-position memorandum.

Figure B-2. Federal key position memorandum

Similar data is not required to be collected for reserve component soldiers
occupying key positions in state and local government or critical civilian industries.50
The regulation only encourages nonfederal employers of Ready Reserve soldiers to
“adopt personnel management procedures designed to preclude conflicts between
47.
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emergency manpower needs of civilian employment activities and the military during a
mobilization” and encourages Ready Reserve soldiers “to use the Federal key positions
guidelines contained herein for making their own key position designations and, as
applicable, recommending key employees for removal from the Ready Reserve.”51
Because it does not mandate screening below the federal government level, the US
Army Reserve lacks important data on its soldier population. This absence of critical
information could lead to false assumptions and planning gaps in the event a full
mobilization is ordered.
The US Army Reserve currently uses three systems or databases to track personnel—
the Regional Level Application Software (RLAS); the Total Army Personnel Database –
Reserve, which is fed by RLAS; and the Commander’s Strength Management Module.52
US Army Reserve commanders, unit administrators, and soldiers are relied on to update
the systems annually. This reporting mechanism is widely underused, and, even when
the information in the systems is up to date, it does not provide USAR leadership with
enough detail.53 Although RLAS currently tracks over 900 job descriptions, the detail
USAR leaders and mobilization planners require is still lacking. The job descriptors
in the systems are overly broad and do not indicate whether a job is a critical
civilian or government job that would be in demand during a full mobilization in a
contested homeland. For example, though “police officer” and “sheriff” are provided
as options, the system does not allow for Ready Reserve members to indicate whether
they are local, county, state, or federal law enforcement officers or specify the agency
or organization for which they work. Other critical government positions that do not
show appropriate levels of specificity within RLAS include chief elected or appointed
officials, emergency managers, legislators or executive branch officials, emergency
medical services, firefighters, public health officials, intelligence analysts, and cyber
practitioners. Similar issues exist in critical civilian industries, such as health care,
transportation, engineering, logistics and supply chain management, and power
generation and distribution. By not drilling down to the necessary level of specificity,
USAR and mobilization planners at the Army and Joint level cannot anticipate
potential conflicts between reserve mobilization and civilian demands at the soldier or
unit level, especially while the homeland is under attack.
RECOMMENDATIONS
At the beginning, this appendix posed some questions: What would the impact of
full mobilization be on government and private organizations in a contested homeland?
What impacts would federal, state, and local governments and private entities
experience as key and essential reserve component soldiers were pulled from their
organizations and businesses while the homeland is under attack? First, to answer these
questions, the Department of Defense must exercise full mobilization in a contested
homeland scenario. It is currently not fulfilling its obligation under Title 10 of US Code
51.
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and DoD Instruction 1235.12. Until the Department of Defense fulfills this obligation,
the United States will not be able to demonstrate the US Army Reserve will be able
to meet its mobilization obligation to the nation during a full mobilization. Due to
the massive scope of this undertaking, the DoD response to this requirement should
take an incremental approach until compliance has been achieved. First, the individual
services should exercise full mobilization of the reserve component. Once exercises
have been accomplished at the service level, the Department of Defense should then
exercise full mobilization. The next step would be to exercise full mobilization under
a contested homeland scenario. As the complexity of the mobilization exercises
increases, a whole-of-government approach should be exercised. This approach
would exercise elements of civilian industry, the Joint Force, and interagency and
intergovernmental partners. Finally, since the worst-case scenario for a near-peer
attack would occur as mobilized elements of the reserve component were assisting
civil authorities following a natural or man-made disaster, simulations should exercise
the friction points and conflicts that may occur among reserve component soldiers, their
civilian occupations, and National Guard obligations during state-level response. In the
exercise, the Federal Emergency Management Agency should be responsible for disaster
response within the homeland, and key government and civilian partners should be
invited to participate as well. One of the objectives of this exercise should be to stress
the national response to both nonkinetic and kinetic attacks to cyber systems, national
transportation hubs and infrastructure, and power grids as the reserve component is
called to full mobilization.
Second, US Army Reserve Command must fix its dangerous personnel information
gap. The command currently lacks vital data on Ready Reserve soldiers serving in
critical civilian professions.
Given its lack of civilian employment data on its soldiers, the US Army Reserve has
no concept of the potential impacts of full mobilization in a contested homeland at this
time. It should update Army Regulation 135-133 to mandate that each Ready Reserve
soldier identify his or her civilian position in RLAS and the Integrated Personnel
and Pay System, the USAR personnel databases of record. This requirement should be
conducted annually, at a minimum. The priority of effort is to capture Ready Reserve
member information and then expand to the standby reserve and retired reserve
members. As part of this effort, civilian occupation codes in RLAS must be updated
to identify critical government and civilian positions in greater detail. Information
on critical federal, state, and local government positions that may conflict with the
US Army Reserve during full mobilization must be captured. Critical government
positions include chief elected or appointed officials, emergency managers, legislators
or executive branch officials, law enforcement, emergency medical services,
firefighters, public health officials, intelligence analysts, and cyber practitioners. In
addition to government positions, US Army Reserve Command should capture data
on critical civilian positions, including medical providers, transportation employees,
engineers, logistics and supply-chain managers, and power-generation and distribution
workers. The US Army Reserve can never fully understand the potential impacts and
friction points of a full mobilization in a contested homeland until it knows which
soldiers work in these critical government and civilian positions.
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Finally, the US Code and certain DoD directives and instructions and Army
regulations should be revised to compel the collection of information on reserve
component soldiers’ employment. Department of Defense Directive 1200.7 was written in
November 1999 and certified as current in November 2003.54 Since then, the Total Army’s
dependence on the reserve component has increased, and the US Army Reserve has
transitioned from a strategic reserve to an operational one.55 The directive is long overdue
for an update. As part of this revision, 10 US Code, Section 10149, “Ready Reserve:
Continuous Screening,” should be updated to codify the closing of the knowledge
gap highlighted earlier. In addition, the US Army Reserve should examine increasing
Individual Mobilization Augmentation and Individual Ready Reserve mobilization
options to increase the available Ready Reserve force in the event of a full mobilization.
Finally, Army Regulation 135-133 should be revised to provide USAR commanders
with guidance on identifying and tracking Ready Reserve soldiers who occupy critical
government and civilian positions and are not currently designated as such in the
system. The regulation currently addresses reserve soldiers who are disqualified
from serving in the Ready Reserve because of the nature of their civilian jobs.56 The
regulation should be amended to include the identification of reserve soldiers who
serve in critical positions but do not meet the current threshold for disqualification.
These modifications to the US Code, DoD policy, and Army regulations would help
the Total Force anticipate potential job conflicts in the reserve component during
total mobilization.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the complete impact of a full mobilization on government and civilian
organizations and the impact of reserve soldiers serving in critical government and
civilian occupations on mobilization rates are currently unclear. Although the likelihood
of a conflict with a near-peer adversary may seem low, the United States, in today’s
volatile and uncertain geopolitical landscape, must prepare for the worst-case scenario.
The consensus seems to be in the event of a national declaration of war or a presidential
declaration of national emergency that requires the use of Section 12301(a) or Section
12302 mobilization authorizations, the federal mobilization effort would trump any
other concern. Believing all reserve component soldiers will be able to immediately
walk away from their civilian professions to answer the call is naive. In some
instances, reserve component soldiers should perhaps temporarily delay their
mobilization to continue to serve in their civilian roles. First, the entire Joint
planning and execution community must begin to study and exercise full mobilization
scenarios using a whole-of-government approach to understand fully any potential
shortcomings in the nation’s response in this dangerous scenario.
54. John J. Hamre, Screening the Ready Reserve, DoD Directive 1200.7 (Washington, DC: OSD,
November 18, 1999).
55. Eric P. Samaritoni, Problems with Transitioning the US Army Reserve (USAR) from a Strategic to
an Operational Reserve Force (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College,
2018), iii.
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Additionally, the US Code and DoD directives and instructions should be updated
to address these situations. The type of citizens who volunteer to serve in the reserve
component of the military are the same types of citizens who serve in key government
and private sector positions. These citizens serve and manage the nation and their local
communities. When the nation is attacked, these citizen-soldiers will be on the front
lines in their communities as first responders and medical providers, repairing damage
and bringing infrastructure and services back online for their states and communities.
Because it does not currently track the critical civilian professions its citizen-soldiers
occupy to the degree it should, the reserve component cannot fully understand the
potential friction and conflicts that may occur between the dual roles its members
might be expected to inhabit during full mobilization.
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APPENDIX C
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD		 Anti-Access/Area Denial
ADP			

Army Doctrine Publication

APP			

Army Protection Program

ASCE

American Society of Civil Engineers

CONUS		 Continental United States
CRR			

Cyber Resilience Review

DCMA		 Defense Contract Management Agency
DHS			

Department of Homeland Security

DoD			

Department of Defense

DSCA			

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

EMP			Electromagnetic Pulse
FBI			

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA			

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHWA		

Federal Highway Administration

GAO			

Government Accountability Office

GPS			

Global Positioning System

HQDA		

Headquarters, Department of the Army

IT			

Information Technology
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JTF			

Joint Task Force

LFA			

Lead Federal Agency

LOE			

Line of Effort

MDO			

Multi-domain Operations

MOTCO		

Military Ocean Terminal Concord

MOTSU		 Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point
NCCIC		 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
NCIRP		 National Cyber Incident Response Plan
NDAA		 National Defense Authorization Act
NIST			

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NMT			

National Mission Team

NNEMP		 Nonnuclear Electromagnetic Pulse
NPS			

National Preparedness System

NRF			

National Response Framework

OSD			

Office of the Secretary of Defense

PPD			

Presidential Policy Directive

RLAS			

Regional Level Application Software

ROC			

Rehearsal of Concept

SAD			

State Active Duty

SDDC		

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
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SLTT			

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial

SSA			

Strategic Support Area

STRAHNET		

Strategic Highway Network

TEA			

Transportation Engineering Agency

UCG			

Cyber Unified Coordination Group

USAR			

US Army Reserve

USCG			

US Coast Guard

USCYBERCOM

US Cyber Command
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